Hash rate cannot get “more uneconomical”. Mining will always seek a return 
equal to the cost of capital, as does all production, and the energy expended 
will always be fundamentally a function of the fee level and energy price. Fee 
level is determined by variable demand for a fixed supply of confirmation.

When you say greed you are simply referring to economically-rational behavior. 
It canny be eliminated, nor would that be a benefit.

WRT energy consumption, there is nothing that can be done to reduce it except 
for people to stop using Bitcoin or for energy to get more expensive.


> On Sep 15, 2018, at 15:45, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev 
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And 
> this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually 
> happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
> I would prefer to see (not only with your proposal) greater bias toward 
> hashrate being exponentially more uneconomical the more it rises to stifle 
> greed. The current level of mining already greatly exceeds that necessary for 
> the stability of the network and far lower hashrates are completely 
> acceptible provided the network is protected from large switch-ons, which I 
> say is achievable.
> I do have other thoughts to approach greed that I have not yet made formal on 
> this list, much unrelated to your proposal, but, I see freedom of use of 
> Bitcoin needing to be censorship resistant but not necessarily mining 
> provided it is protected enough or free or flexible enough to allow for, say, 
> 50k globally distributed standard mining hardware units to exist operating at 
> any one time profitably. That said, I am PoW only and not PoS orientated.
> From: akarama...@gmail.com <akarama...@gmail.com> on behalf of Andrew 
> <onelinepr...@gmail.com>
> Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2018 2:01:19 AM
> To: Damian Williamson
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
> @Moral Agent: No problem. I did ask in the first post what the current
> plans are for selfish miner prevention. So if anyone has any other
> relevant ideas (not just for selfish mining but for making mining more
> decentralized and competetive), then please post it, but I just prefer
> to focus on my proposal more than others.
> @Damian: I think you are concerned that this will incentivize more
> global resource consumption and will be detrimental to our
> environment? Personally, I believe centralization of energy does more
> harm to the environment rather than total energy consumption. If
> Bitcoin helps "power" to become more decentralized, then I wouldn't be
> surprised if total (global) energy consumption actually decreases. The
> debt based economy is forcing us to continuously grow and use up more
> resources, and collectivism is turning individuals into
> super-organisms capable of doing much more harm to the environment
> than can be done by one or a just a few individuals working
> independently. In my proposal, I actually allow for changing
> environmental conditions by measuring only the peak hashrate of the
> past year, and not the full history of blocks.
> On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Damian Williamson <willt...@live.com.au> 
> wrote:
> >>This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate
> >> rises.
> >
> >
> > Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought about
> > moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will
> > consume all available resources within the colony's objective just to spread
> > as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individual
> > returns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed model
> > := bacteria.
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Andrew via
> > bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM
> > To: Bitcoin Dev
> > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
> >
> > I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
> > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
> >
> > The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
> > and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
> > and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
> > order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of
> > changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.
> >
> > You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk
> > thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of
> > "reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout
> > script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total
> > fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "reserve"
> > (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee will
> > be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h
> > and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),
> > a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction
> > (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be
> > released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in
> > that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps
> > rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can be
> > used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for
> > paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block
> > space).
> >
> > This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since
> > if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.
> > Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising
> > hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require
> > transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.
> >
> > I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there
> > is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the
> > block reward, but they will get more important, and this change
> > wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners
> > have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the
> > anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements
> > for validation are quite small I believe.
> >
> > On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew <onelinepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to
> >> mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently.
> >> What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the
> >> future plans?
> >>
> >> One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according
> >> to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)
> >> consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1
> >> day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can
> >> then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at
> >> peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of
> >> 0.5 r.
> >>
> >> If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then
> >> they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that,
> >> the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their
> >> interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.
> >>
> >> What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due
> >> to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to
> >> be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment
> >> algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising
> >> indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.
> >>
> >> Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion
> >> of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28  49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28  49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647
> > _______________________________________________
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> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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