That looks right -- that code path won't get you anywhere near adding a console message, as far as I can tell, but you would be able to queue a report that way. Ideally, we'd have something like deprecation.cc for browser-side that would handle the UMA as well as formatting the report body consistently. As a first pass, until we have more that one browser-generated deprecation report, just generating and queuing it would work.
On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 6:42 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: > I may very well be wrong, but it seems like > CookieUtils::EmitCookieWarningsAndMetrics > <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:content/browser/renderer_host/cookie_utils.cc;l=97;drc=8afc9e45a7e96afda8f22ef044d1e7cdc5a6f75a;bpv=1;bpt=1> > has > the right plumbing to reach RenderFrameHost, and from it, get a > ReportingSource > <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:content/browser/renderer_host/render_frame_host_impl.cc;l=1730;drc=8afc9e45a7e96afda8f22ef044d1e7cdc5a6f75a?q=RenderFrameHost&ss=chromium%2Fchromium%2Fsrc> > that > can enable us to send > <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:content/browser/renderer_host/render_frame_host_impl.cc;l=10676;drc=8afc9e45a7e96afda8f22ef044d1e7cdc5a6f75a;bpv=1;bpt=1?q=RenderFrameHost&ss=chromium%2Fchromium%2Fsrc> > deprecation reports (even if through a different mechanism than > CountDeprecation). > > Ian - thoughts on the above? > > On Thu, Sep 9, 2021 at 9:21 PM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote: > >> I don't think `countDeprecation` is going to work here, insofar as that's >> a Blink-layer concept, and the network stack isn't going to have an >> understanding of page views or use counters or etc. If we've wired things >> up such that deprecation reports can be triggered from the network stack, >> lovely, but I'm not sure that's the case. >> >> Another approach that might be reasonable to approach might be to roll >> this out on a percentage-basis, starting with a substantial portion of >> beta, then rolling to stable iff we're confident in that experience? >> >> This feels like both the right directional and philosophical thing to do >> with cookies. I'd like to see it ship, and a staged rollout might well be a >> reasonable way of gaining confidence in our ability to do so? >> >> -mike >> >> >> On Thu, Sep 9, 2021 at 1:03 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote: >> >>> Sounds good! Can you please ping this thread once results start coming >>> in? Thanks! :) >>> >>> On Wednesday, September 8, 2021 at 3:59:36 AM UTC+2 Andrew Williams >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Sounds good - we will add the CountDeprecation metrics. Thanks for the >>>> suggestion, Yoav, and thank you Ian for the additional info. >>>> >>>> -Andrew >>>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 10:07 AM Ian Clelland <iclell...@chromium.org> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 4:55 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hey Andrew, >>>>>> >>>>>> Given that the metrics are not a superset of what you're trying to >>>>>> deprecate, could you please add CountDeprecation >>>>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:third_party/blink/renderer/core/frame/deprecation.cc;drc=f6f22e82bcd0d50f390b23ee9688c58de5ae0bdc;bpv=1;bpt=1;l=702?q=deprecation&ss=chromium> >>>>>> metrics of the case you are intending to deprecate? That would ensure >>>>>> .e.g >>>>>> deprecation reports are sent to folks that happen to have such cookies. >>>>>> Even though you haven't really asked, from my perspective, it's also >>>>>> fine to add a console deprecation message at this point, in parallel to >>>>>> the >>>>>> metrics. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> FYI, CountDeprecation will take care of adding that console message >>>>> for you, as well as: >>>>> - Generating a report object which can be seen with a >>>>> ReportingObserver, >>>>> - Sending that report to any configured endpoints for the document, >>>>> and >>>>> - Counting the usage for UMA, so that we can track the (hopefully) >>>>> declining usage of the deprecated feature. >>>>> >>>>> Ian >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Cheers :) >>>>>> Yoav >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, September 1, 2021 at 5:05:44 PM UTC+2 Andrew Williams >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Here is the percentage for the metric mentioned in my last email: >>>>>>> over a 7 day period, 0.00004% of cookies seen in the stable version of >>>>>>> Chrome had truncated names and/or values. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ultimately our plan is to ship this feature behind a kill switch >>>>>>> that we could flip if major issues are reported. With that in mind, and >>>>>>> given the low number of truncated cookie names/values observed via our >>>>>>> existing metrics, would it make sense to implement and collect the new >>>>>>> metrics in parallel with rolling out the changes described in this >>>>>>> I2P&S? >>>>>>> Or do you think taking the more cautious approach and >>>>>>> implementing/collecting the new metrics before landing this change is a >>>>>>> better way forward (despite taking more time)? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -Andrew >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 1:45 PM Andrew Williams < >>>>>>> awil...@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for the feedback/questions Yoav and Daniel. