Hi Jorge,

thanks! I guess the security consideration could say even more, e.g. that this 
behavior could be exploited by an attack that relies on the default mechanism. 
And is there anyway to hinder this attack? That should be discussed as well.



> Am 15.01.2019 um 16:49 schrieb Rabadan, Jorge (Nokia - US/Mountain View) 
> <jorge.raba...@nokia.com>:
> Mirja,
> Thank you very much for reviewing.
> Please see in-line with [JORGE].
> Thx
> Jorge
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Mirja Kühlewind <i...@kuehlewind.net>
> Date: Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 12:16 PM
> To: The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
> Cc: "draft-ietf-bess-evpn-df-election-framew...@ietf.org" 
> <draft-ietf-bess-evpn-df-election-framew...@ietf.org>, Stephane Litkowski 
> <stephane.litkow...@orange.com>, "bess-cha...@ietf.org" 
> <bess-cha...@ietf.org>, "stephane.litkow...@orange.com" 
> <stephane.litkow...@orange.com>, "bess@ietf.org" <bess@ietf.org>
> Subject: Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on 
> draft-ietf-bess-evpn-df-election-framework-07: (with COMMENT)
> Resent-From: <alias-boun...@ietf.org>
> Resent-To: <jorge.raba...@nokia.com>, <satya...@cisco.com>, 
> <saja...@cisco.com>, <jdr...@juniper.net>, <kiran.naga...@nokia.com>, 
> <senthil.sathap...@nokia.com>
> Resent-Date: Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 12:16 PM
>    Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
>    draft-ietf-bess-evpn-df-election-framework-07: No Objection
>    When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>    email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>    introductory paragraph, however.)
>    Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>    for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>    The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bess-evpn-df-election-framework/
>    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>    First one minor editorial comment:
>    Sec 3.2 "Otherwise if even a single advertisement for the type-4 route is
>           not received with the locally configured DF Alg and capability,
>           the Default DF Election algorithm (modulus) algorithm MUST be
>           used as in [RFC7432]."
>    I believe you meant a single advertisement is received without the 
> configured
>    DF Alg and capability (or a different one I guess), and not that the
>    advertisement is not received at all (because that might be hard to check),
>    right? Maybe you can rephrase this sentence a bit to make the intention 
> more
>    clear!
> [JORGE] we changed it to the following:
> " - Otherwise if even a single advertisement for the type-4 route is received 
> without the locally configured DF Alg and capability, the Default DF 
> Election..."
>    However, think about this further, I wondering if there is something here 
> that
>    such be discussed in the security considerations, e.g. how easy would it 
> be for
>    an attacker to disturb the algo selection and cause a fallback to the 
> default
>    scheme...?
> [JORGE] yep, good point. We added this in the security section, also based on 
> the comments from another reviewer:
> "Note that the network will not benefit of the new procedures if the DF 
> Election Alg is not consistently configured on all the PEs in the ES (if 
> there is no unanimity among all the PEs, the DF Election Alg falls back to 
> the Default [RFC7432] DF Election)."

BESS mailing list

Reply via email to