Dear Dan,

Thank you very much for your responses to our additional questions.

This item is still pending:

>> Also, please confirm that the single instance of "a/eap/1" is correct (i.e., 
>> "would be "a/eap/1" should not be "would be /a/eap/1").


Should the single instance of "a/eap/1" be "/a/eap/1"?  In other words, is it 
correct that this one instance does not include a slash before the "a"?  We ask 
because of the entries we see in Figure 3.

Currently:
 So, per Figure 3, the URI for the first resource would be "a/eap/1".

= = = = =

The latest files are posted here.  Please refresh your browser:

   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.txt
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.pdf
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.html
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.xml
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-diff.html
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-rfcdiff.html (side by side)
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-auth48diff.html
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-auth48rfcdiff.html (side by side)
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-lastdiff.html
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-lastrfcdiff.html (side by side)

   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-xmldiff1.html
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-xmldiff2.html

Thanks again!

RFC Editor/lb


> On Aug 8, 2025, at 3:39 AM, Dan Garcia Carrillo <garcia...@uniovi.es> wrote:
> 
> Dear RFC Editor, 
> Please see responses inline. 
> El 4/8/25 a las 21:02, Lynne Bartholomew escribió:
>> [You don't often get email from lbartholo...@staff.rfc-editor.org. Learn why 
>> this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
>> 
>> Dear Dan,
>> 
>> Thank you very much for the updated XML file and answers to our questions!
>> 
>> We have some follow-up items for you. Please let us know how this document 
>> should be further updated.
>> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Please note that per post-6000 published RFCs (except for RFC 8995), we 
>> changed '4.04 Not found' to '4.04 Not Found'. Please let us know any 
>> objections.
>> 
> [AUTHORS] No objections to the update. 
> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Regarding our question 13) and your reply: As it appears that "Finally, 
>> sends" means "Finally, the CoAP-EAP application sends", per your note that 
>> the CoAP-EAP application takes control, we updated the "Step 2" text 
>> accordingly. If this is incorrect, please clarify the "Finally, sends" 
>> sentence.
>> 
> [AUTHORS] No objections to the text update. Yes, it is the CoAP-EAP 
> application. 
> 
> 
>> 
>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.2: Do "assigns" and "sends" refer to the
>>>> EAP peer or the EAP peer state machine? If the suggested text is not
>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (previous text is included for context):
>>>> * Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message sending the EAP
>>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, assigns a new resource to
>>>> the ongoing authentication process (e.g., '/a/eap/2'), and deletes
>>>> the previous one ('/a/eap/1'). Finally, sends a '2.01 Created'
>>>> response with the new resource identifier in the Location-Path
>>>> (and/or Location-Query) options for the next step.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested (guessing the EAP peer state machine):
>>>> * Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message, sending the EAP
>>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, the EAP peer state machine
>>>> assigns a new resource to the ongoing authentication process
>>>> (e.g., '/a/eap/2') and deletes the previous one ('/a/eap/1').
>>>> Finally, the EAP peer state machine sends a '2.01 Created'
>>>> response with the new resource identifier in the Location-Path
>>>> (and/or Location-Query) options for the next step. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We believe the best way to specify this is to differentiate 
>>> between "EAP peer state machine" and the CoAP-EAP application of the EAP 
>>> peer.
>>> The EAP peer state machine only deals with EAP messages. Processes EAP 
>>> requests and returns an EAP response.
>>> With that, the CoAP-EAP application within the EAP peer takes control and 
>>> manages everything CoAP related. Assigns a new resource to the ongoing 
>>> authentication process (e.g., '/a/eap/2') and deletes the previous one 
>>> ('/a/eap/1')
>>> So, a suggested new text.
>>> Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message sending the EAP
>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, the CoAP-EAP application
>>> assigns a new resource to the ongoing authentication process
>>> (e.g., '/a/eap/2'), and deletes the previous one ('/a/eap/1').
>>> Finally, sends a '2.01 Created'response with the new resource
>>> identifier in the Location-Path (and/or Location-Query) options
>>> for the next step.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Regarding our question 25) and your reply: Because of the preceding 
>> sentence ("The other supported and negotiated cipher suites are as 
>> follows:"), it was not clear to us how best to update this text. Please 
>> review our update, and let us know if anything is incorrect:
>> 
> 
> [AUTHORS] No objections to the text update. 
> 
> 
>> 
>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Sections 6.1 and Appendix A: Do these algorithms need
>>>> to be numbered? If yes, will this numbering scheme be clear to
>>>> readers?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> * 0) AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 (default)
>>>> 
>>>> * 1) A128GCM, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * 2) A256GCM, SHA-384
>>>> 
>>>> * 3) ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * 4) ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256
>>>> ...
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> Perhaps:
>>>> * AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 (default)
>>>> 
>>>> * A128GCM, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * A256GCM, SHA-384
>>>> 
>>>> * ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256
>>>> ...
>>>> * TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The numbers on Sections 6.1 match the values in “9.1. CoAP-EAP 
>>> Cipher Suites”.
>>> The numbers in Appendix A are the expected continuation of these, but are 
>>> not in the specification, and not in the IANA section. This text should 
>>> also solve issue 42 as well.
>>> Suggested update text:
>>> The following hash algorithms are considered in case the specification 
>>> includes DTLS support in the future (TLS_SHA256,TLS_SHA384,TLS_SHA512)
>>> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Regarding our question 38) and your reply: Please review our updates 
>> related to the removal of the Zigbee reference, and let us know if anything 
>> is incorrect.
>> 
>> 
> 
> [AUTHORS] No objections to the text update. 
> 
> 
>>>> 38) <!-- [rfced] [ZigbeeIP]: We could not find this document number.
>>>> We also found that 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.zigbee.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4xoZxesQ$
>>>>  > steers to
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://csa-iot.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5J3ax9bw$
>>>>  >. When we searched 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://csa-iot.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5J3ax9bw$
>>>>  > for
>>>> the number 095023r34, the result was "Nothing found, please try
>>>> adjusting your search."
>>>> 
>>>> Should a different paper be listed here and cited in Appendices B and
>>>> C.5.1?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> [ZigbeeIP] Zigbee Alliance, "ZigBee IP Specification (Zigbee Document
>>>> 095023r34)", 2014. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Certainly, this seems to be an old reference. We have other 
>>> examples, the best course of action would be to remove this reference and 
>>> the associated text.
>>> Forced removal can be done by sending new specific key material to the 
>>> devices that still belong to the network, excluding the removed device, 
>>> following a model similar to CoJP for 6TiSCH [RFC9031] or Zigbee IP 
>>> [ZigbeeIP].
>>> –
>>> Another example would be when a shared Network Key is required by the 
>>> devices that join a network. An example of this Network Key can be found in 
>>> Zigbee IP [ZigbeeIP] or the THREAD protocol [THREAD].
>>> 
>> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Regarding our question 42) and your reply: Because TLS_SHA256, TLS_SHA384, 
>> and TLS_SHA512 are already in the list, is it necessary to also mention them 
>> in the preceding text?
>> 
>> 
>>>> 42) <!-- [rfced] Appendix A: Should "considered" be "supported" in this
>>>> sentence, along the lines of "The other supported and negotiated
>>>> cipher suites are the following" as seen in Section 6.1?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The hash algorithms considered are the following:
>>>> 
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> Possibly:
>>>> The following hash algorithms are supported:
>>>> 
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512 -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Following the previous issue (point 25)
>>> Proposed text.
>>> The following hash algorithms are considered in case the specification 
>>> includes DTLS support in the future (TLS_SHA256,TLS_SHA384,TLS_SHA512)
>>> 
>> 
>> Possibly:
>> The following hash
>> algorithms are considered in cases where the specification includes DTLS 
>> support in the future:
>> 
> [AUTHORS] Having the ciphersuites already in the list, it is ok not to 
> mention them in the preceding text. 
> 
> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> * Regarding our question 57) and the following items:
>> 
>> 
>>>> b) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>> 
>>>> "a/eap/1" (the URI for the first resource would be "a/eap/1") /
>>>> '/a/eap/1'
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] "a/eap/1"
>>> 
>> 
>> Apologies for missing this earlier: We see the following:
>> 
>> 
>>> So, per Figure 3, the URI for the first resource would be "a/eap/1".
>>> 
>> We also see the following:
>> 
>> 
>>> '/a/eap/1'
>>> "/a/eap/1"
>>> 
>> Are single quotes or double quotes preferred?
>> Also, please confirm that the single instance of "a/eap/1" is correct (i.e., 
>> "would be "a/eap/1" should not be "would be /a/eap/1").
>> 
> [AUTHORS] Please, consider changing to double quotes. 
