Couple of things I just thought about:
1- Presume server should only sweep with two (or more, see below) revocation
certificates being present
2- Need to insert something in the flow so that Alice can verify that the
uploaded key is actually Bob's (and perhaps vise-versa, given an extremely
dedicated attacker with a fast connection?).
Is there a way to do #2 without creating yet another transaction? Admittedly I
am still really puzzled about the accessibility of public keys in Bitcoin!
Please remember that the idea is to have two wallets securely exchange a packet
of metadata about a transaction beyond the scope of Bitcoin itself (a name,
perhaps a small photo, etc) in order to increase usability. This will be my
last post here on the topic except to reply in case anyone else contributes.
-wendell
grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
On Sep 16, 2013, at 4:05 PM, Wendell wrote:
> Luke pointed out that we should not be inserting extraneous data into the
> blockchain, so this sounds like the best option, Eric.
>
> I'm under the impression that a Bitcoin user Alice cannot see the actual
> public key of Bitcoin user Bob, so if we had Hive store metadata on a server
> relating to a given transaction ID, I would not be able to use those public
> keys key to encrypt. Is this a misunderstanding or is it correct?
>
> Assuming it is correct, the best that I could come up with was storing the
> transaction ID with a _fresh_ public key on a server, each time a transfer is
> made. Altogether it looks like this:
>
> - Alice generates a new keypair & revocation certificate for the transaction
> - Alice makes a Bitcoin transaction to Bob
> - Alice sends the transaction ID plus the new public key to server
> - Bob receives the Bitcoin transaction
> - Bob generates a new keypair & revocation certificate
> - Bob does a transaction ID lookup on the server, receives Alice's public
> key, sends his own new one
> - Bob encrypts his user metadata against Alice's new key
> - Alice downloads and decrypts Bob's metadata
> - Alice uploads her revocation certificate
> - Alice uploads her own metadata
> - Bob downloads Alice's metadata
> - Bob uploads his revocation certificate
> - (Server removes all keys with revocation certificates)
>
> I presume going the extra mile to generate new keys for each transaction is
> helpful for privacy?
>
> The above seems rather inelegant to me. I really don't like that clients
> (wallets) are going to be beating down the server all the time checking for
> keys, or that there is a possibility of a desynchronization so severe that
> the user receives the data much too late for it to be useful. But, I suppose
> it can work.
>
> Another thing I'm considering is Alice/Bob validating each other. I suppose
> we should include some kind of code that we encourage people to read to each
> other over the phone or some other medium, to ensure that "it really is
> Alice", before (for example) returning money to a very legit-looking
> personage.
>
> Any other thoughts? I would love to do this without using any servers at all
> ("serverless keyserver", anyone?), but I am not quite sure how.
>
> -wendell
>
> grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
>
> On Sep 7, 2013, at 12:47 AM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
>
>> Why not just use the transaction hash itself for the lookup? Also,
>> presumably you'd want to encrypt the data so that only the recipient of the
>> transaction can do this lookup.
>>
>> -Eric
>>
>> On Sep 6, 2013, at 8:07 AM, Wendell <w...@grabhive.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> We're thinking about ways of automatically exchanging contact details
>>> between wallets, in order to encourage the proliferation of identifiable
>>> names and photos rather than long and hard-to-verify addresses.
>>>
>>> The simplest version goes like this:
>>>
>>> 2 BTC Bitcoin is sent to someone, and a data lookup hash is inserted into
>>> the transaction. When it arrives on the other end, it is indeed looked up,
>>> and instead of being presented with a dialogue that says "you received 2
>>> BTC from 13Y94z43Nbbb6wevRyk82CeDoYQ5S28zmA", it's "You received 2 BTC from
>>> Frank Jones" including a nice photo.
>>>
>>> Now. We can simply delete this data in reference to the transaction ID
>>> after it happens (or delete it after a time), but is there any more
>>> decentralized way to do it? I would prefer us to run no dedicated servers
>>> that would ever put us in a position of being coerced into giving data, or
>>> otherwise altering our system to store it.
>>>
>>> Any thoughts about this?
>>>
>>> -wendell
>>>
>>> grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Learn the latest--Visual Studio 2012, SharePoint 2013, SQL 2012, more!
>>> Discover the easy way to master current and previous Microsoft technologies
>>> and advance your career. Get an incredible 1,500+ hours of step-by-step
>>> tutorial videos with LearnDevNow. Subscribe today and save!
>>> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=58041391&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk_______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIMITED TIME SALE - Full Year of Microsoft Training For Just $49.99!
1,500+ hours of tutorials including VisualStudio 2012, Windows 8, SharePoint
2013, SQL 2012, MVC 4, more. BEST VALUE: New Multi-Library Power Pack includes
Mobile, Cloud, Java, and UX Design. Lowest price ever! Ends 9/20/13.
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=58041151&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
