Regarding system integrity, I think it will always be totally dependent on system programmers, operators, and maintenance engineers. I remember crashing MVS a few times from the main console trying to release a hung job or transaction.
Don Higgins [email protected] www.don-higgins.net -----Original Message----- From: IBM Mainframe Assembler List <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Paul Gilmartin Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 5:53 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Case Study: IBM SYSTEM/360-370 ARCHITECTURE (1987) On 2020-08-08, at 15:19:05, Charles Mills wrote: > > Or a dozen or more other non-magic ways of getting into supervisor state. > How does this interact with IBM's Statement of Integrity: https://www.vm.ibm.com/devpages/SPERA/istatmnt.html ... IBM will accept all APARs that describe exposures to the System Integrity of MVS ... System Integrity is defined for MVS as the inability of any program not authorized by a mechanism under the customer's control to: • circumvent or disable store or fetch protection • access an OS password-protected or a RACF-protected resource (RACF is the Resource Access Control Facility), or • obtain control in an authorized state; that is, in supervisor state, with a protection key less than eight (8), or Authorized Program Facility (APF) authorized. Of course, "under the customer's control" is a key phrase. > -----Original Message----- > From: Robert Netzlof > Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 10:20 AM > > But do remember that in Ye Gude Auld Days, there was a widely known > "magic" SVC which granted authorization to the user. -- gil
