On Fri, 2008-11-21 at 10:33 -0800, Kerim Aydin wrote: > On Fri, 21 Nov 2008, Alex Smith wrote: > >> Scams are and have been rendered ineffective for the most trivial > >> reasons (annotations, decrease by -1), yet anti-scams with glaring > >> mistakes are considered effective? > > This is actually something that annoys me too. I suppose arguably R217 > > provides justification for it; but it's a pretty weak justification, and > > is scambusting really in the best interests of the game? > > You know, maybe we're putting a little *too* much weight on precedent > over judge's discretion? I think a better way to do it is put more > weight on sustaining original judge's arguments (even if we disagree with > them) and thus, this question becomes a question of whether you get a > "scam-favorable" versus "status-quo" judge (and what kind of judges > generally are a majority in the game). I'm not sure if this is worth > legislating versus just generally suggesting a return to this--the only > legislation I can think of might be making appealing inquiry cases a > (Supporters-Objectors >= 2) consent process--thoughts?
It makes the CotC far too powerful, and chance of judge selection far too powerful. Also, generally speaking a majority of judges will be against any given scam, as if half of Agora were in on it we wouldn't need a scam. If you're going to make judge selection that important, you could wait until, say, comex was the only standing judge, then CFJ... The /real/ solution is not to judge until the arguments have died down... -- ais523
