Thank you very much for writing this up.  It's worth noting that there can be 
multiple roots for the transactions that are getting replaced.

So for rule 3, you probably want a feeRate >= the max "package fee rate" of all 
replaced roots.

I am very happy with this proposal in general, as it's clearly a step in the 
right direction for making transaction replacement practically usable for 
todays services.

However, I think your new rule 4 is a bit weak. The logical extension of your 
proposal would be to allow a transaction (say B) be able to replace 
transactions (say A) by purely paying a higher fee rate, /even if it's less 
absolute fee/. In this simple example of B replacing A -- B should pay at 
least:   (a.FeeRate * b.size) + relayFeeRate*(a.size + b.size)



-------- Original Message --------
 On February 12, 2018 10:52 AM, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev 
<> wrote:

>I think it is worth revisiting BIP 125's replace-by-fee policy for when to 
>replace transactions.
>The current policy can be problematic. As noted earlier by Rhavar, sometimes 
>one's transaction becomes pinned making it infeasible to fee bump with RBF.  
>This happens when one makes a normal payment to a large commercial service, 
>and, while the transaction remains unconfirmed, the commercial service creates 
>a low-fee-rate sweep of one's payment, among a collection of others.  If one 
>wants to RBF this original payment, for example to get confirmation of the 
>change output for use in further transactions, the current BIP 125 rules 
>require that you make a fee bump that exceeds the combined total fees of the 
>original transaction and the low-fee-rate sweep of the commercial service.
>The problem is that, while the fee rate of the sweep is low, the absolute size 
>of the fee can still be large, making it infeasible to RBF the original 
>transaction.  BIP 125 was defined back in 2015, when perhaps rational miners 
>did care about absolute fee amounts. However, today we are in an era where 
>rational miners care about fee-rates more than absolute fees.  The fee-rate of 
>the large sweep transaction is low enough that we do not expect that miners 
>will be mining it in the same block as the original transaction.  Today, a 
>rational miner will prefer a fee-bumped version of original transaction 
>without consideration of the low-fee sweep transaction (or at least 
>discounting the low-fee sweep in proportion to the miner's hash-rate fraction).
>Let me quote the five rules that define the current BIP 125 policy:
>>One or more transactions currently in the mempool (original
>>transactions) will be replaced by a new transaction (replacement
>>transaction) that spends one or more of the same inputs if,
>>1. The original transactions signal replaceability explicitly or through 
>>inheritance as described in the above Summary section.
>>2. The
>> replacement transaction does not contain any new unconfirmed inputs 
>>that did not previously appear in the mempool. (Unconfirmed inputs are 
>>inputs spending outputs from currently unconfirmed transactions.)
>>3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid 
>>by the original transactions.
>>4. The
>> replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above
>> the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.  For example, if 
>>the minimum relay fee is 1 satoshi/byte and the replacement transaction 
>>is 500 bytes total, then the replacement must pay a fee at least 500 
>>satoshis higher than the sum of the originals.
>>5. The number of 
>>original transactions to be replaced and their descendant transactions 
>>which will be evicted from the mempool must not exceed a total of 100 
>>To address the new reality of rational miners' consideration, I propose 
>>changing rules 3 and 4 to something like the following.
>3'. The replacement transaction pays a fee rate of at least the effective fee 
>rate of any chain of transactions from the set of original transactions that 
>begins with the root of the original transaction set.
>4'. The
> replacement transaction must also pay for replacing the original transactions 
> at or above
> the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.  For example, if 
>the minimum relay fee is 1 satoshi/byte and the replacement transaction and 
>the original transactions are 1000 bytes total, then the replacement must pay 
>a fee at least 1000 
>satoshis higher than the fee of the root transaction of the original 
>Rule 3' is a fancy way of saying that the replacement transaction must have a 
>fee rate that is larger than the package fee rate of the root of the set of 
>transactions it replaces, where the package fee rate is the fee rate implied 
>by considering CPFP.
>Rule 4' is an amended anti-spam rule that is intended to avoid DOS attacks 
>from churning the mempool. I don't know if it is really necessary to pay for 
>the size of the original transactions being evicted, but some people I chatted 
>with thought it could be important.
>Other people on the mailing list have been thinking about RBF policy for far 
>longer than I have, so I wouldn't be surprised if my proposal above is naive.  
>However, I think it can start a conversation about addressing the problems 
>with the current RBF policy.

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