On Wed, 11 Feb 2009, Alex Smith wrote: > Whether > common-language suggestions can be modified without retracting or > remaking them is, I suspect, normally irrelevant in conversation; I > expect that altering a suggestion would be treated as an entirely > possible action in real-life, and whether that is just an abbreviation > for making a different similar suggestion is nearly always irrelevant, > confined just to the outer realms of philosophical argument (and nomic, > of course). That makes it not particularly helpful...
It is, in fact, helpful. But I'll not claim it as a slam-dunk. A raw, strict reading of the definition alone supports "new proposal" for any "new text version". A more loose reading, including context, would note that if I make a proposal to you (in common english and most general terms, not in a specific legal system) then say "I'm altering the bargain", then some people would call that a new proposal, some people would call that a modified old proposal, some people would make it depend on the amount of substance in the change. It would be extremely perceptual. comex's original argument requires a perceptual definition of broad definitions of "text" and "proposal". So does mine. I have not yet found any true logic, hard precedence, or reducto ad absurdia [er, I'll let comex pluralize that] to sway me either way. I think comex's comments on how we would then refer to proposals or apply are (so far) more trivial follow-on questions to the deep underlying position, and not in themselves telling. Nor does either position "break the game" in a meaningful sense that I can see (again, only leading to some trivial complications). This puts it squarely in "for the good of the game" territory either way, which is what I was primarily trying to establish against comex's arguments. Since that's extremely subjective, that's where my gratuity stops and the judge begins. -Goethe