> 
> 
> 
>> = = =
>> 
>> 
>>>> EAP-Request/Identity / EAP Req/Id / EAP-Req/Id
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-Request/Identity
>>> 
>> 
>>>> EAP-Response/Identity / EAP Resp/Id / EAP Response/Id
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-Response/Identity
>>> 
>> 
>> Apologies for not realizing earlier that using the longer forms 
>> "EAP-Request/Identity" and "EAP-Response/Identity" in Figures 3, 5, and 8 
>> could cause spacing issues in the SVG.
>> 
>> To avoid such spacing issues and define these terms properly where first 
>> used, we suggest the following:
>> 
>> - In Section 3.2, define the abbreviated forms by changing "(EAP 
>> Request/Identity)" to
>> "(EAP-Request/Identity, or EAP-Req/Id)" and changing "an EAP response (EAP 
>> Resp/Id)" to
>> "an EAP response (EAP-Response/Identity, or EAP-Resp/Id)".
>> - In Section 6.1, change "both the EAP-Request/Identity and 
>> EAP-Response/Identity" to
>> "both the EAP-Req/Id and EAP-Resp/Id".
>> - In Section 8.6, change "EAP Request/Id" to "EAP-Req/Id", and change "EAP 
>> Response/Id" to "EAP-Resp/Id".
>> 
>> 
> [AUTHORS] No objections to the text update. 
> 
> 
>> = = =
>> 
>> Regarding this item:
>> 
>> 
>>>> EAP response / EAP Response (used generally in text, e.g.,
>>>> "an EAP response", "an EAP Response")
>>>> (We also see "EAP Response header" in Section 7.1.)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP Response
>>> 
>> Please confirm that "EAP Response" when used generally in text is as 
>> desired. We ask because we see "EAP request" used consistently throughout 
>> the text when used generally.
>> 
>> 
> 
> [AUTHORS] Both should be Capitalized. EAP Response and EAP Request.
> 
> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> Regarding this item:
>> 
>> 
>>>> Session-Lifetime / Session-lifetime / Session Lifetime /
>>>> session lifetime (in running text)
>>>> (Figure 3 and Table 4 use "Session-Lifetime".)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] Session-Lifetime
>>> 
>> 
>> After updating "session lifetime" to "Session-Lifetime", this sentence is 
>> now a bit confusing, as RFC 5247
>> does not mention "Session-Lifetime". Should this sentence be rephrased, or 
>> will it be clear to readers?
>> 
>> Original:
>> * Step 7. When the EAP authentication ends successfully, the EAP
>> authenticator obtains the Master Session Key (MSK) exported by the
>> EAP method, an EAP Success message, and some authorization
>> information (e.g., session lifetime) [RFC5247].
>> 
>> Currently:
>> * Step 7. When the EAP authentication ends successfully, the EAP
>> authenticator obtains the MSK exported by the EAP method, an EAP
>> Success message, and some authorization information (e.g.,
>> Session-Lifetime) [RFC5247].
>> 
>> Possibly:
>> * Step 7. When the EAP authentication ends successfully, the EAP
>> authenticator obtains the MSK exported by the EAP method, an EAP
>> Success message, and some authorization information [RFC5247] (e.g.,
>> Session-Lifetime).
>> 
>> 
> 
> [AUTHORS] It is correct that Session-Lifetime is not specified in RFC5247, 
> but it is something we propose to use as an authorization information 
> instance so the “Possibly” text is correct for us.
> 
> Thank you.
> Best regards.
> 
>> = = = = =
>> 
>> The latest files are posted here. Please refresh your browser:
>> 
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.txt__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbJZA27Ts$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.pdf__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbMyfW1jC$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbLKsqN1X$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.xml__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbP80vQJQ$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-diff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbH0Jmnq8$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-rfcdiff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbEun-yU8$
>>  (side by side)
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-auth48diff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbJC23Knu$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-auth48rfcdiff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbN_-hSIL$
>>  (side by side)
>> 
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-xmldiff1.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbLA__aeT$
>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-xmldiff2.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmaxO7K_ObFZjodcUznRgUKaC4vxIdw6YKWcpvETu7efhpbuKT-ui8hXft2FSGl54UWkXEwnINU9-p9VCbIPCNIVbNa1m-S9$
>> 
>> Thanks again for your help and patience!
>> 
>> RFC Editor/lb
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jul 29, 2025, at 10:09 AM, Dan Garcia Carrillo <garcia...@uniovi.es> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Dear RFC Editor,
>>> Please see answers inline. For the requested clarifications in Figures, we 
>>> attach a .xml version with the figures updated.
>>> Please, let us know if anything else is required.
>>> 
>>> El 18/7/25 a las 19:53, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org escribió:
>>> 
>>>> Authors and AD*,
>>>> 
>>>> *AD, please see question #1 below.
>>>> 
>>>> Authors, while reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as 
>>>> necessary) the following questions, which are also in the XML file.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 1) <!-- [rfced] *AD, text was added to the Acknowledgements section after 
>>>> the
>>>> document was approved for publication. Please review the changes and
>>>> let us know if you approve.
>>>> 
>>>> Diff between v14 and v15:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-15__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH77QRYqZw$
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 2) <!-- [rfced] Please note that the title of the document has been 
>>>> updated as
>>>> follows. We expanded abbreviations per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC
>>>> Style Guide"), recast "-based" to avoid using a hyphen with an expansion,
>>>> and added "for Use with". Please review.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> EAP-Based Authentication Service for CoAP
>>>> 
>>>> Current:
>>>> Authentication Service Based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
>>>> (EAP) for Use with the Constrained
>>>> Application Protocol (CoAP)
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] This change is ok.
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 3) <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in the
>>>> title) for use on 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/search__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH7N7e55Gg$
>>>>  >. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We believe that these could be keywords representing the work:
>>> 
>>> CoAP, EAP, EAP lower layer, Internet of Things, IoT, Constrained Node, 
>>> Smart Object
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 4) <!-- [rfced] Abstract: We had trouble following the meaning of
>>>> "transported" in this sentence. If the suggested text is not
>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> This document specifies an authentication service that uses the
>>>> Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) transported employing
>>>> Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) messages.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> This document specifies an authentication service that uses the
>>>> Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as a transport method that
>>>> employs Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) messages. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text can be misleading as the protocol being 
>>> carried is EAP and the one that carries EAP is CoAP.
>>> Next, our suggested text would be:
>>> This document specifies an authentication service that uses the
>>> Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) as a transport method to
>>> carry the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 5) <!-- [rfced] We found quite a few undefined abbreviations in this
>>>> document. For ease of the reader, we expanded as many of them as we
>>>> could find. Most were straightforward (e.g., SAML per RFC 7833,
>>>> PANA per RFC 5191), but please confirm that our expansions for MIC
>>>> (currently "Message Integrity Check") and LoRa (currently "Long
>>>> Range") are correct.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> EAP relies on lower layer error
>>>> detection (e.g., CRC, checksum, MIC, etc.).
>>>> ...
>>>> Given that EAP is also used for network access authentication, this
>>>> service can be adapted to other technologies. For instance, to
>>>> provide network access control to very constrained technologies
>>>> (e.g., LoRa network).
>>>> 
>>>> Currently (fixed the incomplete sentence in the "LoRa" text):
>>>> EAP relies on lower-layer error
>>>> detection (e.g., CRC, checksum, Message Integrity Check (MIC),
>>>> etc.).
>>>> ...
>>>> Given that EAP is also used for network access authentication, this
>>>> service can be adapted to other technologies - for instance, to
>>>> provide network access control to very constrained technologies
>>>> (e.g., Long Range (LoRa) networks). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Yes, these suggestions are correct.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 6) <!-- [rfced] Section 2: These sentences did not parse. We updated
>>>> the text. If this is incorrect, please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The rationale behind this decision
>>>> is that EAP requests direction is always from the EAP server to the
>>>> EAP peer. Accordingly, EAP responses direction is always from the
>>>> EAP peer to the EAP server.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> The rationale behind this decision is that EAP requests will always
>>>> travel from the EAP server to the EAP peer. Accordingly, EAP
>>>> responses will always travel from the EAP peer to the EAP server. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Yes, these suggestions are correct.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 7) <!-- [rfced] Please review each artwork element. Should any artwork
>>>> element be tagged as sourcecode? If the current list of preferred
>>>> values for "type" on
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/rpc/wiki/doku.php?id=sourcecode-types__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5spEm40g$
>>>>  >
>>>> does not contain an applicable type, please let us know. Also, it is
>>>> acceptable to leave the "type" attribute unset. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We assume that this is in reference to "Figure 6: CBOR Data 
>>> Structure for CoAP-EAP".
>>> It is not our intention to specify sourcecode, it could be left as type 
>>> unset.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 8) <!-- [rfced] Figure 1: We see "(SCOPE OF THIS DOCUMENT)" in the
>>>> ASCII art but "SCOPE OF THIS DOCUMENT" in the SVG. If you prefer the
>>>> parentheses, please correct the SVG in the edited copy of the XML.
