‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On Sunday, December 6, 2020 5:04 AM, David A. Harding <d...@dtrt.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 05, 2020 at 11:10:51PM +0000, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> > I think these results really show there is no reason to try to
> > maintain the old-software-can-send-to-future-segwit-versions property,
> > given that more than one not just didn't support it, but actually sent
> > coins into a black hole.
>
> I don't think this is a good criteria to use for making a decision. We
> shouldn't deny users of working implementations the benefit of a feature
> because some other developers didn't implement it correctly.
>
> > Thus, I agree with Rusty that we should change the checksum for v1+
> > unconditionally.
>
> I disagreed with Rusty previously and he proposed we check to see how
> disruptive an address format change would be by seeing how many wallets
> already provide forward compatibility and how many would need to be
> updated for taproot no matter what address format is used. I think that
> instead is a good criteria for making a decision.
>
> I understand the results of that survey to be that only two wallets
> correctly handled v1+ BIP173 addresses. One of those wallets is Bitcoin
> Core, which I personally believe will unhesitatingly update to a new
> address format that's technically sound and which has widespread support
> (doubly so if it's just a tweak to an already-implemented checksum
> algorithm).

Hi Dave,

You're right to point out there is nuance I skipped over.

Let's look at the behavior of different classes of software/services that exist 
today when trying to send to v1+ addresses:

(A) Supports sending to v1+ today
  * Old proposal: works, but subject to bech32 insertion issue
  * New proposal: fails
(B) Fails to send to v1+ today
  * Old proposal: fails
  * New proposal: fails
(C) Incorrectly sends to v1+ today
  * Old proposal: lost funds
  * New proposal: fails

So the question is how the support for sending to v1+ in (a) software weighs up 
against protecting both (a) from the insertion issue, and (c) from lost funds. 
I do think (c) matters in this equation - people may choose to avoid adopting 
v1+ witnesses if it were to be known that some senders out there would 
misdirect funds. But the fact that (a) is small also means there is very little 
to gain from the old proposal.

So perhaps I should have formulated it as: the small number of v1+ compatible 
senders today (regardless of the reasons for that) shows how futile the attempt 
to have one address type for all witness versions was, and the fact that there 
are even some who misdirect(ed) funds is the final nail in the coffin. Changing 
the checksum unconditionally gives us a new attempt at that.

> Given that, I also now agree with changing the checksum for v1+.

Great.

Cheers,

--
Pieter

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