IMO, it is indeed a scholarly piece, but sounds pessimistic. Some portions are beyond my understanding and knowledge (like who would be good as a governor), but as an ordinary person, I would like to think that this is at least the beginning of the peace process. Cheers!!
“In order to make spiritual progress you must be patient like a tree and humble like a blade of grass.” > Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2008 21:20:13 -0500> To: [email protected]> From: [EMAIL > PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [Assam] Ulfa, Sovereignty and Assam> > Another > excellent piece Baruah. Thanks for sharing.> > m> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At 8:41 PM -0400 7/7/08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:> >The Telegraph > (Calcutta)> >July 8, 2008> >> > >http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080708/jsp/opinion/story_9504721.jsp#> >> >A > CRISIS OF POLICY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION> >> >Sanjib Baruah> >> >A > unilateral ceasefire and a new governor may not be enough to end the> >cycle > of violence and counter-violence in Assam, unless there is a> >radical > renegotiation in the social contract between India and this> >state, writes > Sanjib Baruah.> >> >> >Some in Assam like to see the unilateral ceasefire by > the so-called> >Alpha and Charlie companies of United Liberation Front of > Asom?s 28th> >battalion as good news. However, there is nothing in the > history of> >the past two decades of the state?s politics to suggest that > the> >state?s multi-faceted political crisis, of which Ulfa is a symptom,> > >might end with new defections from Ulfa or, even a mutiny.> >> >A far more > promising development may be the appointment of former> >chief minister of > Rajasthan, Shiv Charan Mathur, as governor. For the> >first time in nearly > two decades, Assam will have a politician as> >governor.> >> >Two other > gubernatorial appointments in the region are significant.> >Sikkim?s new > governor, the retired IAS officer, Balmiki Prasad Singh,> >is an old > ?Northeast hand.? Unlike these two men, the new governor of> >Meghalaya, > Ranjit Shekhar Mooshahary, has had a career in a uniformed> >all-India > security service. But his Bodo roots makes it an interesting> >appointment.> > >> >Governors of the northeastern states have more inputs in policymaking> > >than in the less-troubled states. It is no coincidence that the> >primary > thrust of our policy towards Ulfa during the tenure of the> >last two > governors ? both military men ? has been military. The> >half-hearted steps > toward negotiations were not the result of> >conviction on either side. They > were gestures to satisfy Assamese> >public opinion that strongly favours a > negotiated and honorable> >settlement with Ulfa.> >> >The outgoing governor, > Ajay Singh, leaves behind a remarkably> >unsuccessful record of locking > horns with Ulfa for nearly two decades.> >In the early Nineties, long before > he became the governor, he> >commandeered two counter-insurgency operations > against Ulfa as head of> >the Indian Army?s 4 Corps. As governor, he came to > be associated with> >a hardline position of opposing talks with Ulfa.> >> > >Singh claims in his resumé that as the commander of those> > >counter-insurgency operations, he ?was given the responsibility of> >wiping > out [the] Ulfa insurgency? and that he ?smashed the Ulfa> >insurgency in > less than three months?. But that was more than fifteen> >years ago.> >> > >While Ulfa is at a crossroads today, it is not because of its military> > >reversals alone. Popular outrage at the killings of civilians, and a> > >sense of hopelessness that there is no end in sight to the cycle of> > >violence and counter-violence, are more important factors.> >> >There is no > evidence that anyone knows how to use the shift in the> >public mood as a > political opening. One hopes that the new> >gubernatorial appointments would > mark a shift in the balance between> >military and political thinking. Even > though Ulfa as an idea has> >always been more powerful than the reality, > this has not made engaging> >with it any less challenging.> >> >The > oft-repeated clichés about unemployment and underdevelopment> >creating > conditions for recruitment by insurgent groups, and> >platitudes about > solving the crisis of immigration through> >border-fencing do not give > confidence that our decision-makers> >understand the sources of Ulfa?s > political influence.> >> >The two most recent governors have both been > highly vocal on the> >dangers of illegal immigration from Bangladesh. But to > expect> >political dividends out of such speech-making on this > extraordinarily> >difficult issue without addressing it in any substantial > sense is to> >grossly misunderstand the nature of the immigration crisis and > its> >relationship with the rise of Ulfa.> >> >Ulfa was a radical fringe of > the Assam Movement of 1979-85. From the> >very beginning, it tried to > distance itself from some of the Assam> >Movement?s extreme rhetoric on > ?foreigners? and ?Bangladeshis.? At the> >same time it tried to get > propaganda value out of the evident> >indifference of our governmental > institutions to this key Assamese> >concern.> >> >But the immigration > crisis, for Ulfa, has never been more than a piece> >of evidence of what it > sees as a raw deal that the Assamese got in the> >postcolonial pan-Indian > dispensation.> >> >India?s political and bureaucratic elites inherit a > memory of> >Partition vastly different from that of their counterparts in > Assam.> >Few people seem to know that the migration from eastern Bengal was > a> >politically explosive issue in Assam even as far back as the 1930s.