Authors,
While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary)
the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
1) <!-- [rfced] To keep the abstract succinct, we suggest
moving some of its content to the Introduction. Perhaps the third paragraph
could be worked into the Introduction?
As noted in
Section 4.3 of RFC 7322:
Every RFC must have an Abstract that provides a concise and
comprehensive overview of the purpose and contents of the entire
document, to give a technically knowledgeable reader a general
overview of the function of the document....
A satisfactory Abstract can often be
constructed in part from material within the Introduction section,
but an effective Abstract may be shorter, less detailed, and perhaps
broader in scope than the Introduction.
Please review and let us know how/if the text may be updated.
-->
2) <!--[rfced] It is unclear to us how "that has a signature algorithm..."
fits into the sentence below. Please review and let us know it may be
updated for clarity.
Original:
* Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases
that a certificate needs to be confirmed that has a signature
algorithm that does not indicate a specific hash algorithm to use
for computing the certHash.
Perhaps:
* Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases
where a certificate that has a signature algorithm but doesn't
specify a hash algorithm to compute the certHash needs to be
confirmed.
-->
3) <!-- [rfced] FYI, we have updated the citations in the sentence below
as follows. [RFC9480] does not have an Appendix C.2, but it does have
an Appendix A.2. Please review and confirm that these updates retain
the intended meaning.
Original:
This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the
changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix C.2 of [RFC9480] as
described in Section 1.2.
Current:
This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the
changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of [RFC9480] as
described in Section 1.2.
-->
4) <!-- [rfced] For clarity, we recommend adding citations for ISO/IEC
9594-8/ITU-T X.509". May we add a citation to the existing reference to
[X509.2019]?
Original:
1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509
standards.
-->
5) <!--[rfced] It is unclear what "off-line file-based" refers to in the
sentence below. Does it refer to "transport mechanisms"?
Original:
PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of
"transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line
file-based.
Perhaps:
PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of
"transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line
file-based transport mechanisms.
-->
6) <!--[rfced] For the nested lists in Section 3.1.3, we have updated the
numbering to letters and converted "Notes" to a hanging list to help with
readability. Please review and let us know of any objections.
Original:
1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are
required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public
key).
...
1. initial registration/certification: This is the process
whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA,
prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for
that end entity.
...
1. Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate"
aligns with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509.
Current:
1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are
required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public
key).
...
a. initial registration/certification: This is the process
whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA,
prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for
that end entity.
...
Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate"
aligns with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509.
-->
7) <!--[rfced] May we update the phrasing of "Rail Automation adopted CMP"
to improve readability?
Original:
Also industry standards like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for
mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for Rail Automation adopted
CMP and have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use case.
Perhaps:
Also industry standards, like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for
mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for CMP that has adopted rail
automation, have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use cases.
-->
8) <!--[rfced] We have removed the following from the figure in Section
4.2.2.2 because it is repetitive with the text introducing the figure.
However, please review, as it seems like some of the blank space can also
be removed from the SVG.
Original:
In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as
follows:
-->
9) <!--[rfced] As "CMP" is expanded as "Certificate Management Protocol",
may we update this text to avoid repetition?
Original:
As the functionality of a
CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol
(such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP.
Perhaps:
As the functionality of a
CA and RA is not specific to any CMP (such as CMC), these EKUs are reused by
CMP.
-->
10) <!--[rfced] Should "PKIconf" be updated to "pkiconf", "pkiConf", or
"PKIConf" to reflect usage elsewhere in the document?
Original:
In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will
send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf
for each certConf.
-->
11) <!--[rfced] In the sentence below, does "are typically insufficient..."
refer to "passwords" or "entropy"?
Original:
If user-generated passwords are used as
shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and are
typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated
keys or trust anchors.
Perhaps A (refers to "passwords"):
If user-generated passwords are used as
shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and the
passwords are typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally
generated keys or trust anchors.
Perhaps B (refers to "entropy"):
If user-generated passwords are used as
shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and is
typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated
keys or trust anchors.
-->
12) <!-- [rfced] We are unable to verify these registrations with Entrust.
Please ensure the descriptions and values are correct. In addition, please
consider whether it is appropriate for this text to appear in the IANA
Considerations section, as it seemingly does not provide any information
for IANA and does not require any IANA actions.
Original:
The new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust for id-
KemBasedMac in the arch 1.2.840.113533.7.66. Entrust registered also
the OIDs for id-PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac there.
-->
13) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be alphabetized or left
in their current order?
-->
14) <!-- [rfced] Please review. We found the following URL:
https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/index.html which is provided by authors
of this handbook and includes open-access PDF files of this
reference. Would you like to add this URL to the reference?
[MvOV97] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook
of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press ISBN 0-8493-8523-7,
1996.
