Hi Authors and Deb*, *Deb - As the AD, please review and approve of the following: - Appendix C.4: removal of BCP14 key word (“OPTIONALLY” to “optionally”) - Appendix F: added sentence at the end of the first paragraph
See this diff file for the changes: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-ad-diff.html Authors - Thank you for your reply. We have updated the files accordingly. Please note that we have some follow-up questions: > Please Update Section 5.2.1 based on feedback from Quynh Dang. > OLD > The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or > RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. > CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate, but with all fields > optional. > NEW > The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or RA to specify many > data fields it wishes the certificate it requests to include and to > include any data it is required to provide such as the publicKey field > when it is required for the certificate. CertTemplate is identical to a > TBSCertificate structure (see [RFC 5280]) but with all fields > optional/situational. ) We are having trouble parsing the new suggested text. It is unclear what each of the four instances of “it” refer to. May we update the sentence as follows? Perhaps: The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or RA to specify as many data fields as the structure wishes for the requested certificate. The structure also allows an end entity or RA to include any other necessary data, such as the publicKey field, when t is required for the certificate. A CertTemplate structure is identical to a TBSCertificate structure (see [RFC 5280]) but with all fields optional/situational. >> a) Both the expansion and the acronym for the following terms are used >> throughout >> the document. Would you like to update to using the expansion upon first >> usage and >> the acronym for the rest of the document? >> >> Local Registration Authority (LRA) > [HB] Yes, please do. > As the acronym LRA is not used in the document, please remove this line. ) We note that "local Registration Authority” was used in Section 5.2.8.3.3. We have updated this to “LRA” and left the term in the "Terminology and Abbreviations” section. Please let us know if further updates are needed. Original: This protocol is obviously much longer than the exchange given in Section 5.2.8.3.2 above, but allows a local Registration Authority to be involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not actually created until the proof-of-possession is complete. Current: This protocol is obviously much longer than the exchange given in Section 5.2.8.3.2 above but allows an LRA to be involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not actually created until the POP is complete. --- The files have been posted here (please refresh): https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810.txt https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810.pdf https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810.xml The relevant diff files are posted here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-diff.html (comprehensive diff) https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-auth48diff.html (all AUTH48 changes) https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-auth48rfcdiff.html (AUTH48 changes side by side) Please review the document carefully as documents do not change once published as RFCs. We will await any further changes you may have and approvals from each author and *Deb prior to moving forward in the publication process. Please see the AUTH48 status page for this document here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9810 Thank you, RFC Editor/ap > On Jul 9, 2025, at 3:33 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik > <hendrik.brockhaus=40siemens....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > Hello > > Many thanks for your review and for all valuable changes. > I aligned the responses to your AUTH48 questions with the co-authors, and we > propose the following final changes (see inline below). > Locking at https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-diff.html I have the > following additional proposals: > > Section 4.2.1.1 > OLD > zero touch methods > NEW > zero-touch methods > > Please Update Section 5.2.1 based on feedback from Quynh Dang. > OLD > The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or > RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. > CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate, but with all fields > optional. > NEW > The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or RA to specify many > data fields it wishes the certificate it requests to include and to > include any data it is required to provide such as the publicKey field > when it is required for the certificate. CertTemplate is identical to a > TBSCertificate structure (see [RFC 5280]) but with all fields > optional/situational. > > In Section 5.3.4 you updated (pvno) to (pvnos) to indicate the plural. (pvno) > refers to the PKIHeader field and this field name has no plural. To > circumvent confusion, better delete (pvno) in this place. > OLD > Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has > been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version > numbers (pvno) are described in Section 7. > NEW > Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData, the pvno cmp2021 has > been introduced. Details on the usage of different protocol version > numbers are described in Section 7. > > > Hendrik > >> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- >> Von: rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org <rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org> >> Gesendet: Samstag, 21. Juni 2025 02:10 >> An: Brockhaus, Hendrik (FT RPD CST SEA-DE) >> <hendrik.brockh...