On Mon, 29 Apr 2013, omd wrote: > On Mon, Apr 29, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Kerim Aydin <[email protected]> wrote: > > To which I'll expand: the prime example of permissiveness in CFJ 1719 was > > partnerships (now gone) > > Arguments: Partnerships, including the implicit ability to act on > behalf of them, were originally recognized by CFJ (by you in CFJ > 1622), with the only rules backing being the general ability to create > "binding" agreements. The precedent is no longer sufficient for > partnerships to register because "person" is now explicitly defined, > but the idea that artificial persons and, more importantly in this > case, power of attorney are natural parts of a legal system remains. > > Also, partnerships are not quite gone - Rule 2328 (Public Agreements) > still exists and assumes that such agreements can implicitly act by > power of attorney. > > A possible counter-argument is that, just as acting on behalf has > historically been explicitly defined, with the definition assumed to > override the existing implicit one, Promises now fulfill a similar > role and should override generalized acting on behalf. But Promises > work fairly differently from the usual notion of power of attorney.
My basic thought is that any form of partnership, by the legal and common definitions that underpinned CFJ 1622, is joint responsibility; any partners accept some measure of responsibility a priori, although the contract itself could unbalance that if they agreed to it. Acting-on-behalf (where one first class person posts actions that a second first-class person takes responsibility for) is a fundamentally different beast, executorship has a different set of legal and common definitions, and is *not* something we've been historically "permissive" about, nor something that we brought in during the partnership-CFJ era. Right now, if they made a partnership that said "XY is a partnership between the two that Machiavelli can post the actions for, and djanatyn takes the blame for" I'd accept that partnership as permissively recognizable, but of course as a second-class person. Of interest is CFJ 1895, where (I) noted that created entities or positions (partnerships, officer position) could, as a general principle, be treated permissively, but that first-class personhood (and assigning one first-class person the ability to act for another) should *not*, should, as a general principle, be more sacrosanct. As far as being "natural parts" of a legal system, they are opposite ends of a spectrum. In fact, one could go so far as argue that the natural right of first- class persons to make partnerships or other entities is in part predicated on their natural right to protect their own free will, responsibility, and actions. -G.
