> On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:47 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:16 PM, Jorge Timón <jti...@jtimon.cc> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elombr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the 
>>> requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that can 
>>> come from anywhere at any time…
>> I disagree with this premise. Please, don't take this as an argument
>> from authority fallacy, but I will cite Satoshi to express what I
>> think the assumptions while using the system should be:
>> "As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are
>> not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest
>> chain and outpace attackers."
>> I can't say for sure what was meant by "attacking the network" in this
>> context but I personally mean trying to rewrite valid and
>> proof-of-work-timestamped history.
>> Unconfirmed transactions are simply not part of history yet. Ordering
>> unconfirmed transactions in a consensus compatible way without a
>> universal clock is impossible, that's why we're using proof of work in
>> the first place.
>> Alternative policies are NOT attacks on the network.
> Just to be clear, Jorge, I wasn’t suggesting that unconfirmed transactions 
> are part of any sort of global consensus. In fact, they very much AREN’T. 
> Which is exactly why it is extremely dangerous to accept unconfirmed 
> transactions as final unless you clearly have assessed the risks and it makes 
> sense for the particular business use case.
> - Eric Lombrozo

I think the misunderstanding was in perhaps my earlier statement seemed like I 
was suggesting that it’s the protocol’s responsibility to protect merchants 
from double-spends. On the contrary - I think we agree - the protocol CANNOT 
make any guarantees to ANYONE until we do converge on a history. The “design” I 
speak of here is more on the merchant side.

- Eric Lombrozo

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