@siemens.com>; von Oheimb, David (FT RPD CST SEA-DE) >> <david.von.ohe...@siemens.com>; mike.ounswo...@entrust.com; >> john.g...@entrust.com >> Cc: rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org; lamps-...@ietf.org; lamps-cha...@ietf.org; >> hous...@vigilsec.com; debcool...@gmail.com; auth48archive@rfc-editor.org >> Betreff: AUTH48: RFC-to-be 9810 <draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-18> for your >> review >> >> Authors, >> >> While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) >> the >> following questions, which are also in the XML file. >> >> 1) <!-- [rfced] To keep the abstract succinct, we suggest moving some of its >> content >> to the Introduction. Perhaps the third paragraph could be worked into the >> Introduction? >> >> As noted in >> Section 4.3 of RFC 7322: >> Every RFC must have an Abstract that provides a concise and >> comprehensive overview of the purpose and contents of the entire >> document, to give a technically knowledgeable reader a general >> overview of the function of the document.... >> A satisfactory Abstract can often be >> constructed in part from material within the Introduction section, >> but an effective Abstract may be shorter, less detailed, and perhaps >> broader in scope than the Introduction. >> >> Please review and let us know how/if the text may be updated. >> --> > > [HB] Please remove the third paragraph of the Abstract and update Section 1.3 > as follows: > > OLD: > This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the > changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of [RFC9480] as > described in Section 1.2. Additionally, this document updates the > content of [RFC4210] in the following areas: > > NEW: > This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. > > Backward compatibility with CMP version 2 is maintained > wherever possible. Updates to CMP version 2 improve crypto > agility, extend the polling mechanism, add new general message > types, and add extended key usages (EKUs) to identify special CMP > server authorizations. CMP version 3 is introduced for changes to > the ASN.1 syntax, which support EnvelopedData, certConf with hashAlg, > POPOPrivKey with agreeMAC, and RootCaKeyUpdateContent in ckuann > messages. > > The updates made in this document include the > changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of [RFC9480] as > described in Section 1.2. Additionally, this document updates the > content of [RFC4210] in the following areas: > >> >> >> 2) <!--[rfced] It is unclear to us how "that has a signature algorithm..." >> fits into the sentence below. Please review and let us know it may be >> updated for >> clarity. >> >> Original: >> * Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases >> that a certificate needs to be confirmed that has a signature >> algorithm that does not indicate a specific hash algorithm to use >> for computing the certHash. >> >> >> Perhaps: >> * Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases >> where a certificate that has a signature algorithm but doesn't >> specify a hash algorithm to compute the certHash needs to be >> confirmed. >> --> > > [HB] NEW > * Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting cases > when a certificate needs to be confirmed, but the certificate > was signed using a signature algorithm that does not indicate a > specific hash algorithm to use for computing the certHash. > >> >> >> 3) <!-- [rfced] FYI, we have updated the citations in the sentence below as >> follows. >> [RFC9480] does not have an Appendix C.2, but it does have an Appendix A.2. >> Please >> review and confirm that these updates retain the intended meaning. >> >> Original: >> This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the >> changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix C.2 of [RFC9480] as >> described in Section 1.2. >> >> Current: >> This document obsoletes [RFC4210] and [RFC9480]. It includes the >> changes specified by Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of [RFC9480] as >> described in Section 1.2. >> --> >> > > [HB] Thank you for spotting this. You are right, we wanted to refer to RFC > 9480 Appendix A.2. This change is also included in my proposal to 1) above. > >> >> 4) <!-- [rfced] For clarity, we recommend adding citations for ISO/IEC >> 9594-8/ITU-T >> X.509". May we add a citation to the existing reference to [X509.2019]? >> >> Original: >> 1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509 >> standards. >> --> > > [HB] Yes, please add the reference. > OLD > 1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509 > standards. > > NEW > 1. PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509 > standards, in particular [X509.2019]. > >> >> >> 5) <!