This will indeed give some power to the miners. But they have no incentives in posting super high numbers as that means they won't get paid or they will with a lot of delay. This is not simply like setting the price for a product that has a fixed quality. In the case of the mining services, setting the price also means setting the quality of the product you offer (as higher price = higher security). This is simply a way to let miners have have a say about the quality of the product that they offer. They can always set 0 min fees and settle for the lowest quality/ low price service, or maybe find out that offering a better product for a higher price actually makes them more money.
On Fri, Mar 3, 2023, 3:45 AM WMOURA <neo.m.revoluti...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hello, > > In my amateur opinion, I imagine that this would give excessive power to the > miner, introducing a bug in the system, because if the miner put an absurdly > high minimum rate intentionally or not, this would cause a serious problem, > or not. > > > Em qua., 1 de mar. de 2023 às 17:25, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev < > firstname.lastname@example.org> escreveu: > >> Hello everyone, >> >> I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been >> discussed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that. >> >> I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the >> base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large >> transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN. >> >> In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are >> very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is >> enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher >> fees as they know that that would increase the network security, however >> nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like >> being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they >> just stay low because that's the only rational individual choice. >> >> Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule, >> min_fees, that would work like this: >> - the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the >> block, specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the >> following block in order for it to be valid. >> - one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the >> chain getting stuck. >> >> min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or >> the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value >> transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. Of >> course min_fees=0 would correspond to the current situation. >> >> It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the >> equilibrium closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually >> optimal), and to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course >> it's just a rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was >> just interested in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit >> or if it's not even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not >> considering. >> >> Cheers, >> >> Giuseppe. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> email@example.com >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >
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