Another excellent piece Baruah. Thanks for sharing. m
At 8:41 PM -0400 7/7/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >The Telegraph (Calcutta) >July 8, 2008 > >http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080708/jsp/opinion/story_9504721.jsp# > >A CRISIS OF POLICY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION > >Sanjib Baruah > >A unilateral ceasefire and a new governor may not be enough to end the >cycle of violence and counter-violence in Assam, unless there is a >radical renegotiation in the social contract between India and this >state, writes Sanjib Baruah. > > >Some in Assam like to see the unilateral ceasefire by the so-called >Alpha and Charlie companies of United Liberation Front of Asom?s 28th >battalion as good news. However, there is nothing in the history of >the past two decades of the state?s politics to suggest that the >state?s multi-faceted political crisis, of which Ulfa is a symptom, >might end with new defections from Ulfa or, even a mutiny. > >A far more promising development may be the appointment of former >chief minister of Rajasthan, Shiv Charan Mathur, as governor. For the >first time in nearly two decades, Assam will have a politician as >governor. > >Two other gubernatorial appointments in the region are significant. >Sikkim?s new governor, the retired IAS officer, Balmiki Prasad Singh, >is an old ?Northeast hand.? Unlike these two men, the new governor of >Meghalaya, Ranjit Shekhar Mooshahary, has had a career in a uniformed >all-India security service. But his Bodo roots makes it an interesting >appointment. > >Governors of the northeastern states have more inputs in policymaking >than in the less-troubled states. It is no coincidence that the >primary thrust of our policy towards Ulfa during the tenure of the >last two governors ? both military men ? has been military. The >half-hearted steps toward negotiations were not the result of >conviction on either side. They were gestures to satisfy Assamese >public opinion that strongly favours a negotiated and honorable >settlement with Ulfa. > >The outgoing governor, Ajay Singh, leaves behind a remarkably >unsuccessful record of locking horns with Ulfa for nearly two decades. >In the early Nineties, long before he became the governor, he >commandeered two counter-insurgency operations against Ulfa as head of >the Indian Army?s 4 Corps. As governor, he came to be associated with >a hardline position of opposing talks with Ulfa. > >Singh claims in his resumé that as the commander of those >counter-insurgency operations, he ?was given the responsibility of >wiping out [the] Ulfa insurgency? and that he ?smashed the Ulfa >insurgency in less than three months?. But that was more than fifteen >years ago. > >While Ulfa is at a crossroads today, it is not because of its military >reversals alone. Popular outrage at the killings of civilians, and a >sense of hopelessness that there is no end in sight to the cycle of >violence and counter-violence, are more important factors. > >There is no evidence that anyone knows how to use the shift in the >public mood as a political opening. One hopes that the new >gubernatorial appointments would mark a shift in the balance between >military and political thinking. Even though Ulfa as an idea has >always been more powerful than the reality, this has not made engaging >with it any less challenging. > >The oft-repeated clichés about unemployment and underdevelopment >creating conditions for recruitment by insurgent groups, and >platitudes about solving the crisis of immigration through >border-fencing do not give confidence that our decision-makers >understand the sources of Ulfa?s political influence. > >The two most recent governors have both been highly vocal on the >dangers of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. But to expect >political dividends out of such speech-making on this extraordinarily >difficult issue without addressing it in any substantial sense is to >grossly misunderstand the nature of the immigration crisis and its >relationship with the rise of Ulfa. > >Ulfa was a radical fringe of the Assam Movement of 1979-85. From the >very beginning, it tried to distance itself from some of the Assam >Movement?s extreme rhetoric on ?foreigners? and ?Bangladeshis.? At the >same time it tried to get propaganda value out of the evident >indifference of our governmental institutions to this key Assamese >concern. > >But the immigration crisis, for Ulfa, has never been more than a piece >of evidence of what it sees as a raw deal that the Assamese got in the >postcolonial pan-Indian dispensation. > >India?s political and bureaucratic elites inherit a memory of >Partition vastly different from that of their counterparts in Assam. >Few people seem to know that the migration from eastern Bengal was a >politically explosive issue in Assam even as far back as the 1930s. >Indeed, it shaped Assamese attitudes towards Partition. > >The