On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 3:01 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I believe I could prove that *mathematically*, in order for a NARS system to > consistently, successfully achieve goals in an environment, that environment > would need to have some Occam-prior-like property.
Maybe you can, but "to consistently, successfully achieve goals in an environment" is not in my working definition of "intelligence", so I don't really mind. > However, even if so, that doesn't mean such is the best way to think about > NARS ... that's a different issue. Exactly. I'm glad we finally agree again. ;-) Pei > -- Ben G > > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 11:58 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> Ben, >> >> It seems that you agree the issue I pointed out really exists, but >> just take it as a necessary evil. Furthermore, you think I also >> assumed the same thing, though I failed to see it. I won't argue >> against the "necessary evil" part --- as far as you agree that those >> "postulates" (such as "the universe is computable") are not >> convincingly justified. I won't try to disprove them. >> >> As for the latter part, I don't think you can convince me that you >> know me better than I know myself. ;-) >> >> The following is from >> http://nars.wang.googlepages.com/wang.semantics.pdf , page 28: >> >> If the answers provided by NARS are fallible, in what sense these answers >> are >> "better" than arbitrary guesses? This leads us to the concept of >> "rationality". >> When infallible predictions cannot be obtained (due to insufficient >> knowledge >> and resources), answers based on past experience are better than arbitrary >> guesses, if the environment is relatively stable. To say an answer is only >> a >> summary of past experience (thus no future confirmation guaranteed) does >> not make it equal to an arbitrary conclusion — it is what "adaptation" >> means. >> Adaptation is the process in which a system changes its behaviors as if >> the >> future is similar to the past. It is a rational process, even though >> individual >> conclusions it produces are often wrong. For this reason, valid inference >> rules >> (deduction, induction, abduction, and so on) are the ones whose >> conclusions >> correctly (according to the semantics) summarize the evidence in the >> premises. >> They are "truth-preserving" in this sense, not in the model-theoretic >> sense that >> they always generate conclusions which are immune from future revision. >> >> --- so you see, I don't assume adaptation will always be successful, >> even successful to a certain probability. You can dislike this >> conclusion, though you cannot say it is the same as what is assumed by >> Novamente and AIXI. >> >> Pei >> >> On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 10:00 AM, Pei Wang <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> Ben, >> >> >> >> Thanks. So the other people now see that I'm not attacking a straw man. >> >> >> >> My solution to Hume's problem, as embedded in the experience-grounded >> >> semantics, is to assume no predictability, but to justify induction as >> >> adaptation. However, it is a separate topic which I've explained in my >> >> other publications. >> > >> > Right, but justifying induction as adaptation only works if the >> > environment >> > is assumed to have certain regularities which can be adapted to. In a >> > random environment, adaptation won't work. So, still, to justify >> > induction >> > as adaptation you have to make *some* assumptions about the world. >> > >> > The Occam prior gives one such assumption: that (to give just one form) >> > sets >> > of observations in the world tend to be producible by short computer >> > programs. >> > >> > For adaptation to successfully carry out induction, *some* vaguely >> > comparable property to this must hold, and I'm not sure if you have >> > articulated which one you assume, or if you leave this open. >> > >> > In effect, you implicitly assume something like an Occam prior, because >> > you're saying that a system with finite resources can successfully >> > adapt to >> > the world ... which means that sets of observations in the world *must* >> > be >> > approximately summarizable via subprograms that can be executed within >> > this >> > system. >> > >> > So I argue that, even though it's not your preferred way to think about >> > it, >> > your own approach to AI theory and practice implicitly assumes some >> > variant >> > of the Occam prior holds in the real world. >> >> >> >> >> >> Here I just want to point out that the original and basic meaning of >> >> Occam's Razor and those two common (mis)usages of it are not >> >> necessarily the same. I fully agree with the former, but not the >> >> latter, and I haven't seen any convincing justification of the latter. >> >> Instead, they are often taken as granted, under the name of Occam's >> >> Razor. >> > >> > I agree that the notion of an Occam prior is a significant conceptual >> > beyond >> > the original "Occam's Razor" precept enounced long ago. >> > >> > Also, I note that, for those who posit the Occam prior as a **prior >> > assumption**, there is not supposed to be any convincing justification >> > for >> > it. The idea is simply that: one must make *some* assumption >> > (explicitly or >> > implicitly) if one wants to do induction, and this is the assumption >> > that >> > some people choose to make. >> > >> > -- Ben G >> > >> > >> > >> > ________________________________ >> > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription >> >> >> ------------------------------------------- >> agi >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > > > -- > Ben Goertzel, PhD > CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC > Director of Research, SIAI > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > "A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher > a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, > build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, > cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, > program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. > Specialization is for insects." -- Robert Heinlein > > > ________________________________ > agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=117534816-b15a34 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
