On 6/28/2015 10:07 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
Worryingly large payment providers have shown
willingness(4) to consider extreme measures such as entering into legal
contracts directly with large miners to ensure their transactions get mined.
This is a significant centralization risk and it is not practical or even
possible for small miners to enter into these contracts, leading to a situation
where moving your hashing power to a larger pool will result in higher profits
from hashing power contracts; if these payment providers secure a majority of
hashing power with these contracts inevitably there will be a temptation to
kick non-compliant miners off the network entirely with a 51% attack.
Your incomprehensible meddling with successful usage patterns threatens
to have unintended consequences directly in opposition to your own
stated goal of decentralization. And yet you persist.
As we deliberately break things and turn the P2P network into a
completely unpredictable hodge-podge of relay policies, we should expect
many more participants to bypass the P2P network entirely.
Many of the pieces are already in place.
If we wanted the P2P network to have more predicable behavior, it would
be possible for nodes to provide incentives to their neighbors. For
example, if you had a pair of nodes, you could test your peers to see
that they actually do relay "standard" transactions. This would have
emergent usability benefits for the P2P network as a whole.
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