Chris Priest 於 2015-12-19 22:47 寫到:
On 12/19/15, jl2012 <jl2...@xbt.hk> wrote:
Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 22:34 寫到:
Block witholding attacks are only possible if you have a majority of
hashpower. If you only have 20% hashpower, you can't do this attack.
Currently, this attack is only a theoretical attack, as the ones with
all the hashpower today are not engaging in this behavior. Even if
someone who had a lot of hashpower decided to pull off this attack,
they wouldn't be able to disrupt much. Once that time comes, then I
think this problem should be solved, until then it should be a low
priority. There are more important things to work on in the meantime.
This is not true. For a pool with 5% total hash rate, an attacker only
needs 0.5% of hash rate to sabotage 10% of their income. It's already
enough to kill the pool
This begs the question: If this is such a devastating attack, then why
hasn't this attack brought down every pool in existence? As far as I'm
aware, there are many pools in operation despite this possibility.
It did happen:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/28242v/eligius_falls_victim_to_blocksolution_withholding/
The worst thing is that the proof for such attack is probabilistic, not
deterministic.
A smarter attacker may even pretend to be many small miners, make it
even more difficult or impossible to prove who are attacking.
Then shouldn't this be something the pool deals with, not the bitcoin
protocol?
The only solution is to ask for KYC registration, unless one could
propose
a cryptographic solution that does not require a consensus fork.
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