On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 11:06 PM, Sergio Demian Lerner <sergio.d.ler...@gmail.com> wrote: > Congratulations! > > It a property of the SKCP system that the person who performed the trusted > setup cannot extract any information from a proof? > > In other words, is it proven hard to obtain information from a proof by the > buyer?
Yes, the secrecy is information theoretic (assuming no implementation bugs); beyond the truth of the outcome. This holds even if the initialization is malicious. The soundness of this scheme is computational-- we're trusting a deep stack of cryptographic assumptions that the proofs cannot be forged. _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
