Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be > removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority > coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without > community consensus. > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to > deploy. `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] can be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure if this will be a soft fork. I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and predictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation. [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L66 [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply /dev/fd0 Sent with Proton Mail secure email. ------- Original Message ------- On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Good morning e, and list, > > > Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which > > I was responding. > > > > Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that > > the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no > > consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of > > market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with > > any other good. > > > > The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship > > resistance, not on price. > > > To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail > emission"): > > * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and one > which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or zero. > * Now consider a censoring miner. > * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner > loses out on the fees of those transactions. > * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from the > censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost. > * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is > small relative to the total earnings of each block. > * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is > large relative to the total earnings of each block. > * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains from > the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situation. > > Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erodes > the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved. > But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are > censored or not censored. > Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not > censor coin movements. > Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements. > > > Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be > removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority > coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without > community consensus. > Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to > deploy. > > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
