Wrong agency - it's Home Affairs (Peter Dutton is the minister) not the Attorney General's (Christian Porter) department.
Narelle On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:35 AM Paul Wilkins <[email protected]> wrote: > To my mind, treatment by Attorney General's of the consultation process > holds the public and industry in contempt. With under 2 weeks between > closure of submissions and transfer to PJCIS, how could they have even read > all submissions, let alone given them due consideration? The bearest of > amendments fiddling at the edges serves only so that Dutton can tell the > House industry has been consulted, before steamrolling an ill prepared Bill > through the House. > > The Guardian article suggests Labor support is iffy. But I'm not even > convinced Liberals are behind this, the push seems to emanate from Attorney > General's. > > For anyone with serious concerns, looking to delay passage of the Bill to > give sufficient time to allow development of a considered well designed > framework, with a workable and proportionate regime, I'd be writing to > local members and pointing out where the Bill is premature, deficient and > badly framed. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > > On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 11:07, Paul Wilkins <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns >> >> Submission by Australian Information Industry Association >> <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf> >> >> >> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions >>> to submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only. >>> *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.* >>> >>> There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to >>> be called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would >>> prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the >>> Government's need for an accelerated process is clear. >>> >>> All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now, >>> so that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all >>> the witnesses that want to appear and make these points. >>> >>> >>> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018 >>> >>> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review. >>> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October >>> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the >>> Secretariat at [email protected] by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to assist >>> with planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 October 2018. >>> >>> >>> Please - send an email now to [email protected] to confirm you will >>> (a) make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and >>> then work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent >>> to the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee >>> may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home >>> Affairs.. >>> >>> And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if >>> there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue. >>> >>> Paul. >>> >>> >>> On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote: >>> >>> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill >>> wasn't completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the >>> news cycle around his au pair scrape. >>> >>> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want >>> these powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new >>> powers would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes. >>> >>> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and >>> will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone >>> has their concerns, these are mine: >>> >>> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and >>> TARs. >>> >>> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the issuing >>> agencies. >>> >>> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and >>> instead, have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act >>> as custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data. >>> >>> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs. >>> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include: >>> Cost, security management, risk management, business management >>> processes, disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy >>> Act 1988. >>> >>> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to >>> coerce unlawful access/disclosure. >>> >>> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case >>> for these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I >>> imagine they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" >>> because (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? >>> It'd be good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and >>> physical warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one >>> thing to execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law >>> Enforcement entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law >>> Enforcement go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates >>> to your phone. >>> >>> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber >>> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used, >>> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will >>> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government >>> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest. >>> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public >>> interest, are not always the same thing. >>> >>> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to >>> enforce silence as to the existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this >>> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should >>> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants. >>> >>> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to >>> themselves for 48 hours. >>> >>> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any >>> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending >>> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet. >>> >>> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict >>> themselves to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't >>> extend to compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed >>> to extract data from the target computer. >>> >>> Kind regards >>> >>> Paul Wilkins >>> >>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote: >>>> >>>> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or >>>> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter >>>> > law. >>>> >>>> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention. >>>> The >>>> Australian government removed references to the convention from the >>>> laws >>>> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this >>>> great >>>> quote: >>>> >>>> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian >>>> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international >>>> law.” >>>> >>>> >>>> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/ >>>> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html >>>> p462 >>>> >>>> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless >>>> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the >>>> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> # TRS-80 trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub here >>>> will do \ >>>> # UCC Wheel Member http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #| what squirrels do >>>> best | >>>> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing ]| -- Collect and hide >>>> your | >>>> [ software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\ nuts." -- Acid >>>> Reflux #231 / >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> AusNOG mailing >>> [email protected]http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog > -- Narelle [email protected]
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