I still don't really get it, sorry... ;-( Are you saying
A) that a conscious, human-level AI **can** be implemented on an ordinary Turing machine, hooked up to a robot body or B) A is false ??? If you could clarify this point, I might have an easier time interpreting your other thoughts? I have no idea how you are defining such terms as "abstract symbol manipulation" or "model". Also, I wonder if these terms have to do with what a software system does, or with how you personally choose to analyze/interpret a software system. ben g On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 1:16 AM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > Ben Goertzel wrote: > > > Sure, I know Pylyshyn's work ... and I know very few contemporary AI > scientists who adopt a strong symbol-manipulation-focused view of cognition > like Fodor, Pylyshyn and so forth. That perspective is rather dated by > now... > > But when you say > > " > Where computation is meant in the sense of abstract symbol manipulation > according to rules. 'Rules' means any logic or calculii you'd care to cite, > including any formally specified probablistic/stochastic language. This is > exactly what I mean by COMP. > " > > then things get very very confusing to me. Do you include a formal neural > net model as computation? How about a cellular automaton simulation of > QED? Why is this cellular automaton model not "abstract symbol > manipulation"? > > If you interpret COMP to mean "A human-level intelligence can be > implemented on a digital computer" or as "A human level intelligence can be > implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body" or even as "A > human level intelligence, conscious in the same sense that humans are, can > be implemented on a digital computer connected to a robot body" ... then > I'll understand you. > > We're really at cross-purposes here, aren't we?...this is a Colin/Ben > calibration process.... :-) OK. > > By COMP I mean any abstract symbol manipulation at all in any context. The > important thing is that in COMP there's a model of some kind of learning > mechanism being run by a language of some kind or a "model of a modelling > process" implemented programmatically. In any event the manipulations that > are occuring are manipulations of abstract representation of numbers > according to the language and the model being implemented by the computer > language. > > > But when you start defining COMP in a fuzzy, nebulous way, dismissing some > dynamical systems as "too symbolic" for your taste (say, probabilistic > logic) and accepting others as "subsymbolic enough" (say, CA simulations of > QED) ... then I start to feel very confused... > > I agree that Fodor and Pylyshyn's approaches, for instance, were too > focused on abstract reasoning and not enough on experiential learning and > grounding. But I don't think this makes their approaches **more > computational** than a CA model of QED ... it just makes them **bad > computational models of cognition** ... > > > Maybe a rather stark non-COMP example would help: I would term non-COMP > approach is *there is no 'model' of cognition being run by anything.* The > electrodynamics of the matter itself *is the cognition*. Literally. No > imposed abstract model tells it how to learn. No imposed model is populated > with any imposed knowledge. No human involvement in any of it except > construction. Electrodynamic representational objects are being manipulated > by real natural electrodynamics... is all there is. The 'computation', if > you can call it that, is literally maxwell's equations (embedded on a QM > substrate, of course) doing their natural dynamics dance in real matter, not > an abstraction of maxwell's equations being run on a computer.... > > In my AGI I have no 'model' of anything. I have the actual thing. A bad > model of cognition, to me, is identical to a poor understanding of what the > brain is actually doing. With a good understanding of brain function you > then actually run the real thing, not a model of it. The trajectory of a > model of the electrodynamics cannot be the trajectory of the real > electrodynamics. for the fields inherit behavioural/dynamical properties > from the deep structure of matter, which are thrown away by the model of the > electrodynamics. The real electrodynamics is surrounded by the matter it is > situated in, and operates in accordance with it. > > Remember: A scientific model of a natural process cuts a layer across the > matter hierarchy and throws away all the underlying structure. I am putting > the entire natural hierarchy back into the picture by using real > electrodyamics implemented in the fashion of a real brain, not a model of > the electrodynamics of a real brain or any other abstraction of apparent > brain operation. > > Does that do it? It's very very different to a COMP approach. > > cheers > colin > > > ------------------------------ > *agi* | Archives <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now> > <https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/> | > Modify<https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;>Your Subscription > <http://www.listbox.com> > -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first overcome " - Dr Samuel Johnson ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
