Shane G wrote:
I have harped on about this for years elsewhere, and keep getting beaten down as "unjustified" (that was the politest synonym I could come up with).
If it were "unjustifed" someone would certainly have elaborated and explained: "Look Shane, compare our FLIH intercept to safe storage of firearms or bombs: 1) one needs to gain access to multiple parts, hidden and locked separatly. 2) the number of parts and/or storage methods and/or locations can be shown / demonstrated individually without compromising security." While there is justified concern this FLIH intercept could be exploited, all my clients have (/had) strict controls over their program inventory. This excludes OCO vendor code. What's left are sysprogs and select few TSO users. The latter would likely find easier ways to gain supervisor state than breaking CA's obscure code - at least I would. But if I were a CIO, the answers given to Shane would irritate me, to say the least. Andreas F. Geissbuehler AFG Consultants Inc. http://www.afgc-inc.com/