--[rfced] It is unclear what "off-line file-based" refers to in the >> sentence below. >> Does it refer to "transport mechanisms"? >> >> Original: >> PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of >> "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext >> Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport >> (MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line >> file-based. >> >> Perhaps: >> PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of >> "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, Hypertext >> Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport >> (MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and off-line >> file-based transport mechanisms. >> --> > > [HB] Yes off-line file-based is one of the transport mechanisms listed. > NEW > 8. PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of > "transport" mechanisms, specifically including email, Hypertext > Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport > (MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), and various > off-line and non-networked file transfer methods. >> >> >> 6) <!--[rfced] For the nested lists in Section 3.1.3, we have updated the >> numbering to >> letters and converted "Notes" to a hanging list to help with readability. >> Please review >> and let us know of any objections. >> >> Original: >> 1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are >> required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public >> key). >> ... >> 1. initial registration/certification: This is the process >> whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA, >> prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for >> that end entity. >> ... >> 1. Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate" >> aligns with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509. >> >> Current: >> 1. CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are >> required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public >> key). >> ... >> a. initial registration/certification: This is the process >> whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA, >> prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for >> that end entity. >> ... >> Note 1. The above definition of "cross-certificate" >> aligns with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509. >> --> > > [HB] I like this layout. > >> >> >> 7) <!--[rfced] May we update the phrasing of "Rail Automation adopted CMP" >> to improve readability? >> >> Original: >> Also industry standards like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for >> mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for Rail Automation adopted >> CMP and have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use case. >> >> >> Perhaps: >> Also industry standards, like [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for >> mobile networks and [UNISIG.Subset-137] for CMP that has adopted rail >> automation, have specified a set of mandatory schemes for their use cases. >> --> > > [HB] I am uncertain if your proposal still has the same meaning. > Both standards adopt CMP for certificate management. [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] is a > standard for mobile network infrastructures. [UNISIG.Subset-137] is a > standard for rail automation. > Would this read better? > NEW > Industry standards such as [ETSI-3GPP.33.310] for mobile networks and > [UNISIG.Subset-137] for railroad automation have adopted CMP and > defined a series of mandatory schemes for their use cases. > >> >> >> 8) <!--[rfced] We have removed the following from the figure in Section >> 4.2.2.2 because it is repetitive with the text introducing the figure. >> However, please review, as it seems like some of the blank space can also be >> removed from the SVG. >> >> Original: >> In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as >> follows: >> --> > > [HB] I do not see any change in > <https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810-diff.html>, but everything looks > good. > >> >> >> 9) <!--[rfced] As "CMP" is expanded as "Certificate Management Protocol", >> may we >> update this text to avoid repetition? >> >> Original: >> As the functionality of a >> CA and RA is not specific to any certificate management protocol >> (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP. >> >> Perhaps: >> As the functionality of a >> CA and RA is not specific to any CMP (such as CMC), these EKUs are reused by >> CMP. >> --> > > [HB] Here the term "certificate management protocol" does not specifically > refer to CMP but refers to any protocol managing certificates. > Does this rephrasing improve readability? > NEW > As the functionality of a > CA and RA is not specific to any protocol used for managing > certificates (such as CMC or CMP), these EKUs are reused by CMP. > >> >> >> 10) <!--[rfced] Should "PKIconf" be updated to "pkiconf", "pkiConf", or >> "PKIConf" to >> reflect usage elsewhere in the document? >> >> Original: >> In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will >> send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf >> for each certConf. >> --> > > [HB] Thank you for bringing this up. We also spotted this issue, but did not > start resolving it. But we can do this now. > The field name in the ASN.1 syntax of the PKIBody is "pkiconf". Therfore, we > should consistently use "pkiconf" or "pkiconf message" consistently. > Next to your examples, we should also update "PKIConfirm" accordingly. > Overall, there are 29 occurrences of "pkiconf" to be aligned. > > Section 5.3.16 > OLD > Upon receiving a PKIConfirm for a > certificate response, the recipient MAY treat it as a certConf with > all certificates being accepted. > > NEW > Upon receiving a pkiconf for a > certificate response, the recipient MAY treat it