I believe I could prove that *mathematically*, in order for a NARS system to consistently, successfully achieve goals in an environment, that environment would need to have some Occam-prior-like property.
However, even if so, that doesn't mean such is the best way to think about NARS ... that's a different issue. -- Ben G On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 11:58 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ben, > > It seems that you agree the issue I pointed out really exists, but > just take it as a necessary evil. Furthermore, you think I also > assumed the same thing, though I failed to see it. I won't argue > against the "necessary evil" part --- as far as you agree that those > "postulates" (such as "the universe is computable") are not > convincingly justified. I won't try to disprove them. > > As for the latter part, I don't think you can convince me that you > know me better than I know myself. ;-) > > The following is from > http://nars.wang.googlepages.com/wang.semantics.pdf , page 28: > > If the answers provided by NARS are fallible, in what sense these answers > are > "better" than arbitrary guesses? This leads us to the concept of > "rationality". > When infallible predictions cannot be obtained (due to insufficient > knowledge > and resources), answers based on past experience are better than arbitrary > guesses, if the environment is relatively stable. To say an answer is only > a > summary of past experience (thus no future confirmation guaranteed) does > not make it equal to an arbitrary conclusion — it is what "adaptation" > means. > Adaptation is the process in which a system changes its behaviors as if the > future is similar to the past. It is a rational process, even though > individual > conclusions it produces are often wrong. For this reason, valid inference > rules > (deduction, induction, abduction, and so on) are the ones whose conclusions > correctly (according to the semantics) summarize the evidence in the > premises. > They are "truth-preserving" in this sense, not in the model-theoretic sense > that > they always generate conclusions which are immune from future revision. > > --- so you see, I don't assume adaptation will always be successful, > even successful to a certain probability. You can dislike this > conclusion, though you cannot say it is the same as what is assumed by > Novamente and AIXI. > > Pei > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >> > >> Ben, > >> > >> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man. > >> > >> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded > >> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as > >> adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my > >> other publications. > > > > Right, but justifying induction as adaptation only works if the > environment > > is assumed to have certain regularities which can be adapted to. In a > > random environment, adaptation won't work. So, still, to justify > induction > > as adaptation you have to make *some* assumptions about the world. > > > > The Occam prior gives one such assumption: that (to give just one form) > sets > > of observations in the world tend to be producible by short computer > > programs. > > > > For adaptation to successfully carry out induction, *some* vaguely > > comparable property to this must hold, and I'm not sure if you have > > articulated which one you assume, or if you leave this open. > > > > In effect, you implicitly assume something like an Occam prior, because > > you're saying that a system with finite resources can successfully adapt > to > > the world ... which means that sets of observations in the world *must* > be > > approximately summarizable via subprograms that can be executed within > this > > system. > > > > So I argue that, even though it's not your preferred way to think about > it, > > your own approach to AI theory and practice implicitly assumes some > variant > > of the Occam prior holds in the real world. > >> > >> > >> Here I just want to point out that the original and basic meaning of > >> Occam's Razor and those two common (mis)usages of it are not > >> necessarily the same. I fully agree with the former, but not the > >> latter, and I haven't seen any convincing justification of the latter. > >> Instead, they are often taken as granted, under the name of Occam's > >> Razor. > > > > I agree that the notion of an Occam prior is a significant conceptual > beyond > > the original "Occam's Razor" precept enounced long ago. > > > > Also, I note that, for those who posit the Occam prior as a **prior > > assumption**, there is not supposed to be any convincing justification > for > > it. The idea is simply that: one must make *some* assumption (explicitly > or > > implicitly) if one wants to do induction, and this is the assumption that > > some people choose to make. > > > > -- Ben G > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription > > > ------------------------------------------- > agi > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ > Modify Your Subscription: > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > -- Ben Goertzel, PhD CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC Director of Research, SIAI [EMAIL PROTECTED] "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
