On Nov 12, 2007 5:51 PM, Ian Kluge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Dear Gilberto,
>
> RE Descarte's demon and the cogito, you write,
>
> "No, I haven't forgotten about cogito ergo sum and all that. I'm
> willing to concede that is a fairly persuasive argument. And so,
> firstly, when I think of skepticism, I would mainly have in mind
> opinions about the outside world. But secondly, I would just insert
> that if you look at Buddhist philosophy there are actually some
> arguments which suggest that the existence of the self still isn't as
> simple a question as you or Descartes would make it."
> I'm glad you admit the cogency of the Cartesian and Augustinian argument
> about the existence of the self.
I think you are overstating what I said a bit and are putting words in
my mouth. I certainly didn't mention Augustine, for example.
Overall, I would say that there are thoughtful, intelligent people
(i.e. people who aren't morons) who are persuaded by cogito ergo sum.
And there are also people who aren't morons who would deny the
existence of the self. I don't have any particular desire to ridicule,
demonize or easily dismiss either position.
> Re Buddhism: if you read more deeply into Buddhism (see my "Buddhism and the
> Bahai Writings", in Lights of Irfan, Vol 8, 2007) you will see that there
> isn't any unanimity in Buddhism on the issue of the 'self' or its
> non-existence.
Agreed, but I don't think that matters very much in terms of the
context I was speaking in. Whether it is unanimous or not, the idea
that the self doesn't exist is certainly well-represented in Buddhist
philosophy. And if you find this perspective plausible it allows one
conceive of how thinking doesn't necessarily imply "I am".
> You write,
>
Ian:
> > Even your statement "But for the most part,taking a definitive position
> > about ourselves or the world will require a leap of faith" is
> > self-contradictory to your position.
>
> You write,
>
> "I don't see what would make you say that. What exactly do you think my
> position is?"
>
> In your own words, your position is what you stated immediately previously
> to my response: "Personally I think skepticism is a natural default position
> and in some ways it is really compelling. We don't really know *for sure*
> that our various opinions about the world are true."
Ok.
> If we "don't really know for sure that our various opinions about the world
> are true" - then we cannot make a definitive pronunciation about the world
> like "But for the most part,taking a definitive position about ourselves or
> the world will require a leap of faith."
I think this is a good example of how you sometimes might push things
a bit too far. I'm not a perfect writer but I generally try to say
what I mean. And I specifically put in expressions like "for the most
part" or "in some ways it is really compelling" precisely because I
don't want what I say taken to ridiculous extremes. I never said that
it is impossible to know or establish the truth of every proposition.
Nor do I think that "skepticism" requires that. I already gave a brief
summary of the main argument I would give in support of what I would
call skepticism.
How could a sceptic know that for
> sure? How could a sceptic know, " We don't really know *for sure* that our
> various opinions about the world are true." In short, your statements refute
> themselves.
I think you might be conflating different kinds of skepticisms. On one
level, there is skepticism when it comes to statements about the
world. (And I would have no problem defending that kind of
skepticism). On a different level there is skepticism about
epistemology (what we can know). One can be a skeptic in one sense
without being a skeptic in another.
> You write,
>
> >Given your view, how can you be certain
> > that such a leap of faith is required to take a "definitive position about
> > ourselves or the world"?
>
> "One part of it is that I tend to think that certain knowledge is based
> on deductive reasoning, but statements about the world are generally
> going to be uncertain because they are based on inductive reasoning."
>
> Deductive reasoning is not absolutely divorced from the world. Indeed, it is
> checked against the world so how can a sceptic accept it since " We don't
> really know *for sure* that our various opinions about the world are true."
in order to lead to certainty, deductive reasoning needs to start off
with true axioms. And I would suggest that you either have to start
off with certain plausible assumptions which you nevertheless have to
take on *faith*. Or you have to choose axioms which boil down to
abstract logical principles which really are "divorced from the
world".
> Furthermore, deductive reasoning works on the principles of logic (identity,
> non-contradiction) which themselves are based on worldly experience and
> observation.
I think you have a very different notion of observation than I do.
> You write,
>
> "> How do you know there even is a world?
>
> In the strictest sense, I don't. Of course I'm going to jump out of
> the way when I think I see a car and all that, but those beliefs
> aren't absolutely certain in a rigorous sense."
