https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns
Submission by Australian Information Industry Association <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <[email protected]> wrote: > I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions to > submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only. > *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.* > > There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to be > called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would > prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the > Government's need for an accelerated process is clear. > > All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now, so > that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all > the witnesses that want to appear and make these points. > > > https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018 > > The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review. > Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October > 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the Secretariat > at [email protected] by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to assist with > planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 October 2018. > > > Please - send an email now to [email protected] to confirm you will (a) > make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and then > work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent to > the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee > may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home > Affairs.. > > And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if > there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue. > > Paul. > > > On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote: > > I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill wasn't > completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the news > cycle around his au pair scrape. > > Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want these > powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new powers > would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes. > > However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and > will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone > has their concerns, these are mine: > > 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and > TARs. > > 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the issuing > agencies. > > Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and instead, > have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act as > custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data. > > 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs. > Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include: > Cost, security management, risk management, business management processes, > disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy Act 1988. > > 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to > coerce unlawful access/disclosure. > > 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case for > these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I imagine > they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" because > (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? It'd be > good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and physical > warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one thing to > execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law Enforcement > entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law Enforcement > go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates to your > phone. > > 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber > stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used, > whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will > of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government > leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest. > There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public > interest, are not always the same thing. > > 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to > enforce silence as to the existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this > power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should > rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants. > > 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to > themselves for 48 hours. > > 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any > computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending > to the internet and anything that connects to the internet. > > 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict themselves > to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't extend to > compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed to extract > data from the target computer. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote: >> >> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or >> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter >> > law. >> >> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention. >> The >> Australian government removed references to the convention from the laws >> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this great >> quote: >> >> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian >> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international law.” >> >> >> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/ >> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html >> p462 >> >> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless >> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the >> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will. >> >> -- >> # TRS-80 trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub here >> will do \ >> # UCC Wheel Member http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #| what squirrels do >> best | >> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing ]| -- Collect and hide >> your | >> [ software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\ nuts." -- Acid Reflux >> #231 / > > > > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing > [email protected]http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog > > >
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