>>>> If you prefer that the parentheses be removed, let us know, and we
>>>> will update the ASCII art accordingly. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] There are no need for parentheses, the message is clear without 
>>> them.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 9) <!-- [rfced] Figure 2: We changed "Request/Responses/Signaling" to
>>>> "Request / Responses / Signaling", to match the spacing style of the
>>>> other entries in the figure. However, the "Request / Responses /
>>>> Signaling" line now looks a bit crowded in the SVG renderings in the
>>>> HTML and PDF output files. We cannot determine where in the SVG a
>>>> coordinate should be modified to correct the spacing. Please correct
>>>> the SVG in the edited copy of the XML. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The line should say
>>> Requests / Responses / Signaling
>>> 
>>> We have provided a new <artwork> code in the attached document 
>>> rfc9820_modified.xml that is not so crowded and tries to convey the 
>>> improvements.
>>> This is also updated in svg in the attached file rfc9820_modified.xml
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 10) <!-- [rfced] Sections 3.1 and subsequent: We see phrases such as
>>>> "an intermediary proxy", "intermediary (i.e., proxy)", and
>>>> "intermediaries such as proxies" in this document. Will the
>>>> distinction regarding whether or not intermediaries are sometimes or
>>>> always proxies be clear to readers? -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We are following CoAP terminology, being according to rfc7252
>>> Intermediary
>>> A CoAP endpoint that acts both as a server and as a client towards an 
>>> origin server (possibly via further intermediaries). A common form of an 
>>> intermediary is a proxy; several classes of such proxies are discussed in 
>>> this specification.
>>> Maybe the following modifications would make this clearer to the reader.
>>> 3.1. Discovery
>>> Before the CoAP-EAP exchange takes place, the EAP peer needs to discover 
>>> the EAP authenticator or the entity that will enable the CoAP-EAP exchange 
>>> (e.g.i.e., an intermediary proxy).
>>> —-
>>> 8.3. Allowing CoAP-EAP Traffic to Perform Authentication
>>> Since CoAP is an application protocol, CoAP-EAP assumes certain IP 
>>> connectivity in the link between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator to 
>>> run. This link MUST authorize exclusively unprotected IP traffic to be sent 
>>> between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator during the authentication 
>>> with CoAP-EAP. Once the authentication is successful, the key material 
>>> generated by the EAP authentication (MSK) and any other traffic can be 
>>> authorized if it is protected. It is worth noting that if the EAP 
>>> authenticator is not in the same link as the EAP peer and an intermediate 
>>> entity (i.e.e.g., a CoAP proxy) helps with this process, this concept also 
>>> applies to the communication between the EAP peer and the intermediary.
>>> —-
>>> When the EAP peer intends to be admitted into the network, it would search 
>>> for an entity that offers the CoAP-EAP service, be it directly via the EAP 
>>> authenticator or through an intermediary (i.e.e.g., proxy). See Section 3.1.
>>> —
>>> If the EAP peer cannot connect to the EAP authenticator directly, the EAP 
>>> peer can follow the same process as that described in Section 3.6 to 
>>> perform the authentication (i.e., can connect via an intermediary entity 
>>> (e.g., proxy) that is already part of the network (already shares key 
>>> material and communicates through a secure channel with the authenticator) 
>>> and can aid in running CoAP-EAP).
>>> —
>>> When CoAP-EAP is completed and the OSCORE security association is 
>>> established with the EAP authenticator, the EAP peer receives the local 
>>> configuration parameters for the network (e.g., a network key) and can 
>>> configure a global IPv6 address. Moreover, there is no need for a CoAP 
>>> proxy an intermediary entity after a successful authentication.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 11) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.1: This sentence does not parse. If neither
>>>> suggestion below is correct, please clarify the meaning of "hence".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> For
>>>> example, on a 6LoWPAN network, the Border Router will typically act
>>>> as the EAP authenticator hence, after receiving the Router
>>>> Advertisement (RA) messages from the Border Router, the EAP peer may
>>>> engage on the CoAP-EAP exchange.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggestion #1:
>>>> For
>>>> example, in a 6LoWPAN network, the Border Router will henceforth
>>>> typically act as the EAP authenticator. After receiving the Router
>>>> Advertisement (RA) messages from the Border Router, the EAP peer may
>>>> engage in the CoAP-EAP exchange.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggestion #2:
>>>> For
>>>> example, in a 6LoWPAN network, the Border Router will typically act
>>>> as the EAP authenticator. Hence, after receiving the Router
>>>> Advertisement (RA) messages from the Border Router, the EAP peer may
>>>> engage in the CoAP-EAP exchange. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Suggestion #2
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 12) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.2: Please confirm that the "Implementation
>>>> notes" paragraph and bullet list should remain independent of Step 0
>>>> (i.e., should not be indented so that it is part of Step 0). We see
>>>> "resource of a step of the authentication" in the text, which seems
>>>> to indicate that this information applies to all steps and not just
>>>> Step 0, but we would still like you to confirm that the current
>>>> indentation levels are correct.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> * Step 0. The EAP peer MUST start the CoAP-EAP process by sending a
>>>> "POST /.well-known/coap-eap" request (trigger message). This
>>>> message carries the 'No-Response' [RFC7967] CoAP option to avoid
>>>> waiting for a response that is not needed. This is the only
>>>> message where the EAP authenticator acts as a CoAP server and the
>>>> EAP peer as a CoAP client. The message also includes a URI in the
>>>> payload of the message to indicate the resource where the EAP
>>>> authenticator MUST send the next message. The name of the
>>>> resource is selected by the CoAP server.
>>>> 
>>>> Implementation notes: When generating the URI for a resource of a
>>>> step of the authentication, the resource could have the following
>>>> format as an example "path/eap/counter", where:
>>>> 
>>>> * "path" is some local path on the device to make the path unique.
>>>> This could be omitted if desired.
>>>> 
>>>> * "eap" is the name that indicates the URI is for the EAP peer.
>>>> This has no meaning for the protocol but helps with debugging.
>>>> 
>>>> * "counter' which is an incrementing unique number for every new EAP
>>>> request.
>>>> 
>>>> So, in Figure 3 for example, the URI for the first resource would be
>>>> “a/eap/1"
>>>> 
>>>> * Step 1. ... -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Yes, the "Implementation notes" paragraph and bullet list should 
>>> remain independent of Step 0
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 13) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.2: Do "assigns" and "sends" refer to the
>>>> EAP peer or the EAP peer state machine? If the suggested text is not
>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (previous text is included for context):
>>>> * Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message sending the EAP
>>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, assigns a new resource to
>>>> the ongoing authentication process (e.g., '/a/eap/2'), and deletes
>>>> the previous one ('/a/eap/1'). Finally, sends a '2.01 Created'
>>>> response with the new resource identifier in the Location-Path
>>>> (and/or Location-Query) options for the next step.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested (guessing the EAP peer state machine):
>>>> * Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message, sending the EAP
>>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, the EAP peer state machine
>>>> assigns a new resource to the ongoing authentication process
>>>> (e.g., '/a/eap/2') and deletes the previous one ('/a/eap/1').
>>>> Finally, the EAP peer state machine sends a '2.01 Created'
>>>> response with the new resource identifier in the Location-Path
>>>> (and/or Location-Query) options for the next step. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We believe the best way to specify this is to differentiate 
>>> between "EAP peer state machine" and the CoAP-EAP application of the EAP 
>>> peer.
>>> The EAP peer state machine only deals with EAP messages. Processes EAP 
>>> requests and returns an EAP response.
>>> With that, the CoAP-EAP application within the EAP peer takes control and 
>>> manages everything CoAP related. Assigns a new resource to the ongoing 
>>> authentication process (e.g., '/a/eap/2') and deletes the previous one 
>>> ('/a/eap/1')
>>> So, a suggested new text.
>>> Step 2. The EAP peer processes the POST message sending the EAP
>>> request (EAP-Req/Id) to the EAP peer state machine, which returns
>>> an EAP response (EAP Resp/Id). Then, the CoAP-EAP application
>>> assigns a new resource to the ongoing authentication process
>>> (e.g., '/a/eap/2'), and deletes the previous one ('/a/eap/1').
