horse is already out of the barn with leading //
On Fri, 30 Aug 2013 06:36:56 +0200 Lionel Cons wrote:
> On 29 August 2013 19:45, Glenn Fowler <[email protected]> wrote:
> > 13-08-25 path/pathcanon.c: finalize //@// extended/hidden attribute
> > namespace *for testing*
> Didn't we had the discussion that this is inherently unsafe?
> If you build a path using variables from different sources you sooner
> or later have leading or trailing slashes coming from many sources,
> let or it users or config files, and no one sanitises paths. Not even
> the Solaris or Linux kernels do that for system messages.
> For example:
> PATH1='/var/run/'
> CONFIGDIR='appconfig/'
> LOCK='/@/' # use leading and trailing / to force @ being a directory
> SUBLOCKFILE='/run1982'
> ${PATH1}/${CONFIGDIR}/${LOCK}/${SUBLOCKFILE} will then be
> /var/run//appconfig///@///run1982
> Quick grep over /var/log/messages with grep -F '///' /var/log/messages
> | wc -l returns 419
> Please rip that out. It'll never pass *any* security code review.
> Lionel
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