Good morning Mike, > ZmnSCPxj, > > The growing tare in growing disagreement continues to divide mining capacity > while the network waits for formation of future blocks - you'll never get to > complete consensus unless three is a way to avoid ambiguity in disagreement, > which you have not addressed. The topic of my discussion is an exploitable > condition, your three block plan does not add up. > > I wrote the exploit before I wrote the paper. It is telling that still no one > here has refenced the threat model, which is the largest section of the > entire 8 page paper. The security came before the introduction of FPNC > because security fundamentals is what drives the necessity for the solution. > > The text you are reading right now was delivered using the mailing list > manager Majordomo2, which I shelled in 2011 and got a severity metric and an > alert in the DHS newsletter. Correct me if I am wrong, but I bet that just of > my exploits has probably popped more shells than everyone on this thread > combined. Cryptography? Sure, I'll brag about the time I hacked Square > Inc. This is actually my current favorite crypto exploit — it was the time I > used DKIM signature-malleability to conduct a replay-attack that allowed an > adversary to replay another user's transactions an unlimited number of times. > After receiving a normal payment from another Square user you could empty > their account. This was reported ethically and it was a mutual joy to work > with such a great team. Now it is not just impact, but I am also getting the > feeling that I have collected more CVEs, all this is to say that I'm not new > to difficult vendors.
Argument screens off authority, thus, even if I have no CVEs under this pseudonym, argument must still be weighted more highly than any authority you may claim. > To be blunt; some of you on this thread are behaving like a virgin reading a > trashy love novel and failing to see the point — Just because you aren't > excited, doesn't mean that it isn't hot. > > The exploit described in this paper was delivered to the Bitcoin-core > security team on August 4 at 9:36 PM PST. The industry standard of 90 days > gives you until November 2nd. Now clearly, we need more time. However, if the > consensus is a rejection, then there shouldn't be any concerns with a > sensible 90-day disclosure policy. I am not a member of this security team, and they may have better information and arguments than I do, in which case, I would defer to them if they are willing to openly discuss it and I find their arguments compelling. The attack you describe is: * Not fixable by floating-point Nakamoto consensus, as such a powerful adversary can just as easily prevent propagation of a higher-score block. * Broken by even a single, manually-created connection between both sides of the chain-split. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
