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STRATFOR > Many Hurdles Will Delay U.S. Attack on Iraq > > Summary > > Although the Bush administration appears committed to attacking > Iraq, its ability to do so is limited by several logistical > problems, such as the availability of precision weaponry and > aircraft carriers. These issues are temporary, but a great number > of political problems that could block a campaign will prove much > more difficult to solve. > > Analysis > > U.S. President George W. Bush vowed July 8 to use "all tools" at > his disposal to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Speaking at > a surprise news conference, Bush said the world would be a safer > place once Saddam was overthrown and that he personally is > engaged in "all aspects" of planning to achieve that goal. > > The speech was not the first time Bush had made it clear that his > administration is committed to regime change in Iraq. Of the many > options available to the White House, only large-scale military > action will guarantee the United States an active hand in Iraq > once Saddam is gone. However, technical limitations will push > back the date of an attack until winter at the absolute earliest, > and a host of political hurdles could delay a campaign > indefinitely. > > U.S. strategic planners see two specific reasons to depose > Saddam. First, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons > programs threaten the balance of power in the Middle East. > Officials in Washington also fear that those weapons someday > could find their way into the hands of al Qaeda. This argument is > based on logic and potentiality rather than evidence, but the > consequences of such a development would be so terrible that the > argument must be given credence. > > The second reason involves oil. Iraq has huge reserves of crude, > and gaining control over those resources would greatly enhance > U.S. energy security -- and give Washington considerable leverage > over other oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The > governments of both countries absolutely depend on oil revenues > to maintain domestic stability, and both use their reserves as > leverage when negotiating with the United States and the rest of > the world. For example, Saudi Arabia's oil reserves are a big > reason that U.S. military forces are chasing al Qaeda in western > Pakistan and not in western Saudi Arabia. > > U.S. influence over Iraqi oil reserves would dramatically > decrease Riyadh's leverage with Washington. And, in a pinch, the > United States could threaten to increase Iraqi outputs and > bankrupt the Saudi and Iranian economies. > > But how to get rid of the current regime in Baghdad? The most > hands-off option would be some sort of covert action to remove > Saddam -- possibly by assassinating him, capturing him or forcing > him to flee the country. However, this also is the most difficult > option and the one least likely to succeed. There also is no > guarantee that whatever group that replaced Saddam would be any > better or easier for Washington to control. > > Sparking an internal coup is equally unlikely. For one thing, it > is an extremely difficult thing to do: Stratfor counts at least > four unsuccessful coup plots since the end of the Gulf War. Iraq > is a police state in many respects, and Saddam has an extensive > internal security apparatus at his disposal, comprising multiple > agencies that watch each other as well as monitor potential > unrest. He also manipulates the tribal rivalries that permeate > Iraq, playing factions against each other until it is unclear who > is on which side. > > Coups and covert action carry with them the same problem: The > United States would have relatively little control over the > successor government. In this particular case, any Iraqi military > officer with the fortitude to take on Saddam would not likely > jump eagerly into a role as a U.S. proxy. A new military regime > may even find it useful to continue Iraq's chemical, biological > and nuclear weapons programs. > > The only way to ensure the collapse of the current regime and the > establishment of a suitable replacement is to put U.S. boots on > the ground in Iraq. The question is, how many boots? > > The "Afghan model" of warfare certainly offers an appealing > answer. Using Special Operations forces to link up with local > militants under U.S. air cover would require relatively few U.S. > troops, without a months-long buildup. > > But this option has several problems. First, the Iraqi opposition > is not in the same military class as was the Northern Alliance, > which had 20,000 hardened fighters under its command. Iraq's > Kurdish and Shiite groups maintain armed militias -- but fewer, > and with less experience. > > Second, the Iraqi army is more formidable than were the Taliban, > at least in conventional conflict. Iraq can field more than > 200,000 troops as well as tanks, artillery, helicopters and anti- > aircraft systems -- far more effective than the 50,000 lightly > armed troops commanded by the Taliban. And the Taliban's numbers > were over-inflated due to alliances of convenience, which quickly > fell apart, with local warlords. > > The physical