On Tuesday, June 30, 2015 11:41:29 PM Peter Grigor wrote: > The block size debate centers around one concern it seems. To wit: if block > size is increased malicious miners may publish unreasonably large "bloated" > blocks. The way a miner would do this is to generate a plethora of private, > non-propagated transactions and include these in the block they solve. > > It seems to me that these bloated blocks could easily be detected by other > miners and full nodes: they will contain a very high percentage of > transactions that aren't found in the nodes' own memory pools. This > signature can be exploited to allow nodes to reject these bloated blocks. > The key here is that any malicious miner that publishes a block that is > bloated with his own transactions would contain a ridiculous number of > transactions that *absolutely no other full node has in its mempool*. > > Simply put, a threshold would be set by nodes on the allowable number of > non-mempool transactions allowed in a solved block (say, maybe, 50% -- I > really don't know what it should be). If a block is published which > contains more that this threshold of non-mempool transactions then it is > rejected. > > If this idea works the block size limitation could be completely removed.
This is easily defeated simply by broadcasting the bloat beforehand... Luke _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
