Why should miners only be able to vote for "double the limit" or "halve" the 
limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits:

        0 0 = no preference ("wildcard" vote)
        0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same
        1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved
        1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled

User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of "0 
0" (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block 
voting "0 0" (no preference) could only contain transactions voting "0 0" as 

Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had 
with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. 
And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: 
miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of the users.

On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 2:11 pm, Peter Todd wrote:
> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
> hashing power.
> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
> in a block casting a specific vote.
> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
> fees to vote according to user wishes.
> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
> mechanism such as replace-by-fee.
> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
> https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
> -- 
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778

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