On Thu, 2017-10-12 at 11:41 -0600, Reuben Staley wrote: > You appear to be arguing for the e vs it distinction to be used to > distinguish between persons, as defined by R869 and everything else. By > this definition, Agora, not being capable of ideation on its own, does not > count as a person.
The definition of "person" was somewhat different for many years. What we currently call a "person" used to be a "first-class person". We had "second-class persons" too, which were basically legal constructs which we treated as though they were persons; for example, some contracts used to be persons (and the text of the contract would specify how e was capable of performing actions). They had several restrictions on them, such as not having any voting power unless someone else donated them voting power. That all got removed in a mass repeal some time ago, though, and we decided to go back to having first-class persons as the only sort of person. Arguably this was for the best, given some of the shenanigans that second-class persons got up to. -- ais523
