В Wed, 13 May 2020 21:03:17 +0200
Ruben Somsen <rsom...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Or perhaps you're referring to the issue ZmnSCPxj pointed out after
> that, where refund transaction #1 and the success transaction could
> both become valid at the same time. It would make sense for the test
> to pick up on that, but I believe that is ultimately also not an
> issue (see my last reply in the thread).

This one.

The issue as I see it: Bob can not broadcast success_tx and wait until
Alice has broadcasted refund_tx_1. While refund_tx_1 is in the mempool,
Bob gives success_tx to the friendly miner to have a chance to
invalidate success_tx. Bob already learned secretAlice, so he grabs
his LTC back. If the Bob-friendly miner has luck, success_tx is
confirmed while refund_tx_1 is invalidated, and Bob now have both LTC
and BTC, while Alice is out of her BTC.

> >I did not understand what the destination of Alice&Bob cooperative
> >spend  
> of refund_tx#1 will be
> This transaction can be spent by Alice & Bob right away or by Alice a
> day later (in relative time, so the tx has to confirm first). The
> Alice & Bob condition is there purely to ensure that Bob can spend
> the money before Alice once he receives her key at the end of the
> protocol.

Ah, so this is possible because of the step 5 in the diagram: ``Alice
gives Bob her key ("Alice")'' -- As I understand, this is a way to deny
Alice to use refund_tx_1.

Then if Alice gives her _key_ to Bob before Bob has to share secretBob
via success_tx, could Bob just spend the Alice&Bob output of the
very first, "commitment" transaction that locks BTC ? Bob will receive
BTC, and the LTC can be locked forever, but Bob doesn't care, he got
his BTC.
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