Visit our website: HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------------------------- > Clark said. ``The simple fact is we won.'' C O R R E C T I O N: [The "simple fact is" that US diplomacy moved heaven and earth to persuade the Russians to persuade Milosevic to agree to withdraw his virtually unscathed forces before NATO fractured and lost - which, by early June 1999, the alliance teetered desperately on the very brink of doing... The "simple fact is" that NATO's purported "humanitarian" objectives were downright lies - shamelessly sustained by false Western media reporting... The "simple fact is" that NATO's action in Yugoslavia had gravely escalated the death-toll, pain and human misery on all sides - and was beginning to be seen to have done so despite false Western media reporting... The "simple fact is" that the bombing campaign completely failed to achieve Milosevic's agreement to the terms of NATO's ultimatum turned down by the Serbs at Rambouillet - and claimed by false Western media reporting to "justify" the launch of that campaign... The "simple fact is" that the entire course of the bombing and NATO's disastrously flawed strategies before, during and after Rambouillet were grotesquely distorted and kept hidden from accurate public assessment by false Western media reporting... The "simple fact is" that the only really effective and by far the most decisive "weapon" in NATO's arsenal was false Western media reporting... The "simple fact is" the media "won"... The "simple fact is" that the people - not just Serbs, but ALL of the people, all over the world! - LOST!!!] JJ ---------- >From: Rick Rozoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Wesley Clark's "Doctrine Of Restraint" [WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK] >Date: Thu, Aug 9, 2001, 11:16 am > > --------------------------------------------- > > "There is no question that had we been able to > escalate more rapidly, we would have put more pressure > on Serb leadership but it is also true that had we > escalated more rapidly, we would have fractured NATO > and lost." > > > NATO War Against Serbia Hobbled by Alliance Politics, > GAO Says > By Tony Capaccio > > Washington, Aug. 8 (Bloomberg) -- The North Atlantic > Treaty Organization's 1999 war against Serbia may have > been longer than necessary because it violated at > least seven principles of U.S. military doctrine, says > the U.S. General Accounting Office. > > Political leaders' concerns that casualties be limited > and the alliance remain unified plus an expectation > that Serb leaders would crack within days under > minimal pressure led the military to pull punches -- > forsaking certain air targets and withholding ground > troops, the congressional audit agency says. > > The GAO report is the first independent U.S. > government assessment of the 78-day air campaign to > stop Slobodan Milosevic's effort to run ethnic > Albanians out of the Serbian province of Kosovo. It > acknowledges the campaign was successful and it > doesn't pass judgment on NATO's political concerns. > > At base, the report is a reminder of the constraints > of coalition warfare, and it notes that the U.S. Joint > Chiefs of Staff and Air Force in particular, have > modified their doctrine to accommodate these new > realities. > > ``These concerns will likely weigh as heavily in the > decision- making process as achieving military > objectives,'' it says. ``These operations may not be > conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations > that more closely follow U.S. military doctrine.'' > > The 30-page assessment -- which is slated to be made > public Monday -- was prepared for Representative John > Murtha from Pennsylvania, the ranking Democrat on the > House defense appropriations subcommittee, and House > Armed Services Committee chairman Bob Stump, an > Arizona Republican. > > Clark's Reaction > > NATO's commander during the war, retired Army Gen. > Wesley Clark, agreed with GAO that the Kosovo > operation is a model for the constraints U.S. forces > face in multinational operations. > > But the report paints a misleading picture of the role > politics played in running the Kosovo campaign, Clark > said. > > ``It tells the American public that when the war > started `you bad politicians got in the way and didn't > let us military do what we needed,'' Clark said. ``The > simple fact is we won.'' > > ``The report is useful but I think we have to be > careful that we don't fall into the trap of taking > politics out of conflict -- you can't and never will > and shouldn't,'' Clark said. > > NATO political leaders weren't responsible for the > alliance's failure to deliver on promises to destroy > Serb forces, Clark said. > > ``We had problems striking Serb forces -- the Air > Force needs to work on that,'' Clark said. ``We had > problems taking out Serb air defenses. The Air Force > needs to do more work on that. Neither of those > problems had anything to do with the politicians. I'm > not blaming the commanders. It was beyond their > capability to make the kind of difference I believe > they needed to make,'' he said. > > Seven Departures > > According to the GAO, the campaign departed from the > following principles of U.S. warfare: > > -- starting campaigns with clear military objectives; > > -- using overwhelming force early in a campaign > against vital enemy interests such as command > headquarters, war production facilities and key > support infrastructure; > > -- conducting simultaneous operations against a > variety of targets such as bridges, communications > systems and electric power supplies; > > -- launching air strikes in conjunction with ground > operations to draw out and destroy enemy armor and > mobile forces; > > -- attacking targets in a systematic way to achieve a > clearly defined military or political effect; > > -- approving targets through the military chain of > command instead of through a political process; > > -- setting up a joint command representing the forces > used in combat. > > `Vague and Less Decisive' > > NATO's objectives were ``vague and less decisive'' and > ``not easily attainable through military means,'' the > report says. > > The operation's civilian chiefs -- President Bill > Clinton, U.K. Defense Minister George Robertson and > NATO Secretary General Javier Solano -- said the air > strikes were launched to stop Serb forces from driving > Kosovar Albanians from their homes and to impel a > peace. > > ``Since the goals of the military action were not to > defeat the Yugoslavian leadership but to get it to > stop the violence and reach a peace agreement, it was > unclear how to achieve the goals with air > operations,'' said GAO. > > Clark didn't agree that the war might have been > shorter had ``overwhelming force'' been used early on > against Serb roads, bridges and electrical power > grids, fuel storage facilities and transportation > networks. > > ``NATO believed that if it used minimal force against > Milosevic, there was a chance Milosevic could crack,'' > Clark said. ``You couldn't refute that. If you started > your operations with the intent of wiping out Serbia, > you'd be irrational. It wasn't started as a war. There > was some reasonable hope at the outset that Milosevic > would crack.'' > > ``There is no question that had we been able to > escalate more rapidly, we would have put more pressure > on the Serb leadership but it is also true that had we > escalated more rapidly, we would have fractured NATO > and lost,'' he said. > > __________________________________________________ ------------------------------------------------- This Discussion List is the follow-up for the old stopnato @listbot.com that has been shut down ==^================================================================ EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9spWA Or send an email To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This email was sent to: [email protected] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
