Date: Friday, August 10, 2018 @ 14:22:28
Author: bpiotrowski
Revision: 331337
1:2.6-12: backport fix for CVE-2018-14526
Added:
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
Modified:
wpa_supplicant/trunk/PKGBUILD
----------------------------------------------------------------+
0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch | 44
++++++++++
PKGBUILD | 6 -
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Added: 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
===================================================================
--- 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
(rev 0)
+++ 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
2018-08-10 14:22:28 UTC (rev 331337)
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000
+0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029
+0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+
+ if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+ (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++ /*
++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++ * which is the case in this code branch.
++ */
++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but
unauthenticated data");
++ goto out;
++ }
+ if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+ &key_data_len))
+ goto out;
Modified: PKGBUILD
===================================================================
--- PKGBUILD 2018-08-10 14:11:08 UTC (rev 331336)
+++ PKGBUILD 2018-08-10 14:22:28 UTC (rev 331337)
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
pkgname=wpa_supplicant
pkgver=2.6
-pkgrel=11
+pkgrel=12
epoch=1
pkgdesc='A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks'
url='http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant'
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+ 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
)
validpgpkeys=('EC4AA0A991A5F2464582D52D2B6EF432EFC895FA') # Jouni Malinen
sha256sums=('b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450'
@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@
'147c8abe07606905d16404fb2d2c8849796ca7c85ed8673c09bb50038bcdeb9e'
'596d4d3b63ea859ed7ea9791b3a21cb11b6173b04c0a14a2afa47edf1666afa6'
'c5a17af84aec2d88c56ce0da2d6945be398fe7cab5c0c340deb30973900c2736'
- 'c8840d857b9432f3b488113c85c1ff5d4a4b8d81078b7033388dae1e990843b1')
+ 'c8840d857b9432f3b488113c85c1ff5d4a4b8d81078b7033388dae1e990843b1'
+ '960c3cf2a514479b0b4cf09665186a1a9f5d28e8b05dec23db75c6cc13eb1f7c')
prepare() {
cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver"
