Date: Friday, August 10, 2018 @ 14:22:45
  Author: bpiotrowski
Revision: 331338

archrelease: copy trunk to testing-x86_64

Added:
  wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch)
  
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
    (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch)
  wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD
    (from rev 331337, wpa_supplicant/trunk/PKGBUILD)
  wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/config
    (from rev 331337, wpa_supplicant/trunk/config)
  wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/wpa_supplicant.install
    (from rev 331337, wpa_supplicant/trunk/wpa_supplicant.install)

-----------------------------------------------------------------+
 0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch     |  174 ++++++
 0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch |  250 
++++++++++
 0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch |  184 +++++++
 0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch               |   79 +++
 0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch            |   64 ++
 0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch                   |  132 +++++
 0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch |   43 +
 0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch |   82 +++
 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch  |   44 +
 PKGBUILD                                                        |   91 +++
 config                                                          |   46 +
 wpa_supplicant.install                                          |    7 
 12 files changed, 1196 insertions(+)

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch  
                        (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch  
2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c  | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c    | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h    |  3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h  |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index 4e04169..333035f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ {
+       struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+       struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++      int set = 1;
+ 
+       /*
+        * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+        * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+        * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+        * does not support full AP client state.
++       *
++       * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++       * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++       * the same key.
+        */
+-      if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++      if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++          (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++           !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+               hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++              wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++              set = 0;
++      }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+       if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data 
*hapd,
+                           sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+                           sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+                           sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+-                          sta->added_unassoc)) {
++                          set)) {
+               hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+                              HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+                              "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+-                             sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++                             set ? "set" : "add");
+ 
+               if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+                       hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 3587086..707971d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum 
wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+               break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++      case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++              sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++              return 0;
+       }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine 
*sm)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++      if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++              return 0;
++      return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+                            struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+                u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+       WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+-      WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++      WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+                            struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+               return;
+       }
+ 
++      if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++              /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++               * PN in the driver */
++              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                         "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++              return;
++      }
++
+       /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+        * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+        * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ 
+       /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+       sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++      sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct 
wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 
+       sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+       sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++      sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+       wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+ 
+       buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+       struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+       Boolean PTK_valid;
+       Boolean pairwise_set;
++      Boolean tk_already_set;
+       int keycount;
+       Boolean Pair;
+       struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch)
===================================================================
--- 
testing-x86_64/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch  
                            (rev 0)
+++ 
testing-x86_64/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch  
    2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h |  11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    |   4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+       size_t tk_len;
+ };
+ 
++struct wpa_gtk {
++      u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++      size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++      u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++      size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+  * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+       const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+       u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
++      /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++      if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++          os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++              wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++                      "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver 
(keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++                      gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++              return 0;
++      }
++
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+       wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+               "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+       }
+       os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
++      sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++      os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+       return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++                                     const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++      size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++      u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++      /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++      if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++          os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++              wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++                      "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the 
driver (keyidx=%d)",
++                      keyidx);
++              return  0;
++      }
++
++      wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++              "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++              keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++      wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++      if (keyidx > 4095) {
++              wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++                      "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++              return -1;
++      }
++      if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++                         broadcast_ether_addr,
++                         keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++                         igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++              wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++                      "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++              return -1;
++      }
++
++      sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++      os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++      return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
++
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+                              struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+ {
+@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+       if (ie->igtk) {
+               size_t len;
+               const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+-              u16 keyidx;
++
+               len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+               if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+                       return -1;
++
+               igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-              keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+-              wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+-                      "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+-                      keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+-              wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+-                              igtk->igtk, len);
+-              if (keyidx > 4095) {
+-                      wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-                              "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+-                      return -1;
