Good morning Paul,
I don't think I can stop people from being ignorant about Drivechain. But I can
at least allow the Drivechain-knowledgable to identify each other.
So here below, I present a little "quiz". If you can answer all of these
questions, then you basically understand Drivechain:
0. We could change DC to make miner-theft impossible, by making it a layer1
consensus rule that miners never steal. Why is this cure worse than the disease?
Now miners are forced to look at all sideblocks, not optionally do so if it is
profitable for them.
1. If 100% hashrate wanted to steal coins from a DC sidechain *as quickly as
possible*, how long would this take (in blocks)?
13,150 (I think this is how you changed it after feedback from this list, I
think I remember it was ~3000 before or thereabouts.)
2. Per sidechain per year (ie, per 52560 blocks), how many DC withdrawals can
take place (maximum)? How many can be attempted?
(Ie, how does the 'train track metaphor' work, from ~1h5m in the "Overview and
Misconceptions" video)?
I hate watching videos, I can read faster than anyone can talk (except maybe
Laolu, he speaks faster than I can process, never mind read).
~4 times (assuming 52560 block per year, which may vary due to new miners,
hashrate drops, etc)
3. Only two types of people should ever be using the DC withdrawal system at
all.
3a. Which two?
a. Miners destroying the sidechain because the sidechain is no longer viable.
b. Aggregators of sidechain-to-minechain transfers and large whales.
3b. How is everyone else, expected to move their coins from chain to chain?
Cross-system atomic swaps.
(I use "System" here since the same mechanism works for Lightning channels, and
channels are not blockchains.)
3c. (Obviously, this improves UX.) But why does it also improve security?
Drivechain-based pegged transfers are aggregates of many smaller transfers and thus every
transfer out from the sidechain contributes its "fee" to the security of the
peg.
--
4. What do the parameters b and m stand for (in the DC security model)?
m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad if it
died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue living, 1 = do not
care, > 1 people want to actively kill the sidechain.
b is how much profit a mainchain miner expects from supporting a sidechain (do
not remember the unit though).
Something like u = a + b where a is the mainchain, b is the sidechain, u is the
total profit.
Or fees? Something like that.
5. How can m possibly be above 1? Give an example of a sidechain-attribute
which may cause this situation to arise.
The sidechain is a total scam.
A bug may be found in the sidechain that completely negates any security it
might have, thus removing any desire to protect the sidechain and potentially
make users want to destroy it completely rather than let it continue.
People end up hating sidechains completely.
6. For which range of m, is DC designed to deter sc-theft?
m <= 1
7. If DC could be changed to magically deter theft across all ranges of m, why
would that be bad for sidechain users in general?
Because the sidechain would already be part of mainchain consensus.
--
8. If imminent victims of a DC-based theft, used a mainchain UASF to prohibit
the future theft-withdrawal, then how would this affect non-DC users?
If the non-DC users do not care, then they are unaffected.
If the non-DC users want to actively kill the sidechain, they will
counterattack with an opposite UASF and we have a chainsplit and sadness and
mutual destruction and death and a new subreddit.
9. In what ways might the BTC network one day become uncompetitive? And how is
this different from caring about a sidechain's m and b?
If it does not enable scaling technology fast enough to actually be able to
enable hyperbitcoinization.
Sidechains are not a scaling solution, so caring about m and b is different
because your focus is not on scaling.
--
10. If DC were successful, Altcoin-investors would be harmed. Two
Maximalist-groups would also be slightly harmed -- who are these?
Dunno!
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
