Hash rate cannot get “more uneconomical”. Mining will always seek a return equal to the cost of capital, as does all production, and the energy expended will always be fundamentally a function of the fee level and energy price. Fee level is determined by variable demand for a fixed supply of confirmation.
When you say greed you are simply referring to economically-rational behavior. It canny be eliminated, nor would that be a benefit. WRT energy consumption, there is nothing that can be done to reduce it except for people to stop using Bitcoin or for energy to get more expensive. e > On Sep 15, 2018, at 15:45, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev > <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > > I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And > this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually > happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls? > > I would prefer to see (not only with your proposal) greater bias toward > hashrate being exponentially more uneconomical the more it rises to stifle > greed. The current level of mining already greatly exceeds that necessary for > the stability of the network and far lower hashrates are completely > acceptible provided the network is protected from large switch-ons, which I > say is achievable. > > I do have other thoughts to approach greed that I have not yet made formal on > this list, much unrelated to your proposal, but, I see freedom of use of > Bitcoin needing to be censorship resistant but not necessarily mining > provided it is protected enough or free or flexible enough to allow for, say, > 50k globally distributed standard mining hardware units to exist operating at > any one time profitably. That said, I am PoW only and not PoS orientated. > > From: akarama...@gmail.com <akarama...@gmail.com> on behalf of Andrew > <onelinepr...@gmail.com> > Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2018 2:01:19 AM > To: Damian Williamson > Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention > > @Moral Agent: No problem. I did ask in the first post what the current > plans are for selfish miner prevention. So if anyone has any other > relevant ideas (not just for selfish mining but for making mining more > decentralized and competetive), then please post it, but I just prefer > to focus on my proposal more than others. > > @Damian: I think you are concerned that this will incentivize more > global resource consumption and will be detrimental to our > environment? Personally, I believe centralization of energy does more > harm to the environment rather than total energy consumption. If > Bitcoin helps "power" to become more decentralized, then I wouldn't be > surprised if total (global) energy consumption actually decreases. The > debt based economy is forcing us to continuously grow and use up more > resources, and collectivism is turning individuals into > super-organisms capable of doing much more harm to the environment > than can be done by one or a just a few individuals working > independently. In my proposal, I actually allow for changing > environmental conditions by measuring only the peak hashrate of the > past year, and not the full history of blocks. > > On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Damian Williamson <willt...@live.com.au> > wrote: > >>This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate > >> rises. > > > > > > Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought about > > moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will > > consume all available resources within the colony's objective just to spread > > as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individual > > returns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed model > > := bacteria. > > > > ________________________________ > > From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > <bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Andrew via > > bitcoin-dev <email@example.com> > > Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM > > To: Bitcoin Dev > > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention > > > > I discussed this more at bitcointalk: > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0 > > > > The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining > > and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding, > > and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in > > order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of > > changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees. > > > > You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk > > thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of > > "reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout > > script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total > > fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "reserve" > > (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee will > > be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h > > and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day), > > a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction > > (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be > > released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in > > that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps > > rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can be > > used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for > > paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block > > space). > > > > This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since > > if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners. > > Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising > > hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require > > transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees. > > > > I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there > > is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the > > block reward, but they will get more important, and this change > > wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners > > have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the > > anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements > > for validation are quite small I believe. > > > > On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew <onelinepr...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to > >> mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently. > >> What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the > >> future plans? > >> > >> One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according > >> to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year) > >> consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1 > >> day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can > >> then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at > >> peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of > >> 0.5 r. > >> > >> If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then > >> they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that, > >> the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their > >> interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate. > >> > >> What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due > >> to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to > >> be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment > >> algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising > >> indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining. > >> > >> Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion > >> of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak. > >> > >> > >> -- > >> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647 > > > > > > > > -- > > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647 > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > firstname.lastname@example.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > -- > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647 > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > email@example.com > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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