> > >Indeed, it shaped Assamese attitudes towards Partition.> >> >The flow of > people from one of the subcontinent?s most densely> >populated areas to a > sparsely populated region ? legally open to new> >settlements in colonial > times ? did not stop with Partition. The> >erection of an international > border did not change that reality.> >Indeed, from the Assamese point of > view, the effect of Partition was> >to intensify the migration pressure from > eastern Bengal, with waves of> >Hindu refugees joining in.> >> >In > retrospect, Assam appears to have adapted to this demographic> > >transformation rather well. Official predictions of the 1930s that> > >immigration would permanently alter the future of Assam and destroy> >?the > whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization? did not> >materialize. > But it is not because the predicted demographic changes> >did not take > place: they did, with profound consequences. But contrary> >to the fears of > the colonial era, most East Bengali migrant Muslims> >adopted Assamese as > their mother tongue. No one familiar with the> >relationship between > demographic dynamics and civil disorder in other> >parts of the world would > read this as a sign that everyone would live> >happily ever after.> >> > >Japanese scholar Hiroshi Sato talks about the faultline between the> > >normative definition of citizenship in Indian law, and the actual> > >exercise of franchise by people ?based on the legitimacy of> >rudimentary > documents rather than on the registration of citizenship.?> >The > ?foreigners? question in Assam is the product of this faultline.> > >Understood in this way, it is not surprising that the issue became the> > >epicentre of a veritable political explosion in Assam in 1979. There> >is > no evidence that the ripples of this explosion have subsided.> >> >The power > of Ulfa as an idea reflects a policy impasse of> >subcontinental > proportions, showing up the failures of Partition> >borders and of the > foundational ideologies of the post-Partition> >states. Assam?s numerous > tribal rebellions, and evidence of candidates> >of mainstream political > parties turning to Ulfa?s tacit support during> >elections, and of even the > government relying on such support in> >certain situations ? relations > facilitated by the massive corruption> >that the state has become known for > ? outline the multi-faceted nature> >of the crisis. If political movements > relate to reality, either to the> >bare facts, or to strivings that grow out > of a reality, Ulfa provides> >an example of the latter.> >> >In Ulfa?s > narrative of history, Assam lost its sovereignty in 1826. It> >sees itself > as being engaged in a battle to recover that sovereignty.> >This reading of > history has its elements of myth and fantasy. But as> >the veteran > journalist, M.S. Prabhakara, points out, ?a certain> >wistfulness and > nostalgia over a past when Assam was a sovereign and> >independent political > entity,? have been part of Assamese ?folk> >memories, literature and > cultural and political polemics,? for a long> >time.> >> >To the military > mindset, Ulfa?s insistence on discussing sovereignty> >might seem audacious, > especially given the organization?s weak> >position. At the same time, it is > hard to imagine how the strivings> >that animate Ulfa can be accommodated > within the model of an ethnic> >peace accord ? so popular among our > politicians and bureaucrats.> >> >The chief minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, > has held out the Bodo> >Liberation Tigers as an example. The BLT, he says, > is similar to Ulfa,> >but ?we sat down with BLT and they surrendered.... Now > we have BLT> >members as part of our government.?> >> >But historically, the > ?Assamese? has not been purely an ethnic and> >exclusive category. If the > category includes minorities of all stripes> >? as it does in Ulfa?s vision > ? how can the aspirations of a> >territorially defined political community > be accommodated within the> >model of an ethnic peace accord?> >> >The > reason for Ulfa?s apparent intransigence on the sovereignty> >question may > be because the concept provides a way of getting around> >this difficulty. > It brings to the policy agenda the notion of> >renegotiating the social > contract between India and Assam.> >> >Sovereignty talk does not have to > take the form of the familiar talk> >about independence. However, > compromises within this paradigm are> >possible only if constitutional > reforms are part of the agenda. It> >might also require a willingness to > relate foreign policy issues,> >vis-à-vis relations with Bangladesh, to > domestic policy concerns, but> >in ways other than those that our security > establishment has long> >preferred.> >> >A bold new political initiative to > resolve Assam?s complex crisis must> >consider such options.> >> >The author > is at the Centre for Policy Studies, New Delhi.> >> >> >> >> > >_______________________________________________> >assam mailing list> > >[email protected]> > >http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org> > > > _______________________________________________> assam mailing list> > [email protected]> http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org _________________________________________________________________ Use video conversation to talk face-to-face with Windows Live Messenger. http://www.windowslive.com/messenger/connect_your_way.html?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_Refresh_messenger_video_072008 _______________________________________________ assam mailing list [email protected] http://assamnet.org/mailman/listinfo/assam_assamnet.org