as a certConf with > all certificates being accepted. > > Section 5.3.21 > OLD > If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a > PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is > not valid. > NEW > If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a > pkiconf response or another error message if any part of the header is > not valid. > > Section 5.3.22 > OLD > 1 In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will > send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf > for each certConf. > NEW > 1. In response to an ip, cp, kup, krp, or ccp message, an EE will > send a certConf for all issued certificates and expect a pkiconf > for each certConf. > > OLD > 23 <-- pkiConf <-- > NEW > 23 <-- pkiconf <-- > > OLD > 34 <-- pkiConf <-- > NEW > 34 <-- pkiconf <-- > > Section 6.6.1 > OLD > Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates > the message and the MAC and sends back an acknowledgement using > the PKIConfirm message. > NEW > Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates > the message and the MAC and sends back an acknowledgement using > the pkiconf message. > > Appendix C.1 > OLD > 9. All PKI message exchanges in Appendix C.4 to C.6 require a > certConf message to be sent by the initiating entity and a > PKIConfirm to be sent by the responding entity. The PKIConfirm > is not included in some of the profiles given since its body is > NULL and its header contents are clear from the context. > NEW > 9. All PKI message exchanges in Appendices C.4 to C.6 require a > certConf message to be sent by the initiating entity and a > pkiconf message to be sent by the responding entity. The pkiconf > is not included in some of the profiles given since its body is > NULL and its header contents are clear from the context. > > Appendix C.4 > OLD > The CA sends > a PKIConfirm back, closing the transaction. All messages are > authenticated. > NEW > The CA sends > a pkiconf message back, closing the transaction. All messages are > authenticated. > > OLD > 10 format PKIConf > 11 <-- PKIConf <-- > 12 handle PKIConf > NEW > 10 format pkiconf > 11 <-- pkiconf <-- > 12 handle pkiconf > > OLD > Confirmation -- PKIConf > NEW > Confirmation -- pkiconf > > OLD > body PKIConf > NEW > body pkiconf > > Appendices C.5 and C.6 > OLD > The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction. > NEW > The CA replies with a pkiconf message to close the transaction. > > OLD > * protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY > also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and > PKIConfirm messages; > NEW > * protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY > also be supported) in request, response, certConf, and > pkiconf messages; > > Appendix D.4 > OLD > CA-1 replies > with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction. > NEW > CA-1 replies > with a pkiconf message to close the transaction. > > Appendix F > OLD > -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in > -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf > -- messages > NEW > -- identifies the transaction, i.e., this will be the same in > -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and pkiconf > -- messages > >> >> >> 11) <!--[rfced] In the sentence below, does "are typically insufficient..." >> refer to "passwords" or "entropy"? >> >> Original: >> If user-generated passwords are used as >> shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and are >> typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated >> keys or trust anchors. >> >> Perhaps A (refers to "passwords"): >> If user-generated passwords are used as >> shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and the >> passwords are typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally >> generated keys or trust anchors. >> >> Perhaps B (refers to "entropy"): >> If user-generated passwords are used as >> shared secret information, their entropy cannot be measured and is >> typically insufficient for protected delivery of centrally generated >> keys or trust anchors. >> --> >> > > [HB] What do you think of this proposal? > NEW > If user-generated passwords are used as shared secret information, > their entropy cannot be measured. Passwords generated from user > generated entropy are typically insufficient for protected delivery of > centrally generated keys or trust anchors. > >> >> 12) <!-- [rfced] We are unable to verify these registrations with Entrust. >> Please ensure the descriptions and values are correct. In addition, please >> consider >> whether it is appropriate for this text to appear in the IANA Considerations >> section, as >> it seemingly does not provide any information for IANA and does not require >> any IANA >> actions. >> >> Original: >> The new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust for id- >> KemBasedMac in the arch 1.2.840.113533.7.66. Entrust registered also >> the OIDs for id-PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac there. >> --> > > [HB] These OIDs are registered to the Entrust arc by WG consensus in order to > keep it consistent with previous registrations. Entrust is an author of this > draft and the authors confirm that Entrust's internal (non-public) registry > has noted this. > We added this information to the IANA section as it is about OID > registration. As IANA was fine with this section, I tend to leave the > sentence as it is or just re-phrase it for clarity as follows. > OLD > The new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust for id- > KemBasedMac in the arch 1.2.840.113533.7.66. Entrust registered also > the OIDs for id-PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac there. > NEW > Note that the new OID 1.2.840.113533.7.66.16 was registered by Entrust, > and not by IANA, for id-KemBasedMac in the arch 1.2.840.113533.7.66. > This was done to match the previous registrations for id- > PasswordBasedMac and id-DHBasedMac, which are also on the Entrust private > arc. > >> >> >> 13) <!