>>> Finally, sends a '2.01 Created'response with the new resource
>>> identifier in the Location-Path (and/or Location-Query) options
>>> for the next step.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 14) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.2: Please clarify the meaning of "response to
>>>> carry the EAP response" in this sentence.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The EAP peer will use a response to carry the EAP response in the
>>>> payload. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The text should say:
>>> The EAP peer will use a CoAP response to carry the EAP response in the 
>>> payload.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 15) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5: The second sentence was incomplete and
>>>> difficult to follow. Per Sections 3.5.1 through 3.5.3, we updated
>>>> this section as noted below. If this is incorrect, please clarify.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> This section elaborates on how different errors are handled. From
>>>> EAP authentication failure, a non-responsive endpoint lost messages,
>>>> or an initial POST message arriving out of place.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> This section elaborates on how different errors are handled: EAP
>>>> authentication failure (Section 3.5.1), a non-responsive endpoint
>>>> (Section 3.5.2), and duplicated messages (Section 3.5.3). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 16) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5.2: We could not follow the meaning of this
>>>> run-on sentence. If the suggested text is not correct, please
>>>> provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> By default, CoAP-EAP adopts the
>>>> value of EXCHANGE_LIFETIME as a timer in the EAP peer and
>>>> Authenticator to remove the CoAP-EAP state if the authentication
>>>> process has not progressed in that time, in consequence, it has not
>>>> been completed.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> By default, CoAP-EAP adopts the
>>>> value of EXCHANGE_LIFETIME as a timer in the EAP peer and
>>>> authenticator to remove the CoAP-EAP state if the authentication
>>>> process has not progressed to completion during that time. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 17) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5.3: Does "Step 0" here refer to Step 0 in
>>>> Figure 3 or Step 0 in Figure 5? For ease of the reader, we suggest
>>>> adding a citation for the appropriate figure.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The reception of the trigger message in Step 0 containing the URI
>>>> /coap-eap needs some additional considerations, as the resource is
>>>> always available in the EAP authenticator. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] This first instance of Step 0 is referring to the complete Flow 
>>> in Figure 3.
>>> The last instance refers to Figure 5.
>>> For clarity the text would be:
>>> The reception of the trigger message (Step 0 in Figure 3) containing the 
>>> URI /coap-eap needs some additional considerations, as the resource is 
>>> always available in the EAP authenticator.
>>> If a trigger message arrives at the EAP authenticator during an ongoing 
>>> authentication with the same EAP peer, the EAP authenticator MUST silently 
>>> discard this trigger message.
>>> If an old "POST /.well-known/coap-eap" (Step 0 in Figure 5) arrives at the 
>>> EAP authenticator and there is no authentication ongoing, the EAP 
>>> authenticator may understand that a new authentication process is 
>>> requested. Consequently, the EAP authenticator will start a new EAP 
>>> authentication. However, if the EAP peer did not start any authentication 
>>> and therefore, it did not select any resource for the EAP authentication. 
>>> Thus, the EAP peer sends a '4.04 Not Found' in the response.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 18) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.5.3: The "However, if ..." sentence is
>>>> incomplete; it appears that some words are missing. Please clarify
>>>> this text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the previous and next sentences are included for context):
>>>> Consequently, the EAP authenticator will start a new EAP
>>>> authentication. However, if the EAP peer did not start any
>>>> authentication and therefore, it did not select any resource for the
>>>> EAP authentication. Thus, the EAP peer sends a '4.04 Not found' in
>>>> the response (Figure 5). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Maybe this is simpler,
>>> “However, if the EAP peer did not start any authentication, it will send a 
>>> '4.04 Not found' in the response (Figure 5).”
>>> 
>>>> 19) <!-- [rfced] Section 3.6: The following sentences do not parse.
>>>> 
>>>> If the suggested text for the first sentence is not correct, please
>>>> provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> We cannot follow the meaning of the second sentence. Please clarify
>>>> "the proxy will act as forward, and as reverse for the rest".
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the first sentence is included for context):
>>>> After that, in the
>>>> remaining exchanges the roles are reversed, being the EAP peer, the
>>>> CoAP server, and the EAP authenticator, the CoAP client. When using
>>>> a proxy in the exchange, for message 0, the proxy will act as
>>>> forward, and as reverse for the rest.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested (first sentence):
>>>> In the remaining exchanges, the roles are reversed (i.e., the EAP
>>>> peer acts as the CoAP server, and the EAP authenticator acts as the
>>>> CoAP client). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The text would be the following, hopefully it is clearer:
>>> In the remaining exchanges, the roles are reversed (i.e., the EAP
>>> peer acts as the CoAP server, and the EAP authenticator acts as the
>>> CoAP client). When using a proxy in the exchange, for message 0 it will act 
>>> as a forward proxy, and as a reverse proxy for the rest.
>>> 
>>>> 20) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: We found this sentence confusing, because
>>>> the plural "Examples" is used but the text that follows shows an
>>>> "either-or" relationship ("cipher suites that need to be negotiated
>>>> or ..."). If the suggested text is not correct, please provide
>>>> clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the previous sentence is included for context):
>>>> In the CoAP-EAP exchange, there is information that needs to be
>>>> exchanged between the two entities. Examples of this information are
>>>> the cipher suites that need to be negotiated or authorization
>>>> information (Session-lifetime).
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> In the CoAP-EAP exchange, information needs to be exchanged between
>>>> the two entities - for example, the cipher suites that need to be
>>>> negotiated, or authorization information (Session-lifetime). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 21) <!-- [rfced] Section 5: Per Figure 6, Table 4, and
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/coap-eap/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4SyTyIVA$
>>>>  >, we moved the RID-I item
>>>> so that it is the third item (Label 3, per Figure 6, Table 4, and
>>>> IANA) instead of the second; RID-C is now the second item.
>>>> Please let us know any objections.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> 2. RID-I: Is the Recipient ID of the EAP peer. The EAP
>>>> authenticator uses this value as a Sender ID for its OSCORE
>>>> Sender Context. The EAP peer uses this value as Recipient ID for
>>>> its Recipient Context.
>>>> 
>>>> 3. RID-C: Is the Recipient ID of the EAP authenticator. The EAP
>>>> peer uses this value as a Sender ID for its OSCORE Sender
>>>> Context. The EAP authenticator uses this value as Recipient ID
>>>> for its Recipient Context.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> 2. RID-C: The Recipient ID of the EAP authenticator. The EAP peer
>>>> uses this value as the Sender ID for its OSCORE Sender Context.
>>>> The EAP authenticator uses this value as the Recipient ID for its
>>>> Recipient Context.
>>>> 
>>>> 3. RID-I: The Recipient ID of the EAP peer. The EAP authenticator
>>>> uses this value as the Sender ID for its OSCORE Sender Context.
>>>> The EAP peer uses this value as the Recipient ID for its
>>>> Recipient Context. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] No objection.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 22) <!-- [rfced] Section 6.1: Does "Steps 1 and 2" here refer to
>>>> Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 3 or Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 8?
>>>> For ease of the reader, we suggest adding a citation for the
>>>> appropriate figure.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> OSCORE runs after the EAP authentication, using the cipher suite
>>>> selected in the cipher suite negotiation (Steps 1 and 2). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We refer to Figure 3 in the first instance. To Figure 8 in the 
>>> other instances in that section. Corrected text below:
>>> OSCORE runs after the EAP authentication, using the cipher suite selected 
>>> in the cipher suite negotiation (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 3). To negotiate 
>>> the cipher suite, CoAP-EAP follows a simple approach: The EAP authenticator 
>>> sends a list, in decreasing order of preference, with the identifiers of 
>>> the supported cipher suites (Step 1 in Figure 8). In the response to that 
>>> message (Step 2 in Figure 8), the EAP peer sends its choice.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 23) <!-- [rfced] Section 6.1: We had trouble following this sentence.
>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please clarify "where it can be
>>>> appreciated the disposition".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> An example of the exchange with the
>>>> cipher suite negotiation is shown in Figure 8, where it can be
>>>> appreciated the disposition of both EAP-Request/Identity and EAP-
>>>> Response/Identity, followed by the CBOR object defined in Section 5,
>>>> containing the cipher suite field for the cipher suite negotiation.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> An example exchange for the
>>>> cipher suite negotiation is shown in Figure 8. The
>>>> EAP request (EAP-Request/Identity) and EAP response
>>>> (EAP-Response/Identity) are sent; both messages include the CBOR
>>>> object (Section 5) containing the cipher suite field for the cipher
>>>> suite negotiation. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 24) <!-- [rfced] Figure 7: We note that the ASCII art has two pipes (with 
>>>> "+"
>>>> above each) between the "Data" and "cipher suites" fields, while the SVG
>>>> has vertical lines along with curved lines that intersect each
>>>> other. Please review and correct the edited copy of the XML if needed.
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We provided a new Figure in the xml attached file that hopefully 
>>> is much more clearer.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 25) <!-- [rfced] Sections 6.1 and Appendix A: Do these algorithms need
>>>> to be numbered? If yes, will this numbering scheme be clear to
>>>> readers?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> * 0) AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 (default)
>>>> 
>>>> * 1) A128GCM, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * 2) A256GCM, SHA-384
>>>> 
>>>> * 3) ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * 4) ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256
>>>> ...