flow of people from one of the subcontinent?s most densely >populated areas to a sparsely populated region ? legally open to new >settlements in colonial times ? did not stop with Partition. The >erection of an international border did not change that reality. >Indeed, from the Assamese point of view, the effect of Partition was >to intensify the migration pressure from eastern Bengal, with waves of >Hindu refugees joining in. > >In retrospect, Assam appears to have adapted to this demographic >transformation rather well. Official predictions of the 1930s that >immigration would permanently alter the future of Assam and destroy >?the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization? did not >materialize. But it is not because the predicted demographic changes >did not take place: they did, with profound consequences. But contrary >to the fears of the colonial era, most East Bengali migrant Muslims >adopted Assamese as their mother tongue. No one familiar with the >relationship between demographic dynamics and civil disorder in other >parts of the world would read this as a sign that everyone would live >happily ever after. > >Japanese scholar Hiroshi Sato talks about the faultline between the >normative definition of citizenship in Indian law, and the actual >exercise of franchise by people ?based on the legitimacy of >rudimentary documents rather than on the registration of citizenship.? >The ?foreigners? question in Assam is the product of this faultline. >Understood in this way, it is not surprising that the issue became the >epicentre of a veritable political explosion in Assam in 1979. There >is no evidence that the ripples of this explosion have subsided. > >The power of Ulfa as an idea reflects a policy impasse of >subcontinental proportions, showing up the failures of Partition >borders and of the foundational ideologies of the post-Partition >states. Assam?s numerous tribal rebellions, and evidence of candidates >of mainstream political parties turning to Ulfa?s tacit support during >elections, and of even the government relying on such support in >certain situations ? relations facilitated by the massive corruption >that the state has become known for ? outline the multi-faceted nature >of the crisis. If political movements relate to reality, either to the >bare facts, or to strivings that grow out of a reality, Ulfa provides >an example of the latter. > >In Ulfa?s narrative of history, Assam lost its sovereignty in 1826. It >sees itself as being engaged in a battle to recover that sovereignty. >This reading of history has its elements of myth and fantasy. But as >the veteran journalist, M.S. Prabhakara, points out, ?a certain >wistfulness and nostalgia over a past when Assam was a sovereign and >independent political entity,? have been part of Assamese ?folk >memories, literature and cultural and political polemics,? for a long >time. > >To the military mindset, Ulfa?s insistence on discussing sovereignty >might seem audacious, especially given the organization?s weak >position. At the same time, it is hard to imagine how the strivings >that animate Ulfa can be accommodated within the model of an ethnic >peace accord ? so popular among our politicians and bureaucrats. > >The chief minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, has held out the Bodo >Liberation Tigers as an example. The BLT, he says, is similar to Ulfa, >but ?we sat down with BLT and they surrendered.... Now we have BLT >members as part of our government.? > >But historically, the ?Assamese? has not been purely an ethnic and >exclusive category. If the category includes minorities of all stripes >? as it does in Ulfa?s vision ? how can the aspirations of a >territorially defined political community be accommodated within the >model of an ethnic peace accord? > >The reason for Ulfa?s apparent intransigence on the sovereignty >question may be because the concept provides a way of getting around >this difficulty. It brings to the policy agenda the notion of >renegotiating the social contract between India and Assam. > >Sovereignty talk does not have to take the form of the familiar talk >about independence. However, compromises within this paradigm are >possible only if constitutional reforms are part of the agenda. It >might also require a willingness to relate foreign policy issues, >vis-à-vis relations with Bangladesh, to domestic policy concerns, but >in ways other than those that our security establishment has long >preferred. > >A bold new political initiative to resolve Assam?s complex crisis must >consider such options. > >The author is at the Centre for Policy Studies, New Delhi. > > > > >_______________________________________________ >assam mailing list >[email protected] >http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org _______________________________________________ assam mailing list [email protected] http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