-- [rfced] Would you like the references to be alphabetized or left in >> their current >> order? >> --> >> > > [HB] Yes please alphabetize them. > >> >> 14) <!-- [rfced] Please review. We found the following URL: >> https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/index.html which is provided by authors of >> this handbook and >> includes open-access PDF files of this reference. Would you like to add this >> URL to >> the reference? >> >> [MvOV97] Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook >> of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press ISBN 0-8493-8523-7, >> 1996. >> --> >> > > [HB] This is a great idea. I was not aware of this link. > BTW, it is sufficient to use https://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/ > >> >> 15) <!--[rfced] The following text in Appendices C.3, D.3, and D.6 are not >> complete >> sentences. Please review and let us know how these may be made into complete >> sentences. >> >> Original: >> POP fields for use (in signature field of pop field of >> ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a private >> signing key that corresponds to a public verification key for which a >> certificate has been requested. >> ... >> Profile of how a certificate structure may be "self-signed". >> ... >> Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). >> >> Perhaps: >> The table below describes the POP fields for use (in signature field of >> pop field of ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a >> private signing key that corresponds to a public verification key for >> which a certificate has been requested. >> ... >> The table below is a profile of how a certificate structure may be >> "self-signed". >> ... >> This section describes the creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., >> not two at once). >> --> > > [HB] Thank you for these proposals. I like them. > >> >> >> 16) <!--[rfced] As "OPTIONALLY" is not a key word in BCP14, may we update >> this >> sentence to rephrase to use the key word "OPTIONAL"? >> >> Original: >> This transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and >> OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both sender and subject >> name in the certificate template. >> >> Perhaps: >> This transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber, and >> an OPTIONAL distinguished name used for both the sender and subject >> name in the certificate template. >> --> > > [HB] You are right. This is not a key word. Let's use lower case letters. > NEW > This transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber, and > optionally the distinguished name used for both sender and subject > name in the certificate template. > >> >> >> 17) <!--[rfced] May we update the numbered listed in Appendix C.6 to be a >> bulleted >> list? This would reflect the bulleted list in Appendix C.5. >> >> Appendix C.5: >> * sender name SHOULD be present >> >> * protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY >> also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and >> PKIConfirm messages; >> ... >> >> Appendix C.6: >> 1. sender name SHOULD be present >> >> 2. protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY >> also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and >> PKIConfirm messages; >> ... >> --> > > [HB] Yes please do that. > >> >> >> 18) <!--[rfced] As the text preceding these figures and the titles of the >> figures are very >> similar, may we remove the preceding text to avoid redundancy? >> >> Original: >> Message Flow when the PKI entity has a KEM key pair and certificate: >> ... >> Figure 3: Message Flow when PKI entity has a KEM key pair >> >> >> Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI management entity >> uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic public key: >> ... >> Figure 4: Message Flow when the PKI entity knows that the PKI >> management entity uses a KEM key pair and has the authentic >> public key >> >> >> Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI >> management entity uses a KEM key pair: >> ... >> Figure 5: Message Flow when the PKI entity does not know that the PKI >> management entity uses a KEM key pair >> --> > > [HB] Please go ahead, while using in the first case not "KEM key pair" alone > but "KEM key pair and certificate". > >> >> >> 19) <!