The only excuse I can think of would be if IPCS could not (at some point in time) be restricted (batch or interactive) from displaying security-sensitive storage (e.g., from RACF or ICSF). Are there control block chains that would permit a programmer with either malicious intent (or far too much curiosity for their continued employment) to see security-controlled information? Are there any holes left open? Can IBM guarantee (with legal liability assumed) that there are none such?
If not, then I can see the need for the restriction. If there are, in fact, no holes left or possible then it becomes a matter of educating auditors and management and lawyers, none of which are easily accomplished tasks. Peter -----Original Message----- From: IBM Mainframe Assembler List [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Peter Relson Sent: Friday, August 15, 2014 7:37 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: SNAP macro for storage above the 2G bar? It is unlikely that SNAP will ever be extended to support data above 2G. IEATDUMP is the intended thing to use. >Some organizations restrict the use of IPCS to systems programmers, Is this really true? Obviously that is a bad idea. That doesn't make it untrue, of course. Could those who have such a policy in place comment on this? Protecting your system dump data sets from being read by those who shouldn't is the important thing. >so IEATDUMP would not help me. Only if it is *your* organization is one of those that restrict. Peter Relson z/OS Core Technology Design This message and any attachments are intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. If the reader of the message is not the intended recipient or an authorized representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any attachments from your system.
