By the way, thanks for all the comments... I'll probably shift gears as you both suggest, if I choose to continue further.
--Abram On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 10:02 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 8:56 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [. . .] >> Yes, in principle, PLN will behave in "Hempel's confirmation paradox" in >> a similar way to other Bayesian systems. >> >> I do find this counterintuitive, personally, and I spent a while trying to >> work >> around it ... but finally I decided that my intuition is the faulty thing. >> As you note, >> it's a very small probability adjustment in these cases, so it's not >> surprising >> if human intuition is not tuned to make such small probability adjustments >> in a correct or useful way... > > Well, to take the extreme, suppose we had observe our first crow and > seen that it was black, but later learn that it is in fact the only > crow in existence. The probability adjustment is neither small nor > counterintuitive! > > Anyway, perhaps I can try to shed some light on the broader exchange? > My route has been to understand "A is B" as not P(A|B), but instead > P("A is X" | "B is X") plus the extensional equivalent... under this > light, the negative evidence presented by two statements "B is C" and > "A is not C" reduces the frequency of "A is B", but does not obviously > have any bearing on "B is A". (Perhaps it does have some indirect > bearing, for example through some rule of inversion... but of course > the system is not yet even well-defined, so I'll not speculate.) > ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=114414975-3c8e69 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com