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> Perhaps:
>>>> * AES-CCM-16-64-128, SHA-256 (default)
>>>> 
>>>> * A128GCM, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * A256GCM, SHA-384
>>>> 
>>>> * ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-256
>>>> 
>>>> * ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHAKE256
>>>> ...
>>>> * TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The numbers on Sections 6.1 match the values in “9.1. CoAP-EAP 
>>> Cipher Suites”.
>>> The numbers in Appendix A are the expected continuation of these, but are 
>>> not in the specification, and not in the IANA section. This text should 
>>> also solve issue 42 as well.
>>> Suggested update text:
>>> The following hash algorithms are considered in case the specification 
>>> includes DTLS support in the future (TLS_SHA256,TLS_SHA384,TLS_SHA512)
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 26) <!-- [rfced] Section 6.2: Does "Steps 7 and 8" here refer to
>>>> Steps 7 and 8 in Figure 3? If yes, for ease of the reader we suggest
>>>> adding a citation for Figure 3.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The derivation of the security context for OSCORE allows securing the
>>>> communication between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator once the
>>>> MSK has been exported, providing confidentiality, integrity, key
>>>> confirmation (Steps 7 and 8), and downgrading attack detection. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Yes, we refer to Figure 3.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 27) <!-- [rfced] Section 6.2: We clarified these sentences as noted
>>>> below. If these updates are incorrect, please clarify "the cipher
>>>> suite 0".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> If CS-C or CS-I were not sent, (i.e., default algorithms are used)
>>>> the value used to generate CS will be the same as if the default
>>>> algorithms were explicitly sent in CS-C or CS-I (i.e., a CBOR
>>>> array with the cipher suite 0).
>>>> ...
>>>> If CS-C or CS-I were not sent, (i.e., default algorithms are used)
>>>> the value used to generate CS will be the same as if the default
>>>> algorithms were explicitly sent in CS-C or CS-I (i.e., a CBOR
>>>> array with the cipher suite 0).
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> If neither CS-C nor CS-I was sent (i.e., default algorithms are
>>>> used), the value used to generate CS will be the same as if the
>>>> default algorithms were explicitly sent in CS-C or CS-I (i.e., a
>>>> CBOR array with the cipher suite value of 0).
>>>> ...
>>>> If neither CS-C nor CS-I was sent (i.e., default algorithms are
>>>> used), the value used to generate CS will be the same as if the
>>>> default algorithms were explicitly sent in CS-C or CS-I (i.e., a
>>>> CBOR array with the cipher suite value of 0). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 28) <!-- [rfced] Please review instances of the term "NULL" as used in this
>>>> document and let us know if any updates are needed. We believe that
>>>> "NULL" should be updated to either "NUL" (that is, referring to the
>>>> specific ASCII control code) or "null". -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We mean the same as the instance you can find in rfc5191 of PANA 
>>> page 16
>>> - "IETF PANA" is the ASCII code representation of the non-NULL terminated 
>>> string (excluding the double quotes around it).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 29) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.1: We changed this text as noted below.
>>>> Please review carefully (including our expansion of "AVP" for ease of
>>>> the reader), and let us know if anything is incorrect.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Note: When EAP
>>>> is proxied over an AAA framework, the Access-Request packets in
>>>> RADIUS MUST contain a Framed-MTU attribute with the value 1024, and
>>>> the Framed-MTU AVP to 1024 in DIAMETER This attribute signals the AAA
>>>> server that it should limit its responses to 1024 octets.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> Note: When EAP is proxied over a AAA framework, the
>>>> Access-Request packets in RADIUS MUST contain a Framed-MTU
>>>> attribute with a value of 1024 and, in Diameter, the Framed-MTU
>>>> Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) with a value of 1024. This information
>>>> signals the AAA server that it should limit its responses to 1024
>>>> octets. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 30) <!-- [rfced] Section 7.2: This sentence is difficult to parse. If
>>>> the suggested text is not correct, please rephrase "constrained
>>>> devices and network scenarios" and "older versions with the goal of
>>>> economization".
>>>> 
>>>> Also, please review and let us know whether this "Note:" item that is
>>>> set off in a separate paragraph should be in the <aside> element.
>>>> <aside> is defined as "a container for content that is semantically
>>>> less important or tangential to the content that surrounds it"
>>>> (https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://authors.ietf.org/en/rfcxml-vocabulary*aside__;Iw!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5DOBldVg$
>>>>  ).
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Note: For constrained devices and network scenarios, the use of the
>>>> latest versions of EAP methods (e.g., EAP-AKA' [RFC5448], EAP-TLS 1.3
>>>> [RFC9190]) is recommended in favor of older versions with the goal of
>>>> economization, or EAP methods more adapted for IoT (e.g., EAP-NOOB
>>>> [RFC9140], EAP-EDHOC [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-edhoc], etc.).
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> Note: To improve efficiency in environments with
>>>> constrained devices and networks, the latest versions of EAP methods
>>>> (e.g., EAP-AKA' [RFC5448], EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190]) are recommended over
>>>> older versions. EAP methods more adapted for IoT networks (e.g.,
>>>> EAP-NOOB [RFC9140], EAP-EDHOC [EAP-EDHOC], etc.) are also
>>>> recommended. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 31) <!-- [rfced] Section 8.2: This sentence did not parse. We updated
>>>> it as noted below. If this update is incorrect, please clarify
>>>> "can be with the transport of SAML".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Providing more fine-grained
>>>> authorization data can be with the transport of SAML in RADIUS
>>>> [RFC7833].
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> Providing more fine-grained
>>>> authorization data can be done by transporting the data using the
>>>> Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) in RADIUS [RFC7833]. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 32) <!-- [rfced] Section 8.3:
>>>> 
>>>> a) To what does "exclusively" refer in this sentence? If the
>>>> suggested text is not correct, please clarify.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the previous sentence is included for context):
>>>> Since CoAP is an application protocol, CoAP-EAP assumes certain IP
>>>> connectivity in the link between the EAP peer and the EAP
>>>> authenticator to run. This link MUST authorize exclusively
>>>> unprotected IP traffic to be sent between the EAP peer and the EAP
>>>> authenticator during the authentication with CoAP-EAP.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> This link MUST only authorize
>>>> unprotected IP traffic to be sent between the EAP peer and the EAP
>>>> authenticator during the authentication with CoAP-EAP.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We mean that this link will only allow unprotected traffic 
>>> between the EAP peer and the EAP for the purpose of running CoAP-EAP. Any 
>>> other traffic should not be allowed.
>>> 
>>> The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> b) This sentence did not parse. We updated it to make a complete
>>>> sentence. Please review this update carefully; if it is incorrect,
>>>> please clarify.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> It is worth noting that if the EAP authenticator is not
>>>> in the same link as the EAP peer and an intermediate entity helps
>>>> with this process (i.e., CoAP proxy) and the same comment applies to
>>>> the communication between the EAP peer and the intermediary.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> It is worth noting that if the EAP authenticator is not
>>>> in the same link as the EAP peer and an intermediate entity (i.e., a
>>>> CoAP proxy) helps with this process, this concept also applies to the
>>>> communication between the EAP peer and the intermediary. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 33) <!-- [rfced] Section 8.5: Does "the document" refer to RFC 6677 or
>>>> this document? Also, how may we update "(To be assigned by IANA)"?
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the previous paragraph is included for context):
>>>> According to the [RFC6677], channel binding, related to EAP, is sent
>>>> through the EAP method supporting it.
>>>> 
>>>> To satisfy the requirements of the document, the EAP lower layer
>>>> identifier (To be assigned by IANA) needs to be sent, in the EAP
>>>> Lower-Layer Attribute if RADIUS is used.
>>>> 
>>>> Perhaps:
>>>> To satisfy the requirements of this document, the EAP lower-layer
>>>> identifier for CoAP-EAP (10) needs to be sent, in the EAP
>>>> Lower-Layer Attribute if RADIUS is used.
>>>> 
>>>> Or:
>>>> To satisfy the requirements of this document, the EAP lower-layer
>>>> identifier assigned by IANA (see Section 9.4) needs to be sent, in the EAP
>>>> Lower-Layer Attribute if RADIUS is used.
>>>> -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] We believe the first proposal is ok
>>> To satisfy the requirements of this document, the EAP lower-layer
>>> identifier for CoAP-EAP (10) needs to be sent, in the EAP
>>> Lower-Layer Attribute if RADIUS is used.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 34) <!-- [rfced] Section 8.6: Does "Step 0" here refer to Step 0 in
>>>> Figure 3 or Step 0 in Figure 5? For ease of the reader, we suggest
>>>> adding a citation for the appropriate figure.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> For instance, an attacker can forge
>>>> multiple initial messages to start an authentication (Step 0) with
>>>> the EAP authenticator as if they were sent by different EAP peers. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] we refer to Figure 3.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 35) <!-- [rfced] Sections 9.1 and 9.2: The name "CoAP-EAP protocol" for 
>>>> the new
>>>> registry group reads oddly, as it means "Constrained Application
>>>> Protocol-Extensible Authentication Protocol protocol". May we change the
>>>> name of the new registry group to "CoAP-EAP"?