size of Iraq and the amount of potential opposition > likely will mean a substantial troop commitment for the United > States, if for no other reason than to cover all contingencies. > An assessment earlier this year by a former National Security > Council member estimated a that a total force of 200,000 to > 300,000 troops would be necessary -- a number that was confirmed > by later leaks from the Pentagon. Troops likely would be > stationed in Kuwait and Turkey, with a limited number in Jordan. > > This plan, which has been dubbed "Desert Storm Lite," likely > would rely more on air-mobile operations than the United States > did during the Gulf War. Such operations would be necessary to > secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction sites and would be > backed up by armored thrusts from the north and south. > > Although the precise details of Desert Storm Lite are unclear, > the ultimate result is: a substantial U.S. military presence in > Iraq and a strong U.S. hand in rebuilding the government. > > The Bush administration's problem is that any campaign against > Iraq depends upon a host of other factors. These technical and > political problems likely will set back any potential attack > until nearly 2004. > > On the technical side, the U.S. military has not recovered fully > from the initial battle in Afghanistan. Military forces, > especially aircraft carriers, were thrown into battle on the fly > last fall, much to the detriment of training and maintenance > schedules. Three of the 12 U.S. aircraft carriers are currently > at sea, three are in training cycles, and the rest are undergoing > repairs in port. Training and repairs for several more carriers > are scheduled for completion by late autumn, giving the Pentagon > at least five carriers for an attack. > > Also, the U.S. military still may be short of critical weapons. > Defense officials told the Wall Street Journal in May that it > would take approximately six months to bring the stock of > Hellfire anti-tank missiles up to levels necessary to attack > Iraq. The same is true for the Joint Direct Attack Munition > (JDAM) bombs -- which use a global positioning system guidance > mechanism -- that proved so useful in Afghanistan. > > Even if the Pentagon's arsenal was bulging, U.S. troops and > supplies still would have to be moved into place, and most > estimates say the buildup would take at least two months. There > was some evidence earlier this year that the United States has > been "cheating" -- quietly moving men and materiel into the > theater -- but even at the most optimistic, Washington apparently > would need at least one month for buildup. > > Even more difficult than logistics are the numerous political > issues to be solved. For instance, the war in Afghanistan must be > kept at no more than a low simmer in order for a campaign against > Iraq to proceed. Washington also must ensure that tensions > between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India do not re-ignite after > elections in Kashmir this October and that the Israeli- > Palestinian conflict does not spill over into the rest of the > Middle East, as it threatened to do this year. > > The White House also must feel comfortable that Syria and Iran > will not intervene on Baghdad's behalf. Neither is any great > friend of Iraq, but both Damascus and Tehran are extremely > nervous about the prospect of a U.S. proxy state, with its hand > on the oil taps, emerging on their borders. > > Likewise, the Bush administration must counter Saudi Arabia's > diplomatic efforts to block an attack on Baghdad. Riyadh is > concerned both about its status in the oil market and the > fundamentalist backlash that a U.S. attack could trigger at home. > That's why the Saudi government has spent the last six months > trying to force Washington to focus on the conflict in Israel. > > If that weren't enough, the government in Turkey -- one of > Washington's key allies -- is now caught in a domestic political > maelstrom: The coalition government is slowly collapsing, and new > elections may be in the works. > > Meanwhile, much of the rest of the industrialized world -- > including the European Union, Russia and China -- are none too > keen on Washington's plans. It is doubtful that they will > actively oppose the United States with anything more than > rhetoric, but Washington would no doubt like to have their > silence, if not their support. > > Last but by no means least, the United States must have a > successor regime ready to take over in Baghdad. Assembling such a > regime is no easy task, given the squabbling factions that make > up the Iraqi opposition. They mirror the Iraqi population itself, > which is split between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds -- all of which > are further subdivided into competing clans and tribes. > ___________________________________________________________________ --------------------------- ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST ==^================================================================ This email was sent to: [email protected] EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.bacIlu Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
