Nodes are by design not supposed to be identifiable in any way, including persisting identities across IPs changes or when connecting over different networks (e.g. clearnet/tor). Anything that makes Bitcoin less private is a step backwards. Also absolute node count is pretty meaningless since only fully validating nodes that participate in economic activity really matter.
As a side note, this should probably have started out as a bitcoin-discuss post. On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 4:04 PM, John Hardy via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > The discussion of UASF got me thinking about whether such a method might > lead to sybil attacks, with new nodes created purely to inflate the node > count for a particular implementation in an attempt at social engineering. > > I had an idea for an anonymous, opt-in, unique node identification > mechanism to help counter this. > > This would give every node the opportunity to create a node > ‘address’/unique identifier. This could even come in the form of a Bitcoin > address. > > The node on first installation generates and backs up a private key. The > corresponding public key becomes that node’s unique identifier. If the node > switches to a new software version or a new IP, the identifier can remain > constant if the node operator chooses. > > Asking a node for its identifier can be done by sending a message the > command ‘identify’ and a challenge. The node can then respond with its > unique identifier and a signature for the challenge to prove it. The node > can also include what software it is running and sign this information so > it can be verified as legitimate by third parties. > > Why would we do this? > > Well, it adds a small but very useful piece of data when compiling lists > of active nodes. > > Any register of active nodes can have a record of when a node identifier > was “first seen”, and how many IPs the same identifier has broadcast from. > Also, crucially, we could see what software the node operator has been seen > running historically. > > This information would make it easy to identify patterns. For example if a > huge new group of nodes appeared on the network with no history for their > identifier they could likely be dismissed as sybil attacks. If a huge > number of nodes that had been reporting as Bitcoin Core for an extended > period of time started switching to a rival implementation, this would add > credibility but not certainty (keys could be traded), that the shift was > more organic. > > This would be trivial to implement, is (to me?) non-controversial, and > would give a way for a node to link itself to a pseudo-anonymous identity, > but with the freedom to opt-out at any time. > > Keen to hear any thoughts? > > Thanks, > > John Hardy > > j...@seebitcoin.com > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > >
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