> On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:16 PM, Jorge Timón <jti...@jtimon.cc> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the 
>> requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that can 
>> come from anywhere at any time…
> I disagree with this premise. Please, don't take this as an argument
> from authority fallacy, but I will cite Satoshi to express what I
> think the assumptions while using the system should be:
> "As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are
> not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest
> chain and outpace attackers."
> I can't say for sure what was meant by "attacking the network" in this
> context but I personally mean trying to rewrite valid and
> proof-of-work-timestamped history.
> Unconfirmed transactions are simply not part of history yet. Ordering
> unconfirmed transactions in a consensus compatible way without a
> universal clock is impossible, that's why we're using proof of work in
> the first place.
> Alternative policies are NOT attacks on the network.

Just to be clear, Jorge, I wasn’t suggesting that unconfirmed transactions are 
part of any sort of global consensus. In fact, they very much AREN’T. Which is 
exactly why it is extremely dangerous to accept unconfirmed transactions as 
final unless you clearly have assessed the risks and it makes sense for the 
particular business use case.

- Eric Lombrozo

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