>>>> 
>>>> If yes, we will ask IANA to update the registry group name on
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/coap-eap/coap-eap.xhtml__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH6tPX02Xg$
>>>>  >.
>>>> (We could not find an existing IANA registry with the name "CoAP-EAP",
>>>> so this name would be unique (but we would confirm this with IANA).)
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> IANA has created a new registry titled "CoAP-EAP Cipher Suites" under
>>>> the new group name "CoAP-EAP protocol".
>>>> ...
>>>> IANA has created a new registry titled "CoAP-EAP Information element"
>>>> under the new group name "CoAP-EAP protocol". -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested changes are ok for us.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 36) <!-- [rfced] Section 9.2: Because there is no "Value" entity in the
>>>> "CoAP-EAP Information Elements" registry, we changed "Value" to
>>>> "Label" per 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/coap-eap/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4SyTyIVA$
>>>>  >. If this is
>>>> incorrect, please clarify the list of columns in the "CoAP-EAP
>>>> Information Elements" registry.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The columns of the registry are Name, Label, CBOR Type, Description
>>>> and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are
>>>> text strings.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> The columns of the registry are Name, Label, CBOR Type, Description,
>>>> and Reference, where Label is an integer and the other columns are
>>>> text strings. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The proposed text is correct.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 37) <!-- [rfced] [TS133.501]: We found a more recent version of this
>>>> specification. Because it appears that EAP will continue to be
>>>> mentioned in subsequent versions of this paper, may we update this
>>>> listing as follows?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> [TS133.501]
>>>> ETSI, "5G; Security architecture and procedures for 5G
>>>> System - TS 133 501 V15.2.0 (2018-10)", 2018.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> [TS133.501]
>>>> ETSI, "5G; Security architecture and procedures for 5G
>>>> System - TS 133 501 V18.9.0", April 2025,
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/133500_133599/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH47PGG_Jw$
>>>> 133501/18.09.00_60/ts_133501v180900p.pdf -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggestion is ok and very welcome. Thank you.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 38) <!-- [rfced] [ZigbeeIP]: We could not find this document number.
>>>> We also found that 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.zigbee.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4xoZxesQ$
>>>>  > steers to
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://csa-iot.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5J3ax9bw$
>>>>  >. When we searched 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://csa-iot.org/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5J3ax9bw$
>>>>  > for
>>>> the number 095023r34, the result was "Nothing found, please try
>>>> adjusting your search."
>>>> 
>>>> Should a different paper be listed here and cited in Appendices B and
>>>> C.5.1?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> [ZigbeeIP] Zigbee Alliance, "ZigBee IP Specification (Zigbee Document
>>>> 095023r34)", 2014. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Certainly, this seems to be an old reference. We have other 
>>> examples, the best course of action would be to remove this reference and 
>>> the associated text.
>>> Forced removal can be done by sending new specific key material to the 
>>> devices that still belong to the network, excluding the removed device, 
>>> following a model similar to CoJP for 6TiSCH [RFC9031] or Zigbee IP 
>>> [ZigbeeIP].
>>> –
>>> Another example would be when a shared Network Key is required by the 
>>> devices that join a network. An example of this Network Key can be found in 
>>> Zigbee IP [ZigbeeIP] or the THREAD protocol [THREAD].
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 39) <!-- [rfced] We found a newer version (1.4.0) of the Thread
>>>> specification. As the citation in Appendix B is general in nature,
>>>> may we update this listing as suggested below?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> [THREAD] Thread Group, "Thread specification 1.3", 2023.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> [THREAD] Kumar, S. and E. Dijk, "Thread 1.4 Features White Paper",
>>>> September 2024, 
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.threadgroup.org/Portals/0/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH7aZUQuhA$
>>>> Documents/
>>>> Thread_1.4_Features_White_Paper_September_2024.pdf>. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggestion is ok and welcome. Thank you.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 40) <!-- [rfced] Figure 9:
>>>> 
>>>> a) Please note that we changed "hanshake" to "handshake". However,
>>>> in the HTML and PDF output files, the space after the "e" in
>>>> "hanshake" was removed in the process. We cannot determine where in
>>>> the SVG a coordinate should be modified to correct the spacing.
>>>> Please correct the SVG in the edited copy of the XML.
>>>> 
>>>> b) We see "down" arrows between MSK and DTLS_PSK in the ASCII art
>>>> for this figure, but they do not appear in the SVG. If you would
>>>> like to add the arrows in the SVG, please correct the SVG in the
>>>> edited copy of the XML.
>>>> 
>>>> c) We see "(Protected with (D)TLS)" in the ASCII art but
>>>> "Protected with (D)TLS" in the SVG. If you prefer the parentheses,
>>>> please correct the SVG in the edited copy of the XML. If you prefer
>>>> that the parentheses be removed, let us know, and we will update the
>>>> ASCII art accordingly. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] New figure in rfc9820_modified.xml solves these issues.
>>> Also, for consistency, in Figure 3 there were no arrows indicating key 
>>> derivation, we also updated that Figure in the xml file.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 41) <!-- [rfced] Appendix A:
>>>> 
>>>> a) As it appears that "Steps 1 and 2" here refer to Steps 1 and 2 in
>>>> Figure 8 (as opposed to Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 3), may we add a
>>>> citation for Figure 8 for ease of the reader?
>>>> 
>>>> If the suggested text is not correct, please also clarify "if DTLS
>>>> wants to be used".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> To simplify the design in CoAP-EAP, the KDF hash algorithm
>>>> can be included in the list of cipher suites exchanged in Step 1 and
>>>> Step 2 if DTLS wants to be used instead of OSCORE.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> To simplify the design in CoAP-EAP, the KDF hash algorithm
>>>> can be included in the list of cipher suites exchanged in Steps 1 and
>>>> 2 (Figure 8) if one wants to use DTLS instead of OSCORE.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> b) Should "(RID-C) (RID-I)" be "RID-C || RID-I" per Appendix A.1?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> For the same
>>>> reason, the PSK identity is derived from (RID-C) (RID-I) as defined
>>>> in Appendix A.1. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Yes, this is correct. "(RID-C) (RID-I)" should be "RID-C || RID-I"
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 42) <!-- [rfced] Appendix A: Should "considered" be "supported" in this
>>>> sentence, along the lines of "The other supported and negotiated
>>>> cipher suites are the following" as seen in Section 6.1?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> The hash algorithms considered are the following:
>>>> 
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512
>>>> 
>>>> Possibly:
>>>> The following hash algorithms are supported:
>>>> 
>>>> * 5) TLS_SHA256
>>>> 
>>>> * 6) TLS_SHA384
>>>> 
>>>> * 7) TLS_SHA512 -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Following the previous issue (point 25)
>>> Proposed text.
>>> The following hash algorithms are considered in case the specification 
>>> includes DTLS support in the future (TLS_SHA256,TLS_SHA384,TLS_SHA512)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 43) <!-- [rfced] Appendix A.1: Because the other equations in this
>>>> document don't end in periods, we removed the period from the end of
>>>> this equation. Please let us know any concerns.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> DTLS PSK = KDF(MSK, "CoAP-EAP DTLS PSK", length).
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> DTLS PSK = KDF(MSK, "CoAP-EAP DTLS PSK", length) -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The current proposed correction is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 44) <!-- [rfced] Appendix B: Because "PSK" stands for "Pre-Shared Key",
>>>> should "a shared key PSK" be "a PSK"?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Similarly, to the example of Appendix A.1, where a shared key PSK for
>>>> DTLS is derived, it is possible to provide key material to different
>>>> link-layers after the CoAP-EAP authentication is complete. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] You are correct. "a shared key PSK" should be "a PSK"
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 45) <!-- [rfced] Appendix B: This sentence was difficult to follow.
>>>> We updated it as noted below. If this is incorrect, please clarify
>>>> the text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> How a particular link-layer technology uses the MSK to derive further
>>>> key material for protecting the link-layer or use the OSCORE
>>>> protection to distribute key material is out of the scope of this
>>>> document.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently (changed "uses the MSK ... or use the OSCORE protection" to
>>>> "uses the MSK ... or uses OSCORE protection"):
>>>> How a particular link-layer technology uses the MSK to derive further
>>>> key material for protecting the link layer or uses OSCORE protection
>>>> to distribute key material is outside the scope of this document. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 46) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C: "EAP peers (A and B), which are EAP peers.
