Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> TLDR: MEV = Miner-extractable value, basically if your contracts are complex > enough, miners can analyze which of the possible contract executions are most > profitable for them, and order transactions on the block they are building in > such a way that it is the most profitable path that gets executed. > (do correct me if that summary is inaccurate or incomplete) Yes its elaborated as Miner Extractable Value and also referred as Maximal Extractable Value sometimes because value could be extracted by validators, sequencers and others in some chains. MEV is basically frontrunning some transactions based on mempool activity for profit. Profit could be achieved by order or include/exclude some transactions in block. Normally such opportunities are only found in complex smart contracts that allow trades being settled on-chain. In this (IRC logs) context, Jeremy mentioned sandwich attack. An attacker looks for buy orders in mempool, buy before others and profit from selling at higher price. > Now, having thought of this problem for no more than 5 minutes, it seems to > me, naively, that a mechanism with privacy would be helpful, i.e. the > contract details should be as little-revealed as possible, to reduce the > scope of miner-extractable value. This makes sense and Tarun has shared similar ideas for AMMs in this pdf: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1W6PtJhGgqlNTCENE7I5pO5Brh2oqasVc/view?usp=sharing > Probably, it is best if our covenants systems take full advantage of the > linearity of Schnorr signing, in that case, if there is at all some kind of > branch involved; for example, a previous transaction may reveal, if you have > the proper adaptor signature, some scalar, and that scalar is actually the > `s` component for a signature of a different transaction. > Without knowledge of the adaptor signature, and without knowledge of the link > between this previous transaction and some other one, a miner cannot extract > additional value by messing with the ordering the transactions get confirmed > on the blockchain, or whatever. I am assuming this is possible using all the bitcoin covenant proposals including CTV. > In addition, covenant mechanisms that require large witness data are probably > more vulnerable to MEV. Which covenant mechanisms require large witness data? /dev/fd0 Sent with ProtonMail secure email. ------- Original Message ------- On Friday, May 20th, 2022 at 6:33 AM, ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com> wrote: > Good morning fd0, > > > MEV could be one the issues associated with general covenants. There are > > some resources on https://mev.day if anyone interested to read more about > > it. > > 13:06 <@jeremyrubin> the covenants are "self executing" and can be e.g. > > sandwiched13:07 <@jeremyrubin> so given that bitmatrix is sandwich > > attackable, you'd see similar types of MEV as Eth sees13:07 <@jeremyrubin> > > v.s. the MEV of e.g. lightning channels > > 13:14 < aj> i guess i'd rather not have that sort of MEV available, because > > then it makes complicated MEV extraction profitable, which then makes > > "smart" miners more profitable than "Dumb" ones, which is maybe centralising > > > Well that was interesting.... > > TLDR: MEV = Miner-extractable value, basically if your contracts are complex > enough, miners can analyze which of the possible contract executions are most > profitable for them, and order transactions on the block they are building in > such a way that it is the most profitable path that gets executed. > (do correct me if that summary is inaccurate or incomplete) > > As a concrete example: in a LN channel breach condition, the revocation > transaction must be confirmed within the CSV timeout, or else the theft will > be accepted and confirmed. > Now, some software will be aware of this timeout and will continually raise > the fee of the revocation transaction per block. > A rational miner which sees a channel breach condition might prefer to not > mine such a transaction, since if it is not confirmed, the software will bump > up the fees and the miner could try again on the next block with the higher > feerates. > Depending on the channel size and how the software behaves exactly, the miner > may be able to make a decision on whether it should or should not work on the > revocation transaction and instead hold out for a later higher fee. > > Now, having thought of this problem for no more than 5 minutes, it seems to > me, naively, that a mechanism with privacy would be helpful, i.e. the > contract details should be as little-revealed as possible, to reduce the > scope of miner-extractable value. > For instance, Taproot is good since only one branch at a time can be > revealed, however, in case of a dispute, multiple competing branches of the > Taproot may be revealed by the disputants, and the miners may now be able to > make a choice. > > Probably, it is best if our covenants systems take full advantage of the > linearity of Schnorr signing, in that case, if there is at all some kind of > branch involved; for example, a previous transaction may reveal, if you have > the proper adaptor signature, some scalar, and that scalar is actually the > `s` component for a signature of a different transaction. > Without knowledge of the adaptor signature, and without knowledge of the link > between this previous transaction and some other one, a miner cannot extract > additional value by messing with the ordering the transactions get confirmed > on the blockchain, or whatever. > > This may mean that mechanisms that inspect the block outside of the > transaction being validated (e.g. `OP_BRIBE` for drivechains, or similar > mechanisms that might be capable of looking beyond the transaction) should be > verboten; such cross-transaction introspection should require an adaptor > signature that is kept secret by the participants from the miner that might > want to manipulate the transactions to make other alternate branches more > favorable to the miner. > > In addition, covenant mechanisms that require large witness data are probably > more vulnerable to MEV. > For instance, if in a dispute case, one of the disputants needs to use a > large witness data while the other requires a smaller one, then the disputant > with the smaller witness data would have an advantage, and can match the fee > offered by the disputant with the larger witness. > Then a fee-maximizing miner would prefer the smaller-witness branch of the > contract, as they get more fees for less blockspace. > Of course, this mechanism itself can be used if we can arrange that the > disputant that is inherently "wrong" (i.e. went against the expected behavior > of the protocol) is the one that is burdened with the larger witness. > > Or I could be entirely wrong and MEV is something even worse than that. > > Hmmmmmm > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
