(off-list)
Your email client didn't thread correctly, so I'm not sure if you saw my responses to Adam's email, but note that there
is no such thing as "All that must be done" here - supporting multiple, different, consensus rules for a given chain is
a nontrivial undertaking in Bitcoin Core from a software perspective. The only practical way is to, just treat it as a
different chain, which, in practice, it could be.
One group running LOT=true and one running LOT=false results in two Bitcoins, and the software would need to be able to
handle that (and, presumably, allow users to switch between chains).
Matt
On 2/19/21 17:12, Matt Hill via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Good day all, this is my first post to this mailing list. Per Adam's comment
below:
> given there are clearly people of both views, or for now don't care
but might later, it would minimally be friendly and useful if
bitcoin-core has a LOT=true option - and that IMO goes some way to
avoid the assumptive control via defaults.
Both here and elsewhere, the debate taking place is around the manner of Taproot activation, not whether or not Taproot
should be activated. The latter seems to have widespread support. Given this favorable environment, it seems to me this
is an incredible opportunity for the developer contingency to "take the high road" while also minimizing time to Taproot
activation using political incentives. By offering power on the left hand to miners and and power on the right to users,
neither of whom is expressing disapproval of activation, but both of whom are able to activate without the consent of
the other, both are incentivized to signal activation as quickly as possible to emerge as the "group that did it". All
that must be done is to include a LOT=true option to Bitcoin Core that carries a default of LOT=false. Miners can
activate at any time, users can signal their intent to activate should miners renege, and developers emerge as
politically neutral in the eyes of both.
Extrapolating a bit, I contend this expanded agency of full node operatorship may result in more users running a full
node, which is good and healthy. From a miner's point of view, more full nodes only increases the likelihood of future
UASFs, and so they are even further incentivized to expedite Taproot activation. Perhaps this is a stretch, perhaps not.
To summarize: (1) this positions developers as neutral facilitators who deferred power to the other contingencies; (2)
we may see a rise in the popularity of running a full node and the number of full node operators; (3) miners are
incentivized to activate quickly to avoid being perceived as the "bad guys" and to avoid the spread of full nodes; and
(4) even if miners do not activate, users can organize a UASF in a grass-roots way.
Matt Hill
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