>>>> They are the EAP peers." appeared to be some unintentionally repeated
>>>> text. We removed the extra text as noted below. If some additional
>>>> information for this bullet item was intended (for example, as was
>>>> done for the "EAP authenticator (C)" and "AAA server (AAA)" bullet
>>>> items), please provide the information.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> * 2 EAP peers (A and B), which are EAP peers. They are the EAP
>>>> peers.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> * Two EAP peers (A and B). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 47) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C: "the EAP authenticator acts as an EAP
>>>> authenticator" read oddly and was difficult to follow. We updated
>>>> this sentence as noted below. If this update is incorrect, please
>>>> clarify the text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Here, the EAP authenticator acts as an EAP authenticator in pass-
>>>> through mode.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> Here, the EAP authenticator is operating in pass-
>>>> through mode. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 48) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C: This sentence did not parse. We updated it
>>>> as noted below. If this is incorrect, please clarify "... methods
>>>> might need to be used (...) being able to ...".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> With varied EAP peers and
>>>> networks, more lightweight authentication methods might need to be
>>>> used (e.g., EAP-NOOB[RFC9140], EAP-AKA'[RFC5448], EAP-PSK[RFC4764],
>>>> EAP-EDHOC[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-edhoc], etc.) being able to adapt to
>>>> different types of devices according to organization policies or
>>>> devices capabilities.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> With varied EAP peers and
>>>> networks, authentication methods that are more lightweight (e.g.,
>>>> EAP-NOOB [RFC9140], EAP-AKA' [RFC5448], EAP-PSK [RFC4764], EAP-EDHOC
>>>> [EAP-EDHOC], etc.) and are able to adapt to different types of
>>>> devices according to organization policies or device capabilities
>>>> might need to be used. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 49) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.1: Does "while" in this sentence mean "at
>>>> the same time as" or "as long as" (per the "as long as the key
>>>> material is still valid" phrase in the "It is worth noting that the
>>>> first phase ..." paragraph)?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> This access can be repeated without contacting the EAP
>>>> authenticator, while the credentials given to A are still valid. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] It means "as long as".
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 50) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.1: We had trouble following the meaning of
>>>> "the first phase with CoAP-EAP". If the suggested text is not
>>>> correct, please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> It is worth noting that the first phase with CoAP-EAP is required to
>>>> join the EAP authenticator C's domain.
>>>> 
>>>> Suggested:
>>>> It is worth noting that to join EAP authenticator C's domain, the
>>>> first phase (authentication via CoAP-EAP) is required. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 51) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.2:
>>>> 
>>>> a) Should "AKA" be "AKA'", as used elsewhere in this document?
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> A device (A) of the domain acme.org, which uses a specific kind of
>>>> credential (e.g., AKA) and intends to join the um.es domain.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] This clarification adds more confusion than without it. Please 
>>> leave it as follows
>>> 
>>> A device (A) of the domain acme.org, which uses a specific kind of
>>> credential (e.g., AKA) and intends to join the um.es domain.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> b) This sentence does not parse. It appears that some words are
>>>> missing. Please clarify "Through the local AAA server communicate
>>>> with the home AAA server ...".
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Through the local AAA server
>>>> communicate with the home AAA server to complete the authentication
>>>> and integrate the device as a trustworthy entity into the domain of
>>>> EAP authenticator C. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors]The text hopefully is clearer as follows:
>>> Then, the local AAA server communicates with the home AAA server to 
>>> complete the authentication. This way, the device can be considered as a 
>>> trustworthy entity within the domain of the EAP authenticator C
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 52) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.5.1: We corrected the incomplete
>>>> "Where can ..." sentence as follows. If this change is not correct,
>>>> please provide clarifying text.
>>>> 
>>>> Original (the previous sentence is included for context):
>>>> For
>>>> example, in IEEE 802.15.4 networks, a new KMP ID can be defined to
>>>> add such support in the case of IEEE 802.15.9 [ieee802159]. Where
>>>> can be assumed that the device has at least a link-layer IPv6
>>>> address.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently (now one sentence that includes the expansion for "KMP"):
>>>> For
>>>> example, in IEEE 802.15.4 networks, a new Key Management Protocol
>>>> (KMP) ID can be defined to add such support in the case of IEEE
>>>> 802.15.9 [IEEE802159], where it can be assumed that the device has at
>>>> least a link-layer IPv6 address. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 53) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.5.1: Per the phrase "entity (proxy) that is
>>>> already part of the network (already shares key material and
>>>> communicates through a secure channel with the authenticator)" in the
>>>> next paragraph of this section and per Figure 10, we updated this
>>>> sentence accordingly. If this is incorrect, please clarify what
>>>> communicates through a secure channel.
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> In the case a proxy participates in CoAP-
>>>> EAP, it will be because it is already a trustworthy entity within the
>>>> domain, which communicates through a secure channel with the EAP
>>>> authenticator, as illustrated by Figure 10.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently:
>>>> In the case that a proxy participates in
>>>> CoAP-EAP, it will be because it is already a trustworthy entity
>>>> within the domain and communicates through a secure channel with the
>>>> EAP authenticator, as illustrated by Figure 10. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 54) <!-- [rfced] Appendix C.5.1: This paragraph had several issues:
>>>> This section (Appendix C.5.1) cited itself, and in the second
>>>> sentence, "As mentioned, either ..." was unclear. Also, the
>>>> second sentence was incomplete. Please review all of our updates
>>>> carefully, and let us know if anything is incorrect.
>>>> 
>>>> (Side note: We cited Section 3.6 here because although Section 3.1
>>>> mentions both direct links and linking via a proxy, it doesn't
>>>> provide any descriptive text.)
>>>> 
>>>> Original:
>>>> Thus, the EAP peer follows the same process described in
>>>> Appendix C.5.1 to perform the authentication. As mentioned, either
>>>> with a direct link to the EAP authenticator, or through an
>>>> intermediary entity (proxy) that is already part of the network
>>>> (already shares key material and communicates through a secure
>>>> channel with the authenticator) and can aid in running CoAP-EAP.
>>>> 
>>>> Currently (the direct connection is mentioned in the previous
>>>> paragraph, so we did not mention it again here):
>>>> If the EAP peer cannot connect to the EAP authenticator directly,
>>>> the EAP peer can follow the same process as that described in
>>>> Section 3.6 to perform the authentication (i.e., can connect via
>>>> an intermediary entity (proxy) that is already part of the network
>>>> (already shares key material and communicates through a secure
>>>> channel with the authenticator) and can aid in running CoAP-EAP). -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] The currently suggested text is ok. The only change would be to 
>>> set proxy as example.
>>> … an intermediary entity (e.g., proxy) that is already part of the network
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 55) <!-- [rfced] Figure 10: We see "(security association)" in the ASCII
>>>> art but "security association" in the SVG. If you prefer the
>>>> parentheses, please correct the SVG in the edited copy of the XML.
>>>> If you prefer that the parentheses be removed, let us know, and we
>>>> will update the ASCII art accordingly. -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] it is ok without parenthesis.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 56) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of
>>>> the online Style Guide at
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/*inclusive_language__;Iw!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH7Wcxz1GQ$
>>>>  >,
>>>> and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature
>>>> typically result in more precise language, which is helpful for
>>>> readers.
>>>> 
>>>> For example, please consider whether the following should be updated:
>>>> Master Session Key, Master Secret, Master Salt, Master Key -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] These are the same terms used in the EAP [RFC] standard and 
>>> OSCORE standard [RFC] from which this work depends. It is needed to 
>>> understand the terminology to which we refer.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 57) <!-- [rfced] Please let us know if any changes are needed for the
>>>> following:
>>>> 
>>>> a) The following terms were used inconsistently in this document.
>>>> We chose to use the latter forms. Please let us know any objections.
>>>> 
>>>> AAA Server / AAA server (per post-6000 published RFCs)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] AAA server
>>> 
>>>> Client registration (in running text) /
>>>> client registration (per RFC 9200)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] client registration
>>> 
>>>> b) The following terms appear to be used inconsistently in this
>>>> document. Please let us know which form is preferred.
