Dear Gilberto,
RE Descarte's demon and the cogito, you write,
"No, I haven't forgotten about cogito ergo sum and all that. I'm
willing to concede that is a fairly persuasive argument. And so,
firstly, when I think of skepticism, I would mainly have in mind
opinions about the outside world. But secondly, I would just insert
that if you look at Buddhist philosophy there are actually some
arguments which suggest that the existence of the self still isn't as
simple a question as you or Descartes would make it."
I'm glad you admit the cogency of the Cartesian and Augustinian argument
about the existence of the self. Self is a very hard thing to deny, as the
history of Buddhism shows.
Re Buddhism: if you read more deeply into Buddhism (see my "Buddhism and the
Bahai Writings", in Lights of Irfan, Vol 8, 2007) you will see that there
isn't any unanimity in Buddhism on the issue of the 'self' or its
non-existence. There is no one consistent way to interpret the various
sutras either Pali or Mahayana, and a gamut of Buddhist positions on self
exists. For example in one of the Pali suttas, the Buddha says that his way
is a middle way between the two extremes of an unchanging permanent self and
no-self. Here's part of a paragraph from my paper:
" For example, in the Tathagatgarbha Sutra itself the Buddha says, "Good
sons, all beings, though they find themselves with all sorts of klesas
[defilements], have a tathagatagarbha [Buddha nature or Buddha essence]
that is eternally unsullied, and that is replete with virtues no different
from my own and adds, "the tathagatagarbhas of all beings are eternal and
unchanging." This concept of the tathagatagarbha is so close to a
substantial self ( see David Kalupahana below) that the Mahaparinirvana
Sutra directly identifies it with self or atman. In the twelfth chapter on
Buddha-nature, we read, "The Buddha said: "O good man! 'Self' means
'tathagatagarbha.' Every being has the Buddha Nature. This is self. Such a
self is, since the very beginning, under cover of innumerable illusions."
According to the Buddha, "The true self of the Buddha Nature is like the
diamond which cannot be crushed out," and "The shape of self that seeks to
flee from the world is the Buddha Nature. It is the best way of conceiving
self." These words suggest that the doctrine of anatman in fact denies a
superficial 'ego-self' that is absorbed in the affairs of the world; it does
not necessarily deny the existence of a deep Buddha-nature or
tathagatagarbha within the individual. As Paul Williams says, "One thing
anyway is clear: the Mahaparinirvana Sutra teaches a really existing,
permanent element . . . in sentient beings. The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala
Sutra supports this statement as does Asvaghosha's "The Awakening of Faith
in Mahayana" which states that "The Mind as phenomena (samsara) is grounded
on the Tathagata-garbha."
Moreover, in addition to the tathagatagarbha schools, Thervada Buddhism
believes in a underlying substratum or continuous self process - the
'bhavanaga' or 'life-continuum' or substratum which underlies the moments of
consciousness and provides unity and continuity. The Yogacara branch of the
Madhyamika recognise the 'alaya', which contains the karmic 'seeds' that get
passed on from moment to moment and life to life.
The extreme ontological, psychological and ethical problems associated with
the notion of mind/self as mere aggregate are exactly why tathagatgarbha,
bhavanga and alaya theory developed.
I notice you don't say anything about the being of things as something that
cannot be doubted either.
You write,
RE:
> Even your statement "But for the most part,taking a definitive position
> about ourselves or the world will require a leap of faith" is
> self-contradictory to your position.
You write,
"I don't see what would make you say that. What exactly do you think my
position is?"
In your own words, your position is what you stated immediately previously
to my response: "Personally I think skepticism is a natural default position
and in some ways it is really compelling. We don't really know *for sure*
that our various opinions about the world are true."
If we "don't really know for sure that our various opinions about the world
are true" - then we cannot make a definitive pronunciation about the world
like "But for the most part,taking a definitive position about ourselves or
the world will require a leap of faith." How could a sceptic know that for
sure? How could a sceptic know, " We don't really know *for sure* that our
various opinions about the world are true." In short, your statements refute
themselves.
You write,
>Given your view, how can you be certain
> that such a leap of faith is required to take a "definitive position about
> ourselves or the world"?
"One part of it is that I tend to think that certain knowledge is based
on deductive reasoning, but statements about the world are generally
going to be uncertain because they are based on inductive reasoning."
Deductive reasoning is not absolutely divorced from the world. Indeed, it is
checked against the world so how can a sceptic accept it since " We don't
really know *for sure* that our various opinions about the world are true."
Furthermore, deductive reasoning works on the principles of logic (identity,
non-contradiction) which themselves are based on worldly experience and
observation. Again, how can you accept this as a person who thinks
scepticism is the natural default position?
You write,
"> How do you know there even is a world?
