Meant to link to this other thread [1] as the one on which we need 3 LGTMs.

Cheers,
Titouan

[1]
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/FlenxUPCDec/m/T2YBn0kEBQAJ

On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 6:22 AM Titouan Rigoudy <tito...@google.com> wrote:

> [blink-dev to bcc]
>
> Hi José,
>
> Thanks for reaching out, and sorry for the confusion!
>
> To be clear, the blog post states that this would be enabled in 107 *at
> the earliest*, which reflected our best estimate back when we wrote the
> post.
>
> We are now aiming to ship and start a deprecation trial in 109 at the
> earliest, if this thread gets 3 LGTMs by the end of next week. You can stay
> tuned here to know when this will ship, or follow along on Chromestatus
> [1]. The deprecation trial would allow you to request an extension until
> 113.
>
> Happy to answer any other questions you may have!
>
> Cheers,
> Titouan
>
> [1] https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 3:31 PM José Luis Campanello <
> jose.luis.campane...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> i've been working to fix an application that will be affected by PNA
>> preflights (we have an application that talks to a private server and a
>> local -127.0.0.1- server).
>>
>> As I understood from this blog post (
>> https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-preflight/#rollout-plan),
>> it seems PNA preflights will be enabled starting with release 107, but i
>> can't find any reference as to whether it is being actually released in 107
>> or later (I've seen 109, 112 and shipping on 113). I think I'm probably not
>> understanding correctly all the details of what I'm reading.
>>
>> Can you confirm when this feature will enabled in the standard chrome?
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 30, 2022 at 6:12:42 AM UTC-3 Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>
>>> Hi there,
>>>
>>> Thanks for reaching out.
>>>
>>> Andrew: Indeed, this was crbug.com/1329248, apologies for the
>>> oversight. The change has been rolled back on Friday. Chrome 102 should
>>> pick up the configuration change upon restart.
>>>
>>> cpmtatest: by default, script fetches are made in no-cors mode with
>>> credentials. I believe [1] and [2] are the relevant specification bits
>>> here. If you think this should not be how PNA works, please file an issue
>>> in the GitHub repo [3].
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Titouan
>>>
>>> [1]
>>> https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/urls-and-fetching.html#create-a-potential-cors-request
>>> [2]
>>> https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#fetch-a-classic-script
>>> [3] https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 30, 2022 at 10:46 AM Who Cares <cpmt...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>> Now when chrome 102 is out I wanted to test it so I ran it with
>>>> *--enable-features=PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults*
>>>> There's one thing I'm trying to understand,
>>>> I have an HTML page with a script tag, the src of this tag points to a
>>>> more private network, the default behavior of script tags is not to trigger
>>>> CORS and since v102 they do trigger it which is expected.
>>>> My question is:
>>>> I'm getting this error: *"Response to preflight request doesn't pass
>>>> access control check: The value of the 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'
>>>> header in the response is '' which must be 'true' when the request's
>>>> credentials mode is 'include'."*
>>>> I never asked to send credentials in my script tag, I guess I can force
>>>> not send it by adding *crossorigin="" *to the tag but shouldn't the
>>>> default behavior be not to send it with credentials?
>>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 28, 2022 at 12:47:02 AM UTC+3 Andrew Boeger wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi all -
>>>>>
>>>>> Just want to call out that this assumption...
>>>>> Chrome 102 should also not break anything, since we are sending
>>>>> preflights in warning-only mode. If the preflight fails, a warning is
>>>>> displayed in DevTools but the request proceeds as before
>>>>> ... turned out to be false.
>>>>>
>>>>> The change recently deployed DOES break things. It has broken our
>>>>> internal admin tool our CS teams use to manage customer accounts.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bug opened here >
>>>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1329248
>>>>>
>>>>> In meantime, I have my users moving to other browsers because this has
>>>>> broken a critical function for them.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 3:47:36 AM UTC-5 Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi there,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John: that's due to another facet of Private Network Access (not this
>>>>>> intent) that started a deprecation trial in Chrome 94. See
>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5436853517811712. Unless signed up
>>>>>> for the deprecation trial, HTTP websites are no longer allowed to make 
>>>>>> any
>>>>>> requests to private servers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Martin: there will be no breaking change in Chrome 101. I need to
>>>>>> update the blog post to make the new timeline clearer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chrome 102 should also not break anything, since we are sending
>>>>>> preflights in warning-only mode. If the preflight fails, a warning is
>>>>>> displayed in DevTools but the request proceeds as before. As explained
>>>>>> above, this will remain the case until at least Chrome 105, at which 
>>>>>> point
>>>>>> we may turn on enforcement: when a preflight fails, the request should 
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> be sent and fail. That remains subject to compatibility risk evaluation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:06 AM Martin H <mrtn...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Titouan, Blink Devs,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thank you for this news above.
>>>>>>> I work for a software vendor affected by this change, our software
>>>>>>> installs a small (https://localhost:60500) web server on a users
>>>>>>> local machine and our https:// SAAS web application connects  to
>>>>>>> this to hand off various features
>>>>>>> We were under the impression this change was to occur in Chrome 101
>>>>>>> and have been moving to that timeline rapidly but reading the above I
>>>>>>> understand this has changed (confusingly though much of the 
>>>>>>> documentation
>>>>>>> online still carries older dates and talks about the change as early as 
>>>>>>> 101
>>>>>>> or 102. )
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Should I now understand that *if* this makes Chrome 102 as hoped,
>>>>>>> you will have 3 mile stone releases (aka 102, 103, 104 ) with an intent 
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> ship "private network access" changes in 105?
>>>>>>> I would understand it's just an estimate based on feedback around
>>>>>>> this change but as it stands our business is anticipating change as 
>>>>>>> early
>>>>>>> as next week as this is when 101 was due to ship production.
>>>>>>> it would therefore be extremely beneficial if we understand we have
>>>>>>> more time to work with customers around this, we have produced updated
>>>>>>> compliant local components on our end and released this in the past few
>>>>>>> weeks but as you might expect we need time to address this with every
>>>>>>> single one of our customers, as Chromium based browsers form the
>>>>>>> overwhelming majority of users.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ultimately my requirement is to advise customers on the change as
>>>>>>> best as possible, including how to ensure the change is not deployed as
>>>>>>> some will need time to update their entire fleets.
>>>>>>> When I install Chrome dev 102 build, it seems like our software
>>>>>>> still works as is today. I assume as it's not on yet. Would someone be 
>>>>>>> able
>>>>>>> to state which flags I should enable to replicate what will happen when
>>>>>>> this change goes live?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Is it just the #block-insecure-private-network-requests
>>>>>>> Do I need to
>>>>>>> configure #private-network-access-send-preflights or 
>>>>>>> #private-network-access-respect-preflight-results
>>>>>>> Today all these settings are just "Default
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks in advance, please let me know if there is a better forum for
>>>>>>> this request.
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 3:28:37 AM UTC+10 John Doe wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Sorry seems I accidently switched the S sides in the first
>>>>>>>> question, I meant from public HTTP to private HTTPS so it shouldn't be
>>>>>>>> mixed content, and in such case there's no preflight request.
>>>>>>>> As I mentioned I installed chrome 98 to test it, when accessing a
>>>>>>>> resource from public HTTPS to private HTTPS there's a preflight 
>>>>>>>> request but
>>>>>>>> no such request on an access from public HTTP to private HTTPS.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 19, 2022 at 7:27:42 PM UTC+3 Titouan Rigoudy
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi there,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 1. Such requests are blocked by mixed content. This launch does
>>>>>>>>> not change that.
>>>>>>>>> 2. You will want to respond 200 OK to PNA preflight requests to
>>>>>>>>> your private HTTPS server with the right headers. See the blog post 
>>>>>>>>> [1] for
>>>>>>>>> details.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [1]
>>>>>>>>> https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-preflight/#server-side-requests
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Apr 17, 2022 at 4:56 PM John Doe <clas...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 1. In Chrome 98, there were no preflight requests when accessing
>>>>>>>>>> from public HTTPS to private HTTP, will the same be true in the final
>>>>>>>>>> version?
>>>>>>>>>> 2. In the case when I have a private HTTPS server that I want
>>>>>>>>>> everyone to have access to (also via public HTTP), what options do I 
>>>>>>>>>> have ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, April 6, 2022 at 8:23:58 PM UTC+3 Titouan Rigoudy
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the timely question, I was about to send an update
>>>>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We have fixed nearly all of the blockers identified in the above
>>>>>>>>>>> doc. The only outstanding issue is the aforementioned crash, which 
>>>>>>>>>>> required
>>>>>>>>>>> a bit more design work than the rest. That work has been completed 
>>>>>>>>>>> and CLs
>>>>>>>>>>> to fix the problem are now in review; they should land shortly and 
>>>>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>>>>> in Chrome 102.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We would like to ship again in Chrome 102 in warning-only mode,
>>>>>>>>>>> just as we last tried in Chrome 98. Preflights will be sent but 
>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>> results will not be enforced. Failed preflights will show warnings 
>>>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>>>> DevTools, but requests will otherwise continue unimpeded.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Things will stay that way for at least 3 milestones. We will
>>>>>>>>>>> gather compatibility data by monitoring failed preflights, then 
>>>>>>>>>>> circle back
>>>>>>>>>>> here to garner approvals to turn on enforcement. That launch will be
>>>>>>>>>>> accompanied by a deprecation trial for web developers to sign up 
>>>>>>>>>>> for a time
>>>>>>>>>>> extension if they failed to notice the warnings in time.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 6, 2022 at 3:29 AM Logan Wei <shapi...@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hello,  is there now an updated timeline to roll out this
>>>>>>>>>>>> change?  Will the trial restart in Chrome 102 or a later version?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 6:36:21 PM UTC+8 Titouan Rigoudy
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's the promised doc:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fdwetZXUz_Q03ZpGwXizq5AE1yn_lMhamUJMwvsHvTU/edit
>>>>>>>>>>>>> (public, comment access for committers only)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 17, 2022 at 3:29 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the update Titouan. Looking forward to reading
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your doc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/17/22 9:25 AM, Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just to let you know that due to a couple issues, chief among
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which a renderer crash (crbug.com/1279376), we are rolling
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this feature back from Chrome 98.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A few issues have been identified and will block our next
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt at shipping this. In the meantime, we gathered some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information about impact and notified developers of the upcoming 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> change.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'll write a doc summarizing the timeline and lessons learned, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then share
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as appropriate here.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 5:26 PM Chris Harrelson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> chri...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LGTM3 for step 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 6:11 AM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LGTM2 for step 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/21 5:31 AM, Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *assuming I get 2 more LGTMs, that is.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 11:31 AM Titouan Rigoudy <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tit...@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks! I'll come back for further discussion with UKM
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data in hand.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 10:58 AM Yoav Weiss <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree UKM analysis should not block step 1, as it holds
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little risk. (There's still some risks that servers will 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> choke in the face
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of preflights, but that seems minor compared to the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enforcement risk)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore,* LGTM1 for step 1* (preflights with no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enforcement), but not further (yet). Please come back to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this thread with
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any data you may have as a result of adding UKMs.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 6:44 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yoav, do you think UKM analysis should block sending
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preflights without enforcing their success? I believe 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sending these will
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allow us to get more precise information on the affected 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> websites through
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the usecounter recorded in crrev.com/c/3310846. I can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then analyze UKM data and use the results to inform the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision whether
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and when to switch enforcement on?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:19 PM Titouan Rigoudy <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tit...@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:17 PM Mike West <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mk...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _I_ don't think we should do that, but I'd defer to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan's preference. :)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:14 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks - I also don't think there's a lot of value in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this particular header being the odd-one-out, just 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wanted to confirm we're
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not going to ship "true" first and try to change that to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ?1 later (which is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always challenging).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/2/21 11:11 AM, Mike West wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure it makes sense to introduce a structured
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> header here, given that it's layering on top of CORS 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> headers that I don't
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think there's substantial interest in changing.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:55 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no support for structured headers so far,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for consistency reasons, and there has been no movement 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to deprecate the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "true" value for Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of such a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deprecation seems minimal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I could pretty easily add support for the structured
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "?1" value on top of the "true" token for the new
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header, and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specify that, but I'm not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure it would be terribly useful. Do you think 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Titouan,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious what the plan is for structured
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> headers.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is marked as blocked - has there been other progress 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or thinking behind the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Contact emails tit...@chromium.org,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> va...@chromium.org, cl...@chromium.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explainer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Specification
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Design docs
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Summary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any private
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network requests for subresources, asking for explicit 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permission from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> target server. A private network request is any 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request from a public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> website to a private IP address or localhost, or from 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a private website
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (e.g. intranet) to localhost. Sending a preflight 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request mitigates the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk of cross-site request forgery attacks against 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private network devices
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such as routers, which are often not prepared to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defend against this threat.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blink component
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG review
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG review status Pending
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Risks
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other browser engines do not implement this. Compat 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> straightforward: web servers that do not handle the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new preflight requests
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will eventually break, once the feature ships. The 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plan to address this is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as follows: 1. Send preflight request, ignore result, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always send actual
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request. Failed preflight requests will result in a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> warning being shown in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> devtools. 2. Wait for 3 milestones. 3. Gate actual 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request on preflight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request success, with deprecation trial for developers 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to buy some more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. 4. End deprecation trial 4 milestones later. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UseCounters:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above measure pages that make at least one private 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network request for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which we would now send a preflight request.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gecko: Worth prototyping (
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> )
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WebKit: No signal (
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pending response.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> far suggests that most web developers are OK with this 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new requirement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though some do not control the target endpoints and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be negatively
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impacted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Other signals:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ergonomics
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> None.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Activation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gating access to the private network overnight on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preflight requests would likely result in widespread 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakage. This is why
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the plan is to first send requests but not act on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their result, giving
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> server developers time to implement code handling 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these requests.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Deprecation warnings will be surfaced in DevTools to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alert web/client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> developers when the potential for breakage later on is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> detected.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Enforcement will be turned on later (aiming for 3 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> milestones), along with a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deprecation trial for impacted web developers to buy 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> themselves some more
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. Experience suggests a large fraction of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> developers will not notice
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the advance deprecation warnings until things break.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Security
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This change aims to be security-positive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preventing CSRF attacks against soft and juicy targets 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such as router admin
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interfaces. DNS rebinding threats were of particular 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concern during the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> design of this feature:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Debuggability
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Relevant information (client and resource IP
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address space) is already piped into the DevTools 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network panel.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Deprecation warnings and errors will be surfaced in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the DevTools issues
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> panel explaining the problem when it arises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ? Yes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial instructions
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Flag name
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome? False
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Estimated milestones
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on desktop 98
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on android 98
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prototype:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platform Status <https://www.chromestatus.com/>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> --
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