Since the user can't prove that they are using this technique, or petertodd's timelock encryption for that matter, an attacker has little incentive to stop physically attacking until they have a spendable UTXO.
I believe you can get the same effect with on-chain timelocks, or delete-the-bits plus a rangeproof and a zero-knowledge proof that the rangeproof corresponds to some secret that can be used to derive the expected public key. I think Jeremy Rubin had an idea for such a proof. Also, adam3us has described a similar thought here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=311000.0 - Bryan On Fri, Oct 4, 2019, 4:43 AM Saulo Fonseca via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hi everyone > > If you are a hodler, I like to propose the creation of a key stretching as > a new layer of protection over your current wallet. >
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