Good morning,
>ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>> Hodlers have much greater power in hardfork situations than miners
>
>Not when hodlers are more evenly split between coins. Miners will prefer
>the coin with higher transaction fees which will erode hodler confidence
>via longer delays. This means transaction fees will evolve to the highest
>that common marketplace users can accepet (they are not intereseted in
>hodler security), not the lowest technologically feasible fee that provides
>the greatest security. Large blocks reduce network security while giving
>the higher total transaction fees to miners even as it can reduce fees per
>coin for users. The mining "lobby" will always describe this as "best for
>users". Non-hodling users and miners logically prefer SegWit2x.
Hodlers still have greater power than non-hodling users, whether miners or
day-traders.
Hodlers holding millions in coin, total, can greatly drop price of any
undesired hardfork.
Miners will prefer the coin with higher transaction fees as measured in
real-world value. Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per
block, whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the
unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners will
still prefer the wanted chain regardless. What the chains will compete in is
the real-world value of the total mining reward.
Hodlers hodl all the cards here.
>ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>> BCH changed its difficulty algorithm, and it is often considered to be to
>its detriment due to sudden hashpower oscillations
>
>BCH has survived this long because they did NOT use the bitcoin difficulty
<snip>
All this speculation seems to suggest to me simply that a difficulty change
leads to keeping a chain alive unnecessarily, when by rights, it should be dead
and laid to rest.
If Bitcoin needs some sudden change in difficulty algorithm to survive, then it
has failed. Feel free to do your own hardfork into yet another derivative
altcoin.
>Bitcoin has developers!
>
>And those developers can publish a contingency plan!
>
>And that contingency plan can be an emergency hard fork to a different
>retarget algorithm.
>
>And that emergency hard fork can gain consensus if it is broadly preferred
>over the status quo.
Every hardfork is an invitation to shatter the community even further than it
already is. There is no need for further shattering.
The idea that an emergency hardfork to a different difficulty algorithm is
necessary arises from a lack of understanding of just how much power hodlers
have over the destiny of a coin.
Every hodler who rejects a hardfork, will sell the hardfork coin, increasing
its supply and reducing its price.
Every miner who mines a rejected hardfork, creates new tokens in the hardfork,
increasing its supply and reducing its price.
Coins that are hedl will remain hedl, and are not part of the supply. Thus
coins on the desired chain will remain high in price, regardless of available
transaction rate. The lack of freshly-minted coins also contracts the supply.
In the end, this will result in the same behavior as in BCH, where hodlers sodl
the unwanted hardfork as quickly as they could. Indeed, due exactly to miner
support, 2X is much more likely to quickly drop in price than BCH did. I am
sure you have seen the images pointing out how easy it was to determine when
BCH blocks arrived: they arrived a little before each dip in BCH price. Fast
2X block rate will lead to faster 2X death, with its miners becoming bagholders.
As most Core developers hodl vast amounts, it is far more likely that any
hardfork that goes against what Core wishes will collapse, simply by Core
developers acting in their capacity as hodlers of Bitcoin, without needing to
do any special action in their capacity as developers.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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