In the strictest sense, I don't. Of course I'm going to jump out of
the way when I think I see a car and all that, but those beliefs
aren't absolutely certain in a rigorous sense."
So, you abandon your sceptical principles when it suits you. Why bother
holding beliefs that you have to abandon when the going gets rough? Why not
find beliefs that let you walk the talk?
You demonstrate Santayana's claim that "animal faith" in reality is the
natural default position for humans.
You write,
">
> Here are some things we know for sure about the world:
I think we have different definitions of when we can use the term "for
sure"."
So what do you mean by 'for sure'?
You write, re claims about Ayatollah Khomeini, the queen of England, etc.
"Claims (however extreme) about people I've never met are basically
hearsay and hearsay is not a certain source of knowledge about the
world. Even if a whole lot of people repeat that claim."
This doesn't wash. If you recognise Khomeini as a human being - as you do -
then you will know that he cannot be a duckbill platypus - or a dog. Humans
and duckbills (dogs) are essentially different. You don't need to meet
Khomeini to know that he is not a duckbill or a dog.
Nor do you need to meet the Queen of England to know she is not the queen of
France. You need merely check whether the French governmental system
includes a monarch.
RE: (2) the sun appears to rise in the east
> at dawn.
You write,
"That is actually a really interesting claim and it might take several
exchanges to unpack properly. But in general I would say that claims
about the world which are empirically-based (based on the senses) are
uncertain because your senses can deceive you. But if "appears" is the
important word in that sentence, then I would suggest that this is
precisely what a skeptic would say."
A sceptic couldn't even say that - since such 'appearing' is based on sense
evidence - and as you said immediately above, "claims
about the world which are empirically-based (based on the senses) are
uncertain because your senses can deceive you."
RE: ";(4) The interior angles of a triangle
> on a plane add up to 180 degrees."
You write,
"I would say that logical necessary statements, tautologies, along with
the various theorems of modern mathematics are also true. But I
wouldn't consider them claims about "the world"."
That's a strange thing to say given the uses of various geometries and
mathematical systems in the natural sciences.
RE:
> These are not "word-game[s]": obviously you have overlooked or are
> unfamiliar with the logical problems involved with implicitly or
explicitly
> self-referential statements.
You write,
"On the contrary, it is precisely because I'm familiar with them that I
think your argument is suspect. Self-referential statements tend to be
problematic so there is a certain wisdom in avoiding them."
In what way is my argument self-referential? Relativism has inherent
self-referential problems and so is scepticism, but not realism.
You write
" Imagine a piece of paper with two statements written on it:
1. Exactly one statement on this piece of paper is false.
2. 2 + 2 = 4 [or any other statement one would like to disprove] . . .
. And that's the same kind of word-game you were
playing in your previous arguments."
Given your "one of your favorite example", I'm not convinced you have much
familiarity of with self-referential problems.
Your example of 2 = 2 = 4 etc is fatally flawed and doesn't show any
familiarity with self-refuting propositions. Your example is patently *not*
an example of a self-referential statement.
What you have here are *two* statements which by themselves are not
inherently problematical (self-refuting, self-undermining) but become
problematical when they refer to each other.
This is quite different from a self-referential statement such as "No
absolute statement is correct" - which has inherent problems of *self*
referentiality.
What you have in both cases is a logical analysis why the statements in your
example - or relativist statements - are nonsensical, i.e. they refute each
other, although in self-referentiality, they must refute themselves.
You write RE my examples of relativist/sceptical statements
"No, I am aware of such problems but you choosing to use such
statements when you don't really have to."
I suggest you get your self some philosophical books about relativism etc
and you will see my examples are standard in reference to truth and ethical
relativism.
RE the endless cosmic shaggy dog story of deconstructonist analysis, you
write:
"Even if that is true, that doesn't seem like it would disprove
deconstructionism."
It would show that deconstruction and its methods of analysis are
self-refutational and self-undermining. After all, if it's right, then no
one can actually know what deconstruction actually says - since all texts,
including deconstructionist texts subvert themselves infinitely without ever
reaching a definitive interpretation that tells us the meaning.
When a theory shoots itself in the head like that, there's good reason to
conclude there is something fundamentally flawed with its premises and
principles. The same goes for relativism and scepticism.
RE:
>
> This however leads to problem for deconstructionism: to communicate, you
> have to stop using the method! That should tell us there is something
> fundamentally screwball about deconstructionism as a theory.
You write:
"Yeah, even if that is true, I don't see that as a problem. I don't
think deconstructionism bills itself as a method for communication,
its a method for analysis. Why should you be able to do them both
simultaneously?"
Deconstructionism bills itself as a method of analysing communications -
texts - and this method leads to non-sensical results.
It is also a method of communication (read Derrida about the form of his own
work) and seeks to communicate a method and principles. The latter undermine
the whole project of communication.
Best wishes,
Ian
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