-->
15) <!--[rfced] The following text in Appendices C.3, D.3, and D.6 are not
complete sentences. Please review and let us know how these may be made
into complete sentences.
Original:
POP fields for use (in signature field of pop field of
ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a private
signing key that corresponds to a public verification key for which a
certificate has been requested.
...
Profile of how a certificate structure may be "self-signed".
...
Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once).
Perhaps:
The table below describes the POP fields for use (in signature field of
pop field of ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a
private signing key that corresponds to a public verification key for
which a certificate has been requested.
...
The table below is a profile of how a certificate structure may be
"self-signed".
...
This section describes the creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e.,
not two at once).
-->
16) <!--[rfced] As "OPTIONALLY" is not a key word in BCP14, may we update
this sentence to rephrase to use the key word "OPTIONAL"?
Original:
This transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and
OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both sender and subject
name in the certificate template.
Perhaps:
This transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber, and
an OPTIONAL distinguished name used for both the sender and subject
name in the certificate template.
-->
17) <!--[rfced] May we update the numbered listed in Appendix C.6 to be a
bulleted list? This would reflect the bulleted list in Appendix C.5.
Appendix C.5:
* sender name SHOULD be present
* protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
PKIConfirm messages;
...
Appendix C.6:
1. sender name SHOULD be present
2. protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
PKIConfirm messages;
...
-->
18) <!--[rfced] As the text preceding these figures and the titles of the
figures are very similar, may we remove the preceding text to avoid
redundancy?
Original:
Message Flow when the PKI entity has a KEM key pair and certificate:
...
Figure 3: Message Flow when PKI entity has a KEM key pair
Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI management entity
uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic public key:
...
Figure 4: Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic
public key
Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair:
...
Figure 5: Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI
management entity uses a KEM key pair
-->
19) <!--[rfced] We note that the following references have citations only
in the ASN.1 module in Appendix F. In order to have a 1:1 matchup between
the references section and the text, please review the text and let us know
where a citation for each of the following may be included.
Alternatively, a sentence can be added before the module stating that it
refers to the following (and then list the citations).
[RFC3629]
[RFC6268]
-->
20) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element and let us know if any
should be marked as sourcecode (or another element) instead.
We updated some artwork to sourcecode throughout the document. Please
confirm that these are correct.
In addition, please consider whether the "type" attribute of any sourcecode
element should be set and/or has been set correctly.
The current list of preferred values for "type" is available at
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types>.
If the current list does not contain an applicable type, feel free to
suggest additions for consideration. Note that it is also acceptable
to leave the "type" attribute not set.
-->
21) <!-- [rfced] Please review whether any of the notes in this document
should be in the <aside> element. It is defined as "a container for
content that is semantically less important or tangential to the
content that surrounds it"
(https://authors.ietf.org/en/rfcxml-vocabulary#aside).
-->
22) <!--[rfced] Acronyms
a) Both the expansion and the acronym for the following terms are used
throughout the document. Would you like to update to using the expansion
upon first usage and the acronym for the rest of the document?
Certification Authority (CA)
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
Certificate Transparency (CT)
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Distinguished Name (DN)
End Entity (EE)
extended key usage (EKU)
Key Encapsulation Mechansim (KEM)
Key Generation Authority (KGA)
Local Registration Authority (LRA)
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
one-way function (OWF)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Proof-of-Possession (POP)
Personal Security Environment (PSE)
protocol version number (pvno)
Registration Authority (RA)
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
b) FYI - We have added expansions for the following abbreviations
per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review each
expansion in the document carefully to ensure correctness.
Initial Device Identifier (IDevID)
Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)
Internet of Things (IoT)
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
Organizational Unit (OU)
-->
23) <!--[rfced] Terminology
a) May we update the following terms to the form on the right for consistency?
certification authority > Certification Authority
registration authority > Registration Authority
boot-strapping > bootstrapping
key encapsulation mechanism > Key Encapsulation Mechanism
off-line > offline
on-line > online
b) We note that the following terms are used inconsistently throughout the
document. Please review and let us know if/how these terms may be made
consistent.
Protocol Encryption Key vs. protocl encryption key
X.509v1 vs. X.509 v1
X.509v3 vs. X.509 v3
X.509v3 certificate vs. X.509v3 Certificate
cross-cert* vs. cross cert*
-->
24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the
online Style Guide
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature
typically result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.
Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should
still be reviewed as a best practice.
-->
Thank you.
RFC Editor
On Jun 20, 2025, at 5:06 PM, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org wrote:
*****IMPORTANT*****
Updated 2025/06/20
RFC Author(s):
--------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC 9810 (draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-18)
Title : Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)
Author(s) : H. Brockhaus, D. von Oheimb, M. Ounsworth, J. Gray
WG Chair(s) : Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek
Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters
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