--[rfced] We note that the following references have citations only in >> the ASN.1 >> module in Appendix F. In order to have a 1:1 matchup between the references >> section >> and the text, please review the text and let us know where a citation for >> each of the >> following may be included. >> >> Alternatively, a sentence can be added before the module stating that it >> refers to the >> following (and then list the citations). >> >> [RFC3629] >> [RFC6268] >> --> > > [HB] Pleas update Appendix F as follows: > OLD > The module contains those changes to the > normative ASN.1 module from Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were > specified in [RFC9480], as well as changes made in this document. > NEW > The module contains those changes to the > normative ASN.1 module from Appendix F of [RFC4210] that were > specified in [RFC9480], as well as changes made in this document. > This module makes reference to ASN.1 structures defined in [RFC6268], > as well as the UTF-8 encoding defined in [RFC3629]. > > >> >> >> 20) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element and let us know if any >> should be >> marked as sourcecode (or another element) instead. >> >> We updated some artwork to sourcecode throughout the document. Please confirm >> that these are correct. >> >> In addition, please consider whether the "type" attribute of any sourcecode >> element >> should be set and/or has been set correctly. >> >> The current list of preferred values for "type" is available at > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types. >> If the current list does not contain an applicable type, feel free to >> suggest additions for >> consideration. Note that it is also acceptable to leave the "type" attribute >> not set. >> --> > > [HB] I reviewed <https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9810.xml> and propose > the following changes. > > Section 5.1.3.4 after Figure 2; do not use sourcecode, please use plain text. > Encapsulate(pk) -> (ct, ss) > ... > Decapsulate(ct, sk) -> (ss) > ... > KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk) > ... > KDF(ss, len, context)->(ssk) > > Section 5.3.19.1 > Set the sourcecode element in this and all subsections of 5.3.19 to asn.1. > >> >> >> 21) <!-- [rfced] Please review whether any of the notes in this document >> should be in >> the <aside> element. It is defined as "a container for content that is >> semantically less >> important or tangential to the content that surrounds it" >> (https://authors.ietf.org/en/rfcxml-vocabulary#aside). >> --> > > [HB] I do not see any note that must be tagged <aside>. > >> >> >> 22) <!--[rfced] Acronyms >> >> a) Both the expansion and the acronym for the following terms are used >> throughout >> the document. Would you like to update to using the expansion upon first >> usage and >> the acronym for the rest of the document? >> >> Certification Authority (CA) >> Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) >> Certificate Transparency (CT) >> Diffie-Hellman (DH) >> Distinguished Name (DN) >> End Entity (EE) >> extended key usage (EKU) >> Key Encapsulation Mechansim (KEM) >> Key Generation Authority (KGA) >> Local Registration Authority (LRA) >> Message Authentication Code (MAC) >> one-way function (OWF) >> Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) >> Proof-of-Possession (POP) >> Personal Security Environment (PSE) >> protocol version number (pvno) >> Registration Authority (RA) >> Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) >> >> b) FYI - We have added expansions for the following abbreviations per >> Section 3.6 of >> RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review each expansion in the document >> carefully to ensure correctness. >> >> Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) >> Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) >> Internet of Things (IoT) >> Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Organizational Unit (OU) >> --> > > [HB] Yes, please do. > As the acronym LRA is not used in the document, please remove this line. > >> >> >> 23) <!--[rfced] Terminology >> >> a) May we update the following terms to the form on the right for >> consistency? >> >> certification authority > Certification Authority registration authority > >> Registration >> Authority boot-strapping > bootstrapping key encapsulation mechanism > Key >> Encapsulation Mechanism off-line > offline on-line > online >> >> b) We note that the following terms are used inconsistently throughout the >> document. >> Please review and let us know if/how these terms may be made consistent. >> >> Protocol Encryption Key vs. protocl encryption key >> X.509v1 vs. X.509 v1 >> X.509v3 vs. X.509 v3 >> X.509v3 certificate vs. X.509v3 Certificate >> cross-cert* vs. cross cert* >> --> >> > > [HB] > a) Yes, please do. > > b) Please use the following: > protocol encryption key > X.509v1 > X.509v3 > X.509v3 certificate > cross-cert * (Please do not change the ASN.1 module.) > >> >> 24) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the >> online Style >> Guide >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language >> and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature typically >> result in >> more precise language, which is helpful for readers. >> >> Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should >> still be >> reviewed as a best practice. >> --> > > [HB] I do not see any need for further changes. > >> >> >> Thank you. >> >> RFC Editor >> >> >> On Jun 20, 2025, at 5:06 PM, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org wrote: >> >> *****IMPORTANT***** >> >> Updated 2025/06/20 >> >> RFC Author(s): >> -------------- >> >> Instructions for Completing AUTH48 >> >> Your document has now entered AUTH48. 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Brockhaus, D. von Oheimb, M. Ounsworth, J. Gray >> WG Chair(s) : Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek >> Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters -- auth48archive mailing list -- auth48archive@rfc-editor.org To unsubscribe send an email to auth48archive-le...@rfc-editor.org