>
> So, you abandon your sceptical principles when it suits you. Why bother
> holding beliefs that you have to abandon when the going gets rough? Why not
> find beliefs that let you walk the talk?
I really wish you could find a way to discuss ideas without being so
insulting. In life we can't help but take chances and act on uncertain
knowledge. But just because we choose to do so doesn't disprove
skepticism.
Ian writes,
>
> ">
> > Here are some things we know for sure about the world:
>
> I think we have different definitions of when we can use the term "for
> sure"."
>
> So what do you mean by 'for sure'?
>
Absolute certainty. For example, the kind of logical certainty one
finds in mathematics. But in general, claims about the world don't
rise to that level of certainty.
> You write, re claims about Ayatollah Khomeini, the queen of England, etc.
>
> "Claims (however extreme) about people I've never met are basically
> hearsay and hearsay is not a certain source of knowledge about the
> world. Even if a whole lot of people repeat that claim."
> RE: (2) the sun appears to rise in the east
> > at dawn.
>
> You write,
>
> "That is actually a really interesting claim and it might take several
> exchanges to unpack properly. But in general I would say that claims
> about the world which are empirically-based (based on the senses) are
> uncertain because your senses can deceive you. But if "appears" is the
> important word in that sentence, then I would suggest that this is
> precisely what a skeptic would say."
>
> A sceptic couldn't even say that - since such 'appearing' is based on sense
> evidence - and as you said immediately above, "claims
> about the world which are empirically-based (based on the senses) are
> uncertain because your senses can deceive you."
I would think about this differently. The reason why I said this claim
might take a bit more exchanges to unpack properly is because one
could actually argue that "the sun appears to rise in the east at
dawn" might actually be true by definition. So for that reason it is a
different sort of claim from the previous ones.
>
> RE: ";(4) The interior angles of a triangle
> > on a plane add up to 180 degrees."
>
> You write,
>
> "I would say that logical necessary statements, tautologies, along with
> the various theorems of modern mathematics are also true. But I
> wouldn't consider them claims about "the world"."
>
> That's a strange thing to say given the uses of various geometries and
> mathematical systems in the natural sciences.
Natural scientists can make some use of mathematics but the
mathematical statements are still separate and independent from the
physical statements.For example, one can prove absolutely certain
theorems about conic sections and other curves. But statements about
elliptical orbits of comets and planets or parabolic projectile motion
etc, are empirical claims which are at a different level of certainty.
>
> RE:
> > These are not "word-game[s]": obviously you have overlooked or are
> > unfamiliar with the logical problems involved with implicitly or
> explicitly
> > self-referential statements.
>
> You write,
>
> "On the contrary, it is precisely because I'm familiar with them that I
> think your argument is suspect. Self-referential statements tend to be
> problematic so there is a certain wisdom in avoiding them."
>
> In what way is my argument self-referential? Relativism has inherent
> self-referential problems and so is scepticism, but not realism.
You seem to think of relativism as the belief that ALL propositions
are relative (including the proposition "All propositions are
relative") which is where the self-reference comes in. And you seem
to think that skepticism is the idea that All propositions are
uncertain (including the proposition "All propositions are
uncertain"). But at would say that it is possible to specific a
certain domain, a certain category of statements and say THESE
statements (e.g. religious statements or statements about the velocity
of physical objects) are relative. And if you are careful, you could
avoid the self-reference problems.
>
> You write
>
> " Imagine a piece of paper with two statements written on it:
>
> 1. Exactly one statement on this piece of paper is false.
>
> 2. 2 + 2 = 4 [or any other statement one would like to disprove] . . .
> . And that's the same kind of word-game you were
> playing in your previous arguments."
>
> Given your "one of your favorite example", I'm not convinced you have much
> familiarity of with self-referential problems.
>
Again, you need to work on being able to discuss these concepts
without being so insulting.
> Your example of 2 = 2 = 4 etc is fatally flawed and doesn't show any
> familiarity with self-refuting propositions. Your example is patently *not*
> an example of a self-referential statement.
The first statement on the sheet refers to the truth-value of the
statements on the sheet of paper. Granted it isn't super-obvious, but
the first statement is still indirectly refering to its own truth
value.
-G
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