>>>> 
>>>> "a/eap/1" (the URI for the first resource would be "a/eap/1") /
>>>> '/a/eap/1'
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] "a/eap/1"
>>> 
>>>> CBOR Object / CBOR object
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] CBOR Object
>>> 
>>>> DTLS PSK / DTLS_PSK
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] DTLS_PSK
>>> 
>>>> EAP Failure / EAP failure
>>>> (will send an EAP Failure, sends an EAP failure)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP Failure
>>> 
>>>> EAP-Request/Identity / EAP Req/Id / EAP-Req/Id
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-Request/Identity
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> EAP response / EAP Response (used generally in text, e.g.,
>>>> "an EAP response", "an EAP Response")
>>>> (We also see "EAP Response header" in Section 7.1.)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP Response
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> EAP-Response/Identity / EAP Resp/Id / EAP Response/Id
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-Response/Identity
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> EAP-X-Req (text) / EAP-X Req (Figure 3)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-X-Req
>>> We updated the figures so they are consistent
>>> 
>>>> EAP-X-Resp (text) / EAP-X Resp (Figures 3 and 9)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] EAP-X-Resp
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Network Key / network key
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] Network Key
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Option(s) / option(s) (e.g., "Location-Path Option",
>>>> "Location-Path and/or Location-Query Options",
>>>> "Location-Path or Location-Query options",
>>>> "Location-Path (and/or Location-Query) Options",
>>>> "Location-Path (and/or Location-Query) options")
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] Option(s)
>>> 
>>>> OSCORE Security Context / OSCORE security context
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] OSCORE Security Context
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Session-Lifetime / Session-lifetime / Session Lifetime /
>>>> session lifetime (in running text)
>>>> (Figure 3 and Table 4 use "Session-Lifetime".)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [AUTHORS] Session-Lifetime
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> c) Should quoting and spacing be made consistent? For example:
>>>> 
>>>> Quoting: '2.01 Created' / "2.01 Created"
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] ‘2.01 Created’
>>> 
>>>> Spacing: Payload(EAP-X Resp) / Payload (EAP-X Resp)
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] without spacing between be parenthesis
>>> 
>>>> d) Should spacing after step numbers in figures be made
>>>> consistent? For example:
>>>> 
>>>> ...
>>>> 0)| No-Response |
>>>> ... (Figure 3)
>>>> 
>>>> ...
>>>> 0) | No-Response |
>>>> ... (Figure 5) -->
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> [Authors] Without spacing is ok.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> Thank you.
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Editor/lb/rv
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> Thank you very much.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Jul 18, 2025, at 10:46 AM, rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> *****IMPORTANT*****
>>>> 
>>>> Updated 2025/07/18
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Author(s):
>>>> --------------
>>>> 
>>>> Instructions for Completing AUTH48
>>>> 
>>>> Your document has now entered AUTH48. Once it has been reviewed and
>>>> approved by you and all coauthors, it will be published as an RFC.
>>>> If an author is no longer available, there are several remedies
>>>> available as listed in the FAQ 
>>>> (https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/faq/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4mckAP4A$
>>>>  ).
>>>> 
>>>> You and you coauthors are responsible for engaging other parties
>>>> (e.g., Contributors or Working Group) as necessary before providing
>>>> your approval.
>>>> 
>>>> Planning your review
>>>> ---------------------
>>>> 
>>>> Please review the following aspects of your document:
>>>> 
>>>> * RFC Editor questions
>>>> 
>>>> Please review and resolve any questions raised by the RFC Editor
>>>> that have been included in the XML file as comments marked as
>>>> follows:
>>>> 
>>>> <!-- [rfced] ... -->
>>>> 
>>>> These questions will also be sent in a subsequent email.
>>>> 
>>>> * Changes submitted by coauthors
>>>> 
>>>> Please ensure that you review any changes submitted by your
>>>> coauthors. We assume that if you do not speak up that you
>>>> agree to changes submitted by your coauthors.
>>>> 
>>>> * Content
>>>> 
>>>> Please review the full content of the document, as this cannot
>>>> change once the RFC is published. Please pay particular attention to:
>>>> - IANA considerations updates (if applicable)
>>>> - contact information
>>>> - references
>>>> 
>>>> * Copyright notices and legends
>>>> 
>>>> Please review the copyright notice and legends as defined in
>>>> RFC 5378 and the Trust Legal Provisions
>>>> (TLP – 
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5D1hB7LA$
>>>>  ).
>>>> 
>>>> * Semantic markup
>>>> 
>>>> Please review the markup in the XML file to ensure that elements of
>>>> content are correctly tagged. For example, ensure that <sourcecode>
>>>> and <artwork> are set correctly. See details at
>>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://authors.ietf.org/rfcxml-vocabulary__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4qmIsbLQ$
>>>>  >.
>>>> 
>>>> * Formatted output
>>>> 
>>>> Please review the PDF, HTML, and TXT files to ensure that the
>>>> formatted output, as generated from the markup in the XML file, is
>>>> reasonable. Please note that the TXT will have formatting
>>>> limitations compared to the PDF and HTML.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Submitting changes
>>>> ------------------
>>>> 
>>>> To submit changes, please reply to this email using ‘REPLY ALL’ as all
>>>> the parties CCed on this message need to see your changes. The parties
>>>> include:
>>>> 
>>>> * your coauthors
>>>> 
>>>> * rfc-edi...@rfc-editor.org (the RPC team)
>>>> 
>>>> * other document participants, depending on the stream (e.g.,
>>>> IETF Stream participants are your working group chairs, the
>>>> responsible ADs, and the document shepherd).
>>>> 
>>>> * auth48archive@rfc-editor.org, which is a new archival mailing list
>>>> to preserve AUTH48 conversations; it is not an active discussion
>>>> list:
>>>> 
>>>> * More info:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf-announce/yb6lpIGh-4Q9l2USxIAe6P8O4Zc__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH73FBctPw$
>>>> 
>>>> * The archive itself:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/auth48archive/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH5RDfiTDg$
>>>> 
>>>> * Note: If only absolutely necessary, you may temporarily opt out
>>>> of the archiving of messages (e.g., to discuss a sensitive matter).
>>>> If needed, please add a note at the top of the message that you
>>>> have dropped the address. When the discussion is concluded,
>>>> auth48archive@rfc-editor.org will be re-added to the CC list and
>>>> its addition will be noted at the top of the message.
>>>> 
>>>> You may submit your changes in one of two ways:
>>>> 
>>>> An update to the provided XML file
>>>> — OR —
>>>> An explicit list of changes in this format
>>>> 
>>>> Section # (or indicate Global)
>>>> 
>>>> OLD:
>>>> old text
>>>> 
>>>> NEW:
>>>> new text
>>>> 
>>>> You do not need to reply with both an updated XML file and an explicit
>>>> list of changes, as either form is sufficient.
>>>> 
>>>> We will ask a stream manager to review and approve any changes that seem
>>>> beyond editorial in nature, e.g., addition of new text, deletion of text,
>>>> and technical changes. Information about stream managers can be found in
>>>> the FAQ. Editorial changes do not require approval from a stream manager.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Approving for publication
>>>> --------------------------
>>>> 
>>>> To approve your RFC for publication, please reply to this email stating
>>>> that you approve this RFC for publication. Please use ‘REPLY ALL’,
>>>> as all the parties CCed on this message need to see your approval.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Files
>>>> -----
>>>> 
>>>> The files are available here:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.xml__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH61uj9KFA$
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH46vzPMGQ$
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.pdf__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH4VnhbREw$
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820.txt__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH7CGA_kaw$
>>>> 
>>>> Diff file of the text:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-diff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH6IAS29qA$
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-rfcdiff.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH6sl8fsTg$
>>>>  (side by side)
>>>> 
>>>> Diff of the XML:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9820-xmldiff1.html__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH6VqyXnzw$
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Tracking progress
>>>> -----------------
>>>> 
>>>> The details of the AUTH48 status of your document are here:
>>>> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9820__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TbrbqBQ-ZV4q1lZ-2XZijFJaaOonPT3t5f_RiDDltidPVxX0OgC5zFBsKRUScKfq0HsVOUZdbzjVJ122AH41wCjt6w$
>>>> 
>>>> Please let us know if you have any questions.
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you for your cooperation,
>>>> 
>>>> RFC Editor
>>>> 
>>>> --------------------------------------
>>>> RFC9820 (draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-15)
>>>> 
>>>> Title : EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
>>>> Author(s) : R. Marin-Lopez, D. Garcia-Carrillo
>>>> WG Chair(s) : Loganaden Velvindron, Tim Hollebeek
>>>> 
>>>> Area Director(s) : Deb Cooley, Paul Wouters
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> --
>>> Dan García Carrillo
>>> ---------------------
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Dpto. de Informática, Área de Telemática, Universidad de Oviedo
>>> Escuela Politécnica de Ingeniería, C.P. 33204, Campus de Viesques, Gijón
>>> Dpcho. 2.7.8 - Edificio Polivalente
>>> Tel.: +34 985182654 (Ext. 2654) | email: garcia...@uniovi.es
>>> <rfc9820_modified.xml>
>>> 
>> 
> -- 
> Dan García Carrillo
> ---------------------
> Associate Professor
> Dpto. de Informática, Área de Telemática, Universidad de Oviedo 
> Escuela Politécnica de Ingeniería, C.P. 33204, Campus de Viesques, Gijón
> Dpcho. 2.7.8 - Edificio Polivalente
> Tel.: +34 985182654 (Ext. 2654) | email: garcia...@uniovi.es

-- 
auth48archive mailing list -- auth48archive@rfc-editor.org
To unsubscribe send an email to auth48archive-le...@rfc-editor.org

Reply via email to