+-              }
+-              if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-                                 broadcast_ether_addr,
+-                                 keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+-                                 igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+-                      wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-                              "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+                       return -1;
+-              }
+       }
+ 
+       return 0;
+@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+  */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+-      int clear_ptk = 1;
++      int clear_keys = 1;
+ 
+       if (sm == NULL)
+               return;
+@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 
*bssid)
+               /* Prepare for the next transition */
+               wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+ 
+-              clear_ptk = 0;
++              clear_keys = 0;
+       }
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+-      if (clear_ptk) {
++      if (clear_keys) {
+               /*
+                * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+                * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 
*bssid)
+               os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+               sm->tptk_set = 0;
+               os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++              os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++              os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+       }
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+       os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+       os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+       os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++      os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++      os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+       os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+       os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 
subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+               os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+       } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+-              struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+-              u16 keyidx;
+-
+-              os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+-              keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+-              os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+-              os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+-              keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+-              os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+-              wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+-                              igd.igtk, keylen);
+-              if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-                                 broadcast_ether_addr,
+-                                 keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+-                                 igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+-                      wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+-                                 "WNM mode");
+-                      os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++              const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++              igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+                       return -1;
+-              }
+-              os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+       } else {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+       u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+       int rx_replay_counter_set;
+       u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++      struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++      struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+       struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch)
===================================================================
--- 
testing-x86_64/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch  
                            (rev 0)
+++ 
testing-x86_64/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch  
    2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c   | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+ 
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+                                     const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+-                                    const u8 *key_rsc)
++                                    const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+       const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+       u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
+       /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-      if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+-          os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++      if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++           os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++          (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++           os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++                     sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+                       "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver 
(keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+                       gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+       }
+       os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
+-      sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+-      os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++      if (wnm_sleep) {
++              sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++              os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++                        sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++      } else {
++              sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++              os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++      }
+ 
+       return 0;
+ }
+@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+           (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+                                              gtk_len, gtk_len,
+                                              &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+-           wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
++           wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+                       "RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+               os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+-                                     const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++                                     const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++                                     int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+       size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+       u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+ 
+       /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-      if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+-          os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++      if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++           os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++          (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++           os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++                     sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+                       "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the 
driver (keyidx=%d)",
+                       keyidx);
+@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+               return -1;
+       }
+ 
+-      sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+-      os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++      if (wnm_sleep) {
++              sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++              os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++                        sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++      } else {
++              sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++              os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++      }
+ 
+       return 0;
+ }
+@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+                       return -1;
+ 
+               igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+                       return -1;
+       }
+ 
+@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm 
*sm,
+       if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
+               key_rsc = null_rsc;
+ 
+-      if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
++      if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
+           wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
+               goto failed;
+       os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 
*bssid)
+               sm->tptk_set = 0;
+               os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+               os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++              os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+               os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++              os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+       }
+ 
+@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+       os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+       os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+       os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++      os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+       os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++      os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+       os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 
subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 
+               wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+                               gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+-              if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++              if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+                       os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+                                  "WNM mode");
+@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 
subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+               const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+ 
+               igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+-              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++              if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+                       return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+       } else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+       int rx_replay_counter_set;
+       u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+       struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++      struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+       struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++      struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+       struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch            
                (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch    
2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+This fixes the earlier fix in commit
+ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
+driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
+possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
+message 3/4.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 5 ++---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    | 1 -
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index d200285..1021ccb 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+       size_t kck_len;
+       size_t kek_len;
+       size_t tk_len;
++      int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+ 
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm 
*sm,
+               os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+       }
+       sm->tptk_set = 1;
+-      sm->tk_to_set = 1;
+ 
+       kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
+       kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
+@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+       enum wpa_alg alg;
+       const u8 *key_rsc;
+ 
+-      if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
++      if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+               wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+                       "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+               return 0;
+@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+       /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+       os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+-      sm->tk_to_set = 0;
++      sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+ 
+       if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+               eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+       struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
+       int ptk_set, tptk_set;
+       unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
+-      unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
+       u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+       u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
+       int renew_snonce;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch         
                (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch 
2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++      if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++              wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++                         "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++              sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++              return -1;
++      }
++      wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++                  WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++      sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++      return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+       u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+               SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+       else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+               SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+-      else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+-              SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+-      else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++      else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++              if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++                      SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++              else
++                      SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++      } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+       case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+               break;
+       case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch                
                (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch        
2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index e424168..9eb9738 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+               u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+       } tpk;
+       int tpk_set;
++      int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+       int tpk_success;
+       int tpk_in_progress;
+ 
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct 
wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+       u8 rsc[6];
+       enum wpa_alg alg;
+ 
++      if (peer->tk_set) {
++              /*
++               * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++               * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++               * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++               * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++               * not allow that to happen.
++               */
++              wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++                         " has already been configured to the driver - do not 
reconfigure",
++                         MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++              return -1;
++      }
++
+       os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+ 
+       switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct 
wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+               return -1;
+       }
+ 
++      wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++                 MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+       if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+                          rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+                          "driver");
+               return -1;
+       }
++      peer->tk_set = 1;
+       return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct 
wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+       peer->cipher = 0;
+       peer->qos_info = 0;
+       peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+-      peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++      peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+       peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+       os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+       os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+               wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+               return -1;
+       }
++      peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+       wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+                   peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+       os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, 
struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++      int i;
++
++      for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++              if (nonce[i])
++                      return 1;
++      }
++
++      return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+                                  const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+       peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+       peer->cipher = cipher;
+ 
+-      if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++      if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++          !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+               /*
+                * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+                * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+                               "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder 
nonce");
+                       goto error;
+               }
++              peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+       }
+ 
+ #if 0
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch)
===================================================================
--- 
testing-x86_64/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch  
                            (rev 0)
+++ 
testing-x86_64/0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch  
    2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
+ request
+
+Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
+Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
+response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
+association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
+successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
+protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct 
wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 
+       if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+-                         "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since 
WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
++                         "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since 
WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
+               return;
+       }
+ 
+@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct 
wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+               return;
+       }
+ 
++      wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
++
+       if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
+           wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch)
===================================================================
--- 
testing-x86_64/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch  
                            (rev 0)
+++ 
testing-x86_64/0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch  
    2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c    | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h  | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+       wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++      sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+       /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+       wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t 
*len,
+       u16 capab;
+ 
+       sm->ft_completed = 0;
++      sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+ 
+       buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+               2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const 
u8 *ies,
+               return -1;
+       }
+ 
++      if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++              wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been 
completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++              return 0;
++      }
++
+       if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+               return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const 
u8 *ies,
+               return -1;
+       }
+ 
++      sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+       if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+               return -1;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+       size_t r0kh_id_len;
+       u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+       int ft_completed;
++      int ft_reassoc_completed;
+       int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+       u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+       int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+

Copied: 
wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch)
===================================================================
--- 
testing-x86_64/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch   
                            (rev 0)
+++ 
testing-x86_64/0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch   
    2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+(CVE-2018-14526)
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 
wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 
+0300
++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 
+0300
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c
+ 
+       if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+           (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++              /*
++               * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++               * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++               * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++               * which is the case in this code branch.
++               */
++              if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++                      wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++                              "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but 
unauthenticated data");
++                      goto out;
++              }
+               if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+                                                   &key_data_len))
+                       goto out;

Copied: wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/PKGBUILD)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD                             (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/PKGBUILD     2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# $Id$
+# Maintainer:  Bartłomiej Piotrowski <bpiotrow...@archlinux.org>
+# Contributor: Thomas Bächler <tho...@archlinux.org>
+
+pkgname=wpa_supplicant
+pkgver=2.6
+pkgrel=12
+epoch=1
+pkgdesc='A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks'
+url='http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant'
+arch=(x86_64)
+license=(GPL)
+depends=(openssl-1.0 libdbus readline libnl)
+install=wpa_supplicant.install
+source=(https://w1.fi/releases/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.gz{,.asc}
+        config
+        0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
+        0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
+        0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
+        0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
+        0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
+        0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
+        0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
+        0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
+        0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
+)
+validpgpkeys=('EC4AA0A991A5F2464582D52D2B6EF432EFC895FA') # Jouni Malinen
+sha256sums=('b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450'
+            'SKIP'
+            'aeba21c48416342092964dada271ca6dfe842fc862774c2d3b150785225f66e2'
+            '529113cc81256c6178f3c1cf25dd8d3f33e6d770e4a180bd31c6ab7e4917f40b'
+            'd86d47ab74170f3648b45b91bce780949ca92b09ab43df065178850ec0c335d7'
+            'd4535e36739a0cc7f3585e6bcba3c0bb8fc67cb3e729844e448c5dc751f47e81'
+            '793a54748161b5af430dd9de4a1988d19cb8e85ab29bc2340f886b0297cee20b'
+            '147c8abe07606905d16404fb2d2c8849796ca7c85ed8673c09bb50038bcdeb9e'
+            '596d4d3b63ea859ed7ea9791b3a21cb11b6173b04c0a14a2afa47edf1666afa6'
+            'c5a17af84aec2d88c56ce0da2d6945be398fe7cab5c0c340deb30973900c2736'
+            'c8840d857b9432f3b488113c85c1ff5d4a4b8d81078b7033388dae1e990843b1'
+            '960c3cf2a514479b0b4cf09665186a1a9f5d28e8b05dec23db75c6cc13eb1f7c')
+
+prepare() {
+  cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver"
+  local i; for i in "${source[@]}"; do
+    case $i in
+      *.patch)
+        msg2 "Applying patch $i"
+        patch -p1 -i "$srcdir/$i"
+        ;;
+    esac
+  done
+
+  cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/$pkgname"
+  cp "$srcdir/config" ./.config
+}
+
+build() {
+  cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/$pkgname"
+
+  export CFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $CFLAGS -I/usr/include/openssl-1.0"
+  export LIBS="-L/usr/lib/openssl-1.0"
+  export LIBS_p="-L/usr/lib/openssl-1.0"
+
+  make LIBDIR=/usr/lib BINDIR=/usr/bin
+  make LIBDIR=/usr/lib BINDIR=/usr/bin eapol_test
+}
+
+package() {
+  cd "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/$pkgname"
+  make LIBDIR=/usr/lib BINDIR=/usr/bin DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install
+  install -Dm755 eapol_test "$pkgdir/usr/bin/eapol_test"
+
+  install -d -m755 "$pkgdir/etc/wpa_supplicant"
+  install -Dm644 wpa_supplicant.conf \
+    "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf"
+
+  install -d -m755 "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man"{5,8}
+  install -m644 doc/docbook/*.5 "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man5/"
+  install -m644 doc/docbook/*.8 "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man8/"
+  rm -f "$pkgdir/usr/share/man/man8/wpa_"{priv,gui}.8
+
+  install -d -m755 "$pkgdir/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services"
+  install -m644 \
+    dbus/fi.{epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant,w1.wpa_supplicant1}.service \
+    "$pkgdir/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/"
+
+  install -Dm644 dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf \
+    "$pkgdir/etc/dbus-1/system.d/wpa_supplicant.conf"
+
+  install -d -m755 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system"
+  install -m644 systemd/*.service "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
+}

Copied: wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/config (from rev 331337, 
wpa_supplicant/trunk/config)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/config                               (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/config       2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+CONFIG_AP=y
+CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y
+CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y
+CONFIG_BACKEND=file
+CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_BUS=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y
+CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y
+CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y
+CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y
+CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y
+CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y
+CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y
+CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y
+CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y
+CONFIG_HS20=y
+CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y
+CONFIG_IBSS_RSN=y
+CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y
+CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y
+CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y
+CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y
+CONFIG_IPV6=y
+CONFIG_LIBNL32=y
+CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y
+CONFIG_P2P=y
+CONFIG_PEERKEY=y
+CONFIG_PKCS12=y
+CONFIG_READLINE=y
+CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y
+CONFIG_TDLS=y
+CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y
+CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y
+CONFIG_WPS=y
+CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y
+CONFIG_TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS="DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW:3DES"

Copied: wpa_supplicant/repos/testing-x86_64/wpa_supplicant.install (from rev 
331337, wpa_supplicant/trunk/wpa_supplicant.install)
===================================================================
--- testing-x86_64/wpa_supplicant.install                               (rev 0)
+++ testing-x86_64/wpa_supplicant.install       2018-08-10 14:22:45 UTC (rev 
331338)
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+post_upgrade() {
+  if [[ $(vercmp "$2" '1:2.6-3') -lt 0 ]]; then
+    echo ':: The /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf is file no longer 
managed by pacman'
+    echo '   and if it was modified, it has been renamed to 
wpa_supplicant.conf.pacsave.'
+    echo '   Move it to the original location if needed.'
+  fi
+}

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