https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/440
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8636
This document specifies proposed changes to the Bitcoin transaction validity 
rules to fix the malleability of extra stack element for OP_CHECKMULTISIG and 
OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY.

The original plan was to do the LOW_S and NULLDUMMY (BIP146) together with 
segwit in 0.13.1. However, as we discovered some undocumented behavior in 
LOW_S, we may want to deploy the LOW_S softfork in a later release. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8533#issuecomment-243973512

I will edit the BIP146 later.

  BIP: ?
  Title: Dealing with dummy stack element malleability
  Author: Johnson Lau <jl2...@xbt.hk>
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 2016-09-02

Abstract

This document specifies proposed changes to the Bitcoin transaction validity 
rules to fix the malleability of extra stack element for OP_CHECKMULTISIG and 
OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY.

Motivation

Signature malleability refers to the ability of any relay node on the network 
to transform the signature in transactions, with no access to the relevant 
private keys required. For non-segregated witness transactions, signature 
malleability will change the txid and invalidate any unconfirmed child 
transactions. Although the txid of segregated witness (BIP141) transactions is 
not third party malleable, this malleability vector will change the wtxid and 
may reduce the efficiency of compact block relay (BIP152).

A design flaw in OP_CHECKMULTISIG and OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY makes them 
consuming an extra stack element ("dummy element") after signature validation. 
The dummy element is not inspected in any manner, and could be replaced by any 
value without invalidating the script. This document specifies a new rule to 
fix this signature malleability.

Specification

To fix the dummy element malleability, a new consensus rule ("NULLDUMMY") is 
deployed to require that the dummy element MUST be the empty byte array. 
Anything else makes the script evaluate to false immediately. The NULLDUMMY 
rule applies to OP_CHECKMULTISIG and OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY in pre-segregated 
scripts, and also pay-to-witness-script-hash scripts described in BIP141.

Deployment

This BIP will be deployed by "version bits" BIP9 using the same parameters for 
BIP141 and BIP143, with the name "segwit" and using bit 1.

For Bitcoin mainnet, the BIP9 starttime is midnight TBD UTC (Epoch timestamp 
TBD) and BIP9 timeout is midnight TBD UTC (Epoch timestamp TBD).

For Bitcoin testnet, the BIP9 starttime is midnight 1 May 2016 UTC (Epoch 
timestamp 1462060800) and BIP9 timeout is midnight 1 May 2017 UTC (Epoch 
timestamp 1493596800).

Compatibility

The reference client has produced compatible signatures from the beginning, and 
the NULLDUMMY rule has been enforced as relay policy by the reference client 
since v0.10.0. There has been no transactions violating the requirement being 
added to the chain since at least August 2015. In addition, every non-compliant 
signature can trivially be converted into a compliant one, so there is no loss 
of functionality by this requirement.

Implementation

An implementation for the reference client is available at 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/8636

Acknowledgements

This document is extracted from the previous BIP62 proposal, which was composed 
by Pieter Wuille and had input from various people.

Copyright

This document is placed in the public domain.
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