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We have some metrics >>>>>>>> <https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/700dc7fe1578ab5e0e50a6304f2a1960005b8f8b:tools/metrics/histograms/metadata/cookie/histograms.xml;l=56;bpv=1;bpt=0> >>>>>>>> on Chrome's existing behavior to truncate cookie lines containing \x00, >>>>>>>> \x0d, and \x0a (specifically, in cases where the truncation affects the >>>>>>>> cookie name or the cookie value). The percentage of cookies with >>>>>>>> truncated >>>>>>>> names or values is quite low, although I'm still waiting on approval to >>>>>>>> release the exact percentage. We don't have any metrics for cases >>>>>>>> where >>>>>>>> truncation affected cookie attribute parsing (for example, the >>>>>>>> malicious >>>>>>>> case this intent aims to address) or where truncation was harmless (for >>>>>>>> example, a newline as the last character in the cookie line), though. >>>>>>>> Especially for the latter case, it does seem plausible that certain >>>>>>>> sites >>>>>>>> could be constructing cookie lines in such a way that control >>>>>>>> characters >>>>>>>> slip in unnoticed. We will add new metrics to cover these cases so >>>>>>>> that we >>>>>>>> can better predict the level of breakage that these changes may have. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -Andrew >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 26, 2021 at 2:22 PM Daniel Bratell <bratel...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Even if browsers are currently slightly incompatible, it seems >>>>>>>>> this change will short term make them more incompatible. As Yoav >>>>>>>>> said, it >>>>>>>>> would be good to have an idea about how common this is, i.e. how >>>>>>>>> often will >>>>>>>>> cookies that are today truncated instead be rejected? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> /Daniel >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2021-08-25 16:18, Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hey Andrew! Thanks for working on this, this seems like a >>>>>>>>> significant compatibility gap (with security implications) that would >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> great to close. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, August 24, 2021 at 3:45:50 PM UTC+2 Andrew Williams >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Contact emails awil...@chromium.org, miketa...@chromium.org Explainer >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1531 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1589 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Specification >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/blob/main/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis.md >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Summary >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Updates how control characters in cookie data are handled. >>>>>>>>>> Specifically, the tab character is now permitted, but all other >>>>>>>>>> control >>>>>>>>>> characters cause the entire cookie to be rejected (previously the >>>>>>>>>> \x00, >>>>>>>>>> \x0D, and \x0A characters in a cookie line caused it to be truncated >>>>>>>>>> instead of rejected entirely, which could have enabled malicious >>>>>>>>>> behavior >>>>>>>>>> in certain circumstances). This behavior is also in line with the >>>>>>>>>> latest >>>>>>>>>> drafts of RFC6265bis. >>>>>>>>>> Blink component >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Internals>Network>Cookies >>>>>>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Internals%3ENetwork%3ECookies> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Motivation >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In the case where attacker controlled data is used to set a new >>>>>>>>>> cookie, having certain control characters truncate the cookie line >>>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>>> result in security-related cookie attributes being ignored. This >>>>>>>>>> behavior >>>>>>>>>> may also lead to cookie data corruption when control characters are >>>>>>>>>> introduced, which may cause unpredictable behavior on the >>>>>>>>>> application side >>>>>>>>>> (more so than cookies not being set, which is a case that >>>>>>>>>> applications >>>>>>>>>> should already handle). Having control characters result in the whole >>>>>>>>>> cookie being rejected helps mitigate these concerns and aligns >>>>>>>>>> Chrome with >>>>>>>>>> RFC6265bis. For the tab character, although it falls in the control >>>>>>>>>> character range (\x00 - \x1F, \x7F), it’s a printable character and >>>>>>>>>> allowed >>>>>>>>>> by other browsers. Treating it the same way that the space character >>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> treated makes sense intuitively, eliminates a potential >>>>>>>>>> fingerprinting >>>>>>>>>> vector, and aligns Chrome with RFC6265bis. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In the past, moving to a stricter models that forbade certain >>>>>>>>> characters resulted in at least some breakage of non-malicious >>>>>>>>> content. I >>>>>>>>> doubt this one would be significantly different. >>>>>>>>> Do you have a sense of the resulting breakage? If not, I think >>>>>>>>> it'd make sense to add metrics to our cookie parsing algorithm and >>>>>>>>> see what >>>>>>>>> that breakage would look like. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Initial public proposal TAG review >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> N/A >>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-api-owners-discuss/c/uBxq9uCpKx0/m/A5LI0NbyAAAJ>: >>>>>>>>>> this change is already specified in RFC 6265bis and is a relatively >>>>>>>>>> minor >>>>>>>>>> change to what's already implemented in Chrome (to improve spec >>>>>>>>>> compliance). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I agree that this change is in lower layers than those the TAG >>>>>>>>> usually deals with. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> TAG review status Not applicable >>>>>>>>>> Risks >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> N/A >>>>>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> WebKit / Safari: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - All control characters except the tab character cause the >>>>>>>>>> cookie to be rejected if present in the name and cause the rest of >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> cookie line to be truncated if present in the value >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Gecko / Firefox: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - 0x00 in the cookie value causes the rest of the value to be >>>>>>>>>> truncated (but subsequent attributes are preserved) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - 0x00 in the cookie name causes the rest of the name and the >>>>>>>>>> value to be truncated (but subsequent attributes are preserved) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - 0x0d and 0x0a cause the entire cookie line to be truncated >>>>>>>>>> (attributes ignored) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - 0x01 through 0x09 (the tab character), 0x0b through 0x0c, and >>>>>>>>>> 0x0e through 0x1f cause the cookie to be rejected if they are >>>>>>>>>> present in >>>>>>>>>> the name, but are allowed in the cookie value >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - 0x7f is allowed in the cookie name and cookie value >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The following issues exist reporting these differences: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Firefox - >>>>>>>>>> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1702031#c1 >>>>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> WebKit - https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=229088 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Allowing tab characters in cookie names aligns Chrome with Safari >>>>>>>>>> but not Firefox, and allowing tabs in the cookie value aligns Chrome >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> both. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Regarding control characters (not including tab), what will >>>>>>>>>> change in Chrome is the handling of 0x00, 0x0d, and 0x0a characters. >>>>>>>>>> Today, Chrome truncates cookie lines when these characters are >>>>>>>>>> encountered, >>>>>>>>>> and this intent proposes having these characters result in cookie >>>>>>>>>> rejection >>>>>>>>>> instead. Rejecting cookie names containing these characters aligns >>>>>>>>>> Chrome >>>>>>>>>> with Safari but not Firefox, but rejecting cookie values containing >>>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>> characters is inconsistent with existing Safari or Firefox behavior. >>>>>>>>>> However, these changes unify Chrome’s control character handling >>>>>>>>>> behavior, >>>>>>>>>> better align Chrome with RFC6265bis, and also help prevent a class of >>>>>>>>>> cookie attribute removal attacks (when malicious input is used to >>>>>>>>>> build a >>>>>>>>>> cookie line under certain conditions). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Gecko: N/A - these changes seem too small to justify this effort >>>>>>>>>> WebKit: >>>>>>>>>> N/A - these changes seem too small to justify this effort >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I somewhat agree that asking for a position here would be an >>>>>>>>> overkill, but would love to get a signal from both Mozilla and Safari >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> their intents to align with the RFC. (the former seems more likely >>>>>>>>> than the >>>>>>>>> latter, as this seems like a CFNetwork issue) >>>>>>>>> At the same time, the issues seem sufficient for that purpose, >>>>>>>>> assuming folks there respond. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Web developers: N/A - these changes are relatively small and are >>>>>>>>>> in alignment with the RFC, other browsers, and/or existing behavior >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yeah, developers are unlikely to be happy about this from a >>>>>>>>> breakage perspective, even if it'd reduce compat issues. The main >>>>>>>>> thing we >>>>>>>>> can do about that is ensure breakage is minimal before shipping. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Debuggability >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> DevTools debugging support will be implemented along with this >>>>>>>>>> change. Rejected response cookies are already shown in DevTools in >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> Network panel, with a status explaining why they were rejected. >>>>>>>>>> Another >>>>>>>>>> status will be added to annotate cookies rejected due to control >>>>>>>>>> characters. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests >>>>>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md> >>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In Progress - >>>>>>>>>> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/3084521 >>>>>>>>>> Flag name >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> UpdatedCookieControlCharacterChecks >>>>>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> False >>>>>>>>>> Tracking bug >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1233602 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Estimated milestones >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> M96 >>>>>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5709264560586752 >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Requesting approval to ship? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status >>>>>>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/>. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/e2de8b96-8878-47fe-99e2-5497b96c9adcn%40chromium.org >>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/e2de8b96-8878-47fe-99e2-5497b96c9adcn%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/44805dc7-edd8-218d-dcbe-9c589509b633%40gmail.com >>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/44805dc7-edd8-218d-dcbe-9c589509b633%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/fcb32661-cecb-4f5a-a29d-9f3cdfbc5395n%40chromium.org >>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/fcb32661-cecb-4f5a-a29d-9f3cdfbc5395n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>>>>> . >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "blink-dev" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to blink-dev+unsubscr...@chromium.org. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/984b9bba-57f7-4145-9e1e-ee50601aae68n%40chromium.org >>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/984b9bba-57f7-4145-9e1e-ee50601aae68n